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ARTICLE
GUIDANCE RULES MID ENFORCEMENT RULES:
A BETTER VIEW OF THE CATHEDRAL
Dale A. Nance*
Contemporary economic analysis of law is a product of the confluence of
standard microeconomic analysis with a legal tradition heavily influenced by
American Legal Realism. The effect of this merger has often been an analysis
of legal institutions from the perspective of the Holmesian "bad man," who
sees predicted legal actions as merely costs or benefits to be taken into account.
This approach might be illuminating for the purposes of an "outsider," such as
a behavioral sociologist or perhaps even a legal advisor alerting her "bad man"
client to the risks of adverse legal consequences. But it produces bizarre results
when used to understand basic legal concepts, such as the notion of property,
that in fact reflect the perspective of "insiders," that is, persons who try to shape
the law to achieve various purposes and those citizens who willingly conform
their conduct to the law's requirements. The resulting distortion is demonstrated by an analysis of one of the most important articles in the literature of
law and economics. Reexamination of that article forms the basis of an improved understanding of the relationship between economic analysis and such
legal concepts.
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INTRODUCTION

NE of the challenges of legal ~heory is to articulate a core
set of concepts, not too large m number, that can be used
to analyze the enormous variety of particular laws. Some theorists have sought to reveal the recurring patterns in legal relations while paying no particular attention to the broad institutional goals served by such patterns. For example, early in this
century, Wesley Hohfeld analyzed jural relations as falling1 into
one of eight related categories or combinations thereof. AI-

O

'Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 Yale LJ. 16 (1913). For future reference, it is convenient to
summarize his entitlement forms here. The categories are: right, duty, privilege, noright, power, immunity, disability, and liability. Id. at 30. All start with the primitive
notion that A can have a duty to B with respect to act X if A is obligated to B to do
or refrain from doing X. One can then say that B has a right (also sometimes called a
claim-right) against A with respect to X. But if B has no such right against A, then B
has a no-right against A with respect to X, and A has a privilege as against B with
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though some have criticized his work as mere formalism, there
can be little doubt that Hohfeld's analysis of entitlement forms
provides considerable insight for those who are willing to take
the time to study it careful1y. 2
On the ·other hand, some theorists, while laboring over more
macroscopic issues concerning the nature and functions of law
in general, have also done much to advance our understanding
of the relationship between such big questions and more mundane analytical questions. For example, starting with the notion
that law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the
governance of rules, Lon Fuller dedicated much of his career to
the elaboration of principles to answer questions like "What
kinds of conduct are suitable to be governed by rules?" and
"What kinds of rules are most appropriate in each of the various
domains of sociallife?" 3 Answers to such questions inevitably involve exploration of the ways that various kinds of rules function.
With the increasing importance of economics in the analysis
of legal rules, one article has emerged in recent decades as perhaps the most influential piece of scholarship relating the macroscopic to the microscopic. In 1972, building on the work of
other pioneers in the field, Guido Calabresi and Douglas
Melamed identified a particular typology of legal rules-distinguishing among property, liability, and inalienability rules-and
analyzed those rule types with respect to efficiency goals, distributional goals, and "other justice considerations." 4 Their framerespect to X. ld. at 30-33. If C has the authority to change the existing relationship
between A and B with respect to X, such as changing B's right into a no-right, then C
has a power with respect to A, B, and X, and A and B each have a liability with
respect to C and X. ld. at 44-53. But if C has no such authority, then C has a
disability with respect to A, B, and X, and A and B each have an immunity with
respect to C and X. ld. at 55. (As a special case, C can be either A or B.) While
Hohfeld clearly and rightly believed that clarity in the use of these conceptions is
helpful in resolving practical legal problems, he made no attempt to relate his
conceptions to macro-level governmental policies. See id. at 20.
2
See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U.
Miami L. Rev. 1119 (1990) (illustrating the radical antiforrnalism inherent in Hohfeld's
analysis).
3
See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. ed. 1969); The Principles of
Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L. Fuller (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 1981 ).
• Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972) [hereinafter
C&M].
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work has since been used in countless law school classes to explain and critique substantive doctrines like the law of adverse5
possession, the law of nuisance, and the law of eminent domain,
as well as remedial doctrines governing the choice between
6
damages and injunctive relief in any substantive area. It has
also found its way into an enormous number of scholarly writings on these and many other subjects.7
The impact of their article indicates the importance of a clear
understanding of the typology that Calabresi and Melamed
("C&M") articulated. Unfortunately, a careful reexamination
of the original work reveals that it is flawed in an important and
fundamental way. Ultimately, the flaw can be attributed to the
authors' failure to appreciate a distinction long recognized in
the work of the "macro" legal theorists-the distinction between guidance rules and enforcement rules. In this Article, I
will identify this mistake, trace some of its unfortunate consequences, and suggest its cause. What results is an enriched typology that distinguishes between rules for the guidance of the
law-abiding citizen and rules for the enforcement of such guidance rules against the not-so-law-abiding. The resulting perspective complements similar work by Jules Coleman and Jody
Kraus 8 and sheds additional light on the distinctions between

5 See, e.g., Olin L. Browder et al., Basic Property Law 997-1000 (5th ed. 1989)
(eminent domain); Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property 140 n.19, 985 (3d
ed. 1993) (adverse possession); Charles M. Haar & Lance Liebman, Property and
Law 103-04 (2d ed. 1985) (nuisance); Sandra H. Johnson et al., Property Law: Cases,
Materials and Problems 763-66 (1992) (nuisance); Sheldon F. Kurtz & Herbert
Hovencamp, Cases and Materials on American Property Law 769-71 (nuisance); Grant
S. Nelson eta!., Contemporary Property 140-41 (1996) (nuisance).
'See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials
355-56 (2d ed. 1994).
7 In fact, theirs is one of the most frequently cited of all law review articles.
See
Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 Chi.-Kent. L.
Rev. 751, 767 tbU (1996) (reporting that C&M was the eleventh most frequently
cited article in the surveyed journals during the 1956-1995 period, which includes
sixteen years before the article was even published).
n Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 Yale
L.J. 1335 (1986).
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tort and crime and between distributive and corrective justice,
both matters of enduring scholarly interese
It will be evident that the argument presented here could be
developed more abstractly as constructive criticism of various
strands of modern legal theory not limited to law and economics. Indeed, the later Parts of the Article move far away from
the details of the contribution by C&M. I have nonetheless chosen to ground my discussion in a critique of their work, both because of the analytical precision that is made possible by focusing on a specific example of post-Realist theorizing and because
of the continuing importance of their contribution. 10
In Parts I and II, I reexamine the typology presented by
C&M, identify an important ambiguity in their scheme, and explain the best way to resolve that ambiguity. The key, it will be
seen, is to identify their rule types as guidance rules rather than
enforcement rules, exactly the opposite of the prevailing view.
In Part III, I relate this result to the distinction between a price
and a sanction, illustrating the untoward consequences of conflating the guidance and enforcement functions. In Part IV, I
discuss the cmitribution of Professors Coleman and Kraus and
present another possible resolution of C&M's ambiguity. In
Part V, I further demonstrate the importance of the distinction
between guidance rules and enforcement rules by illustrating
certain features of the analysis of legal norms that tend to be
masked by the usual understanding of C&M's framework.
C&M welcomed the potential results of taking a different
view. Likening the matter to Claude Monet's famous paintings
of the Rouen Cathedral, they acknowledged that their typology
was only "One View of the Cathedral." 11 In that spirit, and with
• See, e.g., Symposium, The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. Rev.
1 (1996); Symposium, Corrective Justice and Formalism: The Care One Owes One's
Neighbors, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 403 (1992).
10
Several articles, the most notable of which are discussed hereafter, have appeared
in the last couple of years continuing the debate largely initiated by Calabresi and
Melamed. The continuing influence of C&M is also evidenced by a collection of
papers presented as a twenty-fifth anniversary retrospective on that piece and its
influence at the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools on
January 5, 1997, and published as Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 Yale L.J. 2081 (1997).
11
C&M, supra note 4, at 1090 n.2.
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the undeniable benefit of much hindsight, I offer another view
of the law's domain. It is not so much a different perspective,
however, as a broader one: I offer an n+m dimensional view that
includes two interpretations of C&M's view, one n dimensional
and the other m dimensional, as special cases.
Moreover, the significance of this expanded focus is not merely
analyticaL It allows one to correct a severe distortion present in
C&M's scheme of analysis, considered as a component of legal
theory for a liberal state. That distortion arises from the peculiar blending of an interest in the incentives that affect behavior
with a skepticism about substantive legal rules. In other words,
it reflects the marriage of economic rationalism with American
Legal Realism. \Vhatever one thinks of these t\vo theoretical
orientations taken separately, their merger has produced a theory, conventional law and economics, that can hardly avoid
missing the forest for the trees because it presupposes a model
of human behavior at odds with the liberal institutions it is used
to interpret. Any comprehensive legal theory must come to
grips with the nature of man and of the law as a human institution. Going back to the basics of legal ordering and seeing
C&M's contribution in that light make possible an improved
conceptual framework of liberalism's legal entitlements.

I. A CRUCIAL AMBIGUITY
In this Part, I restate C&M's typology of rules (Section A),
identify the ambiguity of interest (Section B), and demonstrate
the unsatisfactory nature of C&M's statements relating to this
ambiguity (Section C). The discussion in the last Section also
points the way toward the solution offered in Part II.
A. The Rule Typology Revisited
Starting with the proposition that the law chooses among citizens in the allocation of entitlements, C&M identified three distinct ways in which those entitlements are protected:
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its
holder must buy it from him in a voluntary transaction in which
the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller . ...
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Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he
is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule . ...
An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is
not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller .12
The authors then exemplified these rule types in the course of
explaining some relationships among them:
It should be clear that most entitlements to most goods are
mixed. Taney's house may be protected by a property rule in
situations where Marshall wishes to purchase it, by a liability
rule where the government decides to take it by eminent domain, and by a rule of inalienability in situations where Taney
is drunk or incompetent. 13

This passage suggests, although it does not exactly say, that in
a given context, with respect to a given issue, only one of the
three rules can apply. For example, if Taney's relationship to
Marshall in regard to Marshall's interest in owning the house is
governed by a property rule, then it cannot also be governed on
the same issue by a rule of inalienability. Inalienability denies
the power of Taney and Marshall to transfer the entitlement by
agreement, yet the power to transfer seems implicit in the definition of a property rule. Of course, C&M's definition of a
property rule does not actually say that such a power to transfer
exists; it says only that if a transfer is to occur, it must be by
C&M, supra note 4, at 1092 (emphasis added). C&M did not write with the analytical precision of a Hohfeld, and one should not read this passage as intended to
provide detailed necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the concepts of
property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules. Indeed, I shall point later to
qualifications that seem to be implicit in their discussion.
13 Id. at 1093. One conspicuous ambiguity in the C&M formulation is the reference
to an "objectively" determined price under liability rules. See id. at 1092. The
objective-subjective distinction can mean many things, but in this context the authors
make clear that all that is meant by "objective" is that it is determined by a third
person, the adjudicator, rather than by agreement between the parties. Id. Their
eminent domain example illustrates this point. Whether this is a good way to use the
term "objective" is subject to doubt. I would have preferred a phrase like "publicly
imposed value" instead of "objectively determined value." But no harm is done as
long as one keeps in mind the intended distinction. C&M certainly did not mean to
suggest that "objective" (publicly imposed) valuation is inherently superior to "subjective" (privately agreed) valuation. Indeed, they emphasized that the latter often
generates more efficient outcomes. See id. at 1124-27.
12
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14

agreement.
But the authors clearly intended the power to
transfer to be an aspect or implicit corollary of a property rule. 15
Similarly, if Taney's relationship to the government with regard to its interest in owning the house for -a particular purpose
is governed by a liability rule, then it cannot also be governed
on the same issue by a property rule. For if the government
may take the house upon payment of compensation, then it is
not true that the government may only acquire it by voluntary,
negotiated transfer. Significantly, it does not matter whether
the government might obtain the entitlement by a voluntary,
negotiated purchase. That alone does not make the relationship
one governed by a property rule. 16 On the other hand, it appears that a po}ver to malce a voluntary transfer is implicit in the
concept of a liability rule, just as it is implicit in the concept of a
property rule. 17
- Finally, this power to make a voluntary transfer serves to differentiate both property and liability rules from inalienability
rules. Accordingly, an entitlement governed by an inalienability
rule cannot also be governed by a property or liability rule as
between the same persons. As far as is indicated by the quoted
definitions, a rule of inalienability might be constructed so as to
allow for an unconsented taking, or such a taking might be pro-

11
'

Actually, what it says is that someone who "wishes" to "remove" an entitlement
governed by a property rule "must buy it," id. at 1092, but of course C&M could not
really have meant that: If anyone who merely "wishes" to have property belonging to
someone else must buy it, then the law would be compeiling unwanted sales all over
the place, which is inconsistent with the authors' further specification that the sale be
a voluntary transaction. Thus, what C&M surely meant was that a property rule is in
place only if, in order to acquire the entitlement or damage its res, one must obtain
the consent of its present holder.
15
See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1345 (asserting but not arguing the point);
Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 Cornell L.- Rev. 822, 835, 844,
849-51 (1993) (assuming but not arguing the point).
16
Of course, if the government's purpose in acquiring the entitlement does not
satisfy constitutional requirements for the exercise of eminent domain so that an
involuntary taking is not allowed, then with respect to that purpose the relationship
between Taney and the government will be governed by a property rule. But that is
just to restate the truism that two persons may be related by a different type of rule
with regard to the same object when a different issue is at stake.
17
See Morris, supra note 15, at 845 (again assuming but not arguing the point).
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hibited. In this respect, an ~nalienability rule might operate more
like a liability rule or mote like a property rule. 18
Exploring issues of mutual exclusivity suggests a different issue: exhaustiveness. Clearly C&M did not mean that these three
rules are the only ones that can apply. Other configurations of
duties, privileges, powers, and immunities can be imagined,
even when limiting one's attention-as did C&M-to rules governing the transfer of entitlements. 19 Indeed, later in their article
C&M added what they themselves regarded as a previously neglected rule, although they did not characterize it as a distinct
type of rule. 20 It can be illustrated by taking the case of Taney,
whose burning of leaves on his land causes smoke and odors to
pass over to Marshall's. Putting aside inalienability, there are
actually four readily identifiable configurations of property and
liability rules.
First, if we conclude that Taney is free to do so without accounting to his neighbor, we recognize a property rule in regard
to leaf burning, as long as Taney and Marshall are free to enter
an agreement to stop the burning. 21 If, however, we conclude
that Taney may not burn the leaves unless Marshall agrees to
allow it, we again recognize a property rule, except that now the
property rule favors Marshall by supporting his interest in enjoying his land free of the smoke and odors of leaf burning. 22

"See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
19
For a thorough discussion see Morris, supra note 15.
20
See C&M, supra note 4, at 1116.
21
See id. at 1115-16.
22
See id. In the first case, Taney's Hohfeldian privilege is governed by a property
rule, while in the second case, Marshall's Hohfeldian claim-right is governed by a
property rule. See supra note 1. Since both are property rules, we might describe
this difference by saying that in the first instance Taney has the property right with
respect to leaf burning, and in the second Marshall has such a right. Notice, however,
that in each of these cases, we could look at the matter from the point of view of the
"loser," that is, we could ask about the nature of the entitlement held by the person
who does not have the property right. It might appear as if that person has nothing at
all. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of The Cathedral, 106 Yale L.J. 2175, 217879 (1997) (referring to the loser in each case as having nothing). But sometimes this
is mistaken: In the first case, for example, Marshall enjoys the rightful use of the
unpolluted air so long as Taney chooses not to pollute, at least so long as Taney has
no distinct claim-right against Marshall's enjoyment of the unpolluted air. Thus,
Marshall has something in such a case, although C&M did not recognize that fact by
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As a third possibility, if we conclude that Taney is free to
burn the leaves provided he compensates Marshall for any harm
thereby done to Marshall's interests, then we recognize a liability rule with respect to Marshall's entitlement to unpolluted air.
Indeed, along with eminent domain, such conditionally privi23
leged nuisances constitute the paradigmatic liability rules.
Finally, the fourth possible rule arises if we conclude that
Taney is free to burn the leaves so long as Marshall does not compensate Taney for the damage to Taney's interests in not being
able to burn the leaves (e.g., the cost of having the leaves removed to be disposed of elsewhere). In that case, we recognize
24
a different liability rule, one protecting Taney's leaf burning.
All of the foregoing seems to have been intended by C&M
and is now quite familiar to students of property law. And the
most important observation to be made about this scheme is
that its novelty consists entirely of the specification of liability
rules as coequal to the more familiar property and inalienability
rules. 25 Indeed, much of the interest in, and influence of, C&M's
typology arises from this fact. 26 It is significant, therefore, that a
giving a distinct name to this jural relationship. An exclusive focus on transfer
relationships obscures this asymmetry.
23 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1116 & n.55 (citing Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,
257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (polluting cement plant could continue operations upon
payment of permanent damages)).
"According to C&M, "[t]he fourth rule, really a kind of partial eminent domain
coupled with a benefits tax, can be stated as follows: Marshall may stop Taney from
poiiuting, but if he does he must compensate Taney." id. at 1116. Although in
subsequent passages they explain why the fourth rule type is not encountered in
common-law adjudication, id. at 1116-17, students of property will recognize that this
is a plausible characterization of the rule in Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev.
Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), a case, coincidentally decided the same year that
C&M published their article, in which the court ordered the defendant, an operator
of cattle feedlots, to move and the plaintiff, the developer of a neighboring retirement community, to pay for it.
25 Under an efficiency analysis, these liability rules are explained as responding to
the existence of transaction costs, holdouts, or free riders that otherwise would impede
the voluntary and Pareto efficient transfer of entitlements. See C&M, supra note 4,
at 1105-10.
26 There is an enduring controversy over the breadth of the circumstances calling for
the use of liability rules on efficiency grounds. Compare Ian Ayres & Eric Talley,
Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade,
104 Yale L.J. 1027 (1995) (arguing that liability rules can improve efficiency even in
!ow transaction costs contexts by encouraging parties' disclosure of accurate information concerning their evaluations of entitlements), with James E. Krier & Stewart
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crucial ambiguity in their typology involves the nature of liability rules.

B. The Ambiguity Identified
Consider another hypothetical regarding Taney's entitlement
in his house:
Marshall, in a hurry to make an important conference on the
subject of judicial review, drives at a greatly excessive rate of
speed, misses a turn, and crashes through the bay window of
Taney's house.
Assume that the evidence would warrant, if not require, a finding that Marshall's driving was reckless. If Taney is entitled to
compensation for the damages, how shall we describe the result
in terms of the C&M typology? The lawyer's instinct is to describe the situation as entailing a liability rule, since Marshall is
"liable" for the proximate consequences of his negligent or reckless conduct. Indeed, academics commonly reach this conclusion.27 But this description is problematic and, I will argue, ultimately mistaken, at least for C&M's conception of a liability rule.
If one returns to their definition of such rules, one finds that a
liability rule would cover this situation only if Marshall may
drive recklessly provided compensation is paid. 28 Note the perJ. Schwab, Properly Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440 (1995) (arguing that factors like high transaction costs, which
favor liability rules, are often offset by the high costs of judicial assessments of
"damages" under liability rules and the need to encourage private parties to find ways
to reduce transaction costs).
27 Consider, for example, the following attempt to restate C&M's concept of a
liability rule: "Liability Rule: My right to X (my security against being harmed by the
reckless driving of others, say) requires that others compensate me (pay me damages)
for crossing the border defined by my right to X." Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jules L.
Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence 112 (rev. ed. 1990).
See also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An
Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 715, 715 (1996) (describing liability rules as
ones by which the state "discourages violations by requiring transgressors to pay
victims for harms suffered" (emphasis added)); id. at 753 (characterizing negligence
liability of drivers as involving a liability rule when driving is negligent). Such views
are understandable considering C&M's own discussion of the accident situation. See
infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
28
Actually, C&M wrote in terms of what a Marshall "may" do if "he is willing" to
pay compensation. See supra text accompanying note 12. If this is to be sensible as
an interpretation of our practices, it must preclude the possibility that Marshall is
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missive word "may," implying social acceptance, if not outright
approval, of the taking of the entitlement. This understanding is
reinforced by the paradigm examples C&M offered: eminent
domain and those nuisances that are allowed to continue (upon
payment of compensation) because of the social good of the activities in question. 29 In the hypothetical, however, Marshall's
conduct is not socially desirable; it is not a privileged tort. Marshall is "liable," in part, because society deems his conduct wrongful, the sort of activity that ought to be discouraged. 30 The definition of a liability rule does not read:
An entitlement is protected by a liability rule whenever someone in fact destroys the initial entitlement, or is able to do so,
and is required because of such conduct to pay an objectively
determined value for it.

Thus the fact that Marshall can act so as to iwpose this loss on
Taney subject only to a damage award· does not mean that the
scenario instantiates a liability rule. 31
willing but unable to pay. The state would not, for example, ordinarily be permitted
to take private property without the constitutionally mandated compensation on the
excuse that it has no money with which to pay it. See 3 Julius L. Sackman & Russel
D. Van Brunt, Nichols' The Law of Eminent Domain§§ 8.9-.10 (rev. 3d ed. 1994). So
C&M's reference to the actor's willingness to pay was probably intended to indicate
either the existence of a legal duty to compensate or actual compensation. Which of
these is the right way to understand "willingness" depends upon the resolution of the
ambiguity addressed in the text.
"See C&M, supra note 4, at 1093, 1105, 1106-07, 1119-20. By "paradigm example"
I mean an example that is so conspicuously employed to iiiustrate the concept that
one may properly look to the example to help resolve ambiguities in the concept's
explanation or definition. Clearly, eminent domain is such an example in C&M's
article, and the conditionally privileged nuisance is at least very close to paradigmatic. Jn the following Section, I examine C&M's comparatively brief and (I argue)
non-paradigmatic treatment of accident law.
30
See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts,§ 31, at 16973, § 33, at 193-208 (5th ed. 1984). To be sure, negligence liability is also based on
compensating the injured party. Whether these two ideas can be separated is one of
the most fundamental theoretical issues in the law of torts, but its resolution does not
affect the present point. Compare, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law
56-83 (1995) (developing an Aristotelian account of the "intrinsic unity" of the plaintiff-defendant relationship) with Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 386-406 (1992)
(arguing that such separation can legitimately be maintained despite the plaintiffdefendant linkage inherent in our usual notion of corrective justice).
31 Of course, it is true that after the fact we "accept" the injury, in the sense that the
law is unable to undo the accident. But that does not mean that we accept, let alone
condone, all the actions that brought the injury about. The same point likely is true
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Perhaps then Taney's entitlement is protected in this context
by a property rule. After all, we do allow people to agree to accept the consequences of reckless behavior, as in race car driving. Taney could have sold his permission to Marshall, thereby
waiving any right to compensation. It is not, therefore, incoherent to say that Marshall should not have driven recklessly without Taney's consent. Of course, obtaining such permission
would be practically infeasible, since probably neither Marshall
nor Taney would have known in advance with whom to deal,
even if they had the time to negotiate. But that is not the point
here. The question is not whether transaction costs of negotiation are so high that as a practical matter the entitlement cannot
be alienated in this context;32 rather, it is simply whether it is
correct under C&M's definitions to say that Taney's interest is
protected by a (practically inalienable) property rule, as opposed to a liability rule.
Indeed, the only difficulty with characterizing the matter as
involving a property rule is an ambiguous word in C&M's definition: Property rules are said to be in place when the acquiring
party (Marshall) "must" buy the entitlement in a voluntary
transaction. 33 In our example, Marshall in fact has, in one sense,
taken Taney's entitlement (to be free of reckless damage to his
house) without first negotiating a deal with Taney. Consequently, one would infer that the situation does not exemplify a
property rule if the word "must" in the definition signifies an
empirical proposition about what can be done by the Marshalls
of the world rather than an imperative or prescription that only
consensual transfers should occur.

of some, but not all, nuisance cases in which an injunction is denied in favor of
damages for fear of causing substantial waste or harm. Thus in a case like Boomer,
see supra note 23, prospective, injunctive relief might be denied only because the
polluting company has made a significant investment that cannot be reversed without
serious costs; if the issue were to arise before such investment occurs, an injunction
might issue if the anticipated pollution is considered wrongful. See Daniel
Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1, 15-18 (1989) (so
interpreting Boomer).
32
Cf. C&M, supra note 4, at 1100-01 (discussing the assignment of entitlements to
"merit goods" and noting that high transaction costs can make such goods practically
inalienable).
33
Id. at 1092.
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Notice that the interpretive assumption one would use to exclude Taney's entitlement from the property rule category is the
same one that serves to include the entitlement in the liability
rule category. If we take the rule types as referring to what persons are empirically capable of doing-what the law does or does
not prevent them from doing-then we get the result that Taney
is protected by a liability rule and not a property rule. However,
if we take these rule types as referring to what the law prescribes-what the law directs that it is proper or improper to dothen we get the result that Taney is protected by a property rule
and not a liability rule. 34 How shall we resolve this ambiguity?
C. Wrestling with the Ambiguity

Of course, in one sense C&M were free to stipulate whatever
definitions they wanted. I'·Tonetheless, their choices may be criticized if, for example, they cause confusion or are internally inconsistent. Moreover, in the absence of any clear indication as
to whether a prescriptive or descriptive definition was intended,
we are faced with an interpretive question: Which definition
makes more sense of what is otherwise presented in their paper?
And even if one can determine what was intended, at least in
particular passages taken by themselves, the ambiguity allows us
to ask the interpretive question, especially because C&M's subject is the explanation of social practices. 35 Thus, although C&M's
concrete intentions are relevant to the discussion, our ultimate
concern is with the question of how to make C&M's scheme
most coherent and enlightening as an account of legal practices.
We may start by noting the way in which C&M characterized
all of their rule types: They referred to them as ways of "protecting" entitlements. 36 And "protection" might be thought to be
coincident with enforcement. That is, an entitlement is not "protected" except to the extent it is enforced, and C&M's rule types

34

Another logical possibility is that C&M's rule types refer to what the law is

prepared to enforce, whether or not that enforcement is actually successful as to any

particular person. This possibility is discussed infra Section IV .B.
35 See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 53-65 (1986) (discussing the role of author's
intention in interpretation).
36

See C&M, supra note 4, at 1089, 1105, 1106.
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are thus seen as marking different ways that society enforces entitlements. Indeed, this is today the generally accepted view of
the matter. Although variations and ambiguities are legion, it is
fair to say that the prevailing account identifies C&M's rule
types with particular, assumedly effective remedies: Liability
rules are identified with the actual payment of compensation if
an unconsented taking occurs, and property rules are identified
with the effective prevention of unconsented taking, usually by
an injunction, which forces parties to negotiate any transfer of
the entitlement. 37
There is no logical difficulty, however, in distinguishing between a rule that is designed to protect an entitlement and one
that succeeds in doing so. This raises the possibility of identifying the rule types with remedies that are not necessarily effective.38 Furthermore, it is not at all clear that C&M were really
considering the specification of various rule types designed to
protect otherwise well-defined entitlements. It is also plausible,
despite C&M's characterization, to think of these rule types as
different ways a general sense of entitlement can be given concrete form. This is the position taken by a small minority of
scholars.39
37
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Unifying Remedies: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Startling Rules, 106 Yale L.J. 2149, 2150-51 (1997) (identifying liability rules with tort
damages and property rules with injunctions); Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. Legal Stud. 13, 19 (1985)
("[T]he property rule/liability rule distinction goes only to the question of remedies
to protect substantive rights."). The matter is often presented to students in this way.
See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 102-08 (1988); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 5, at 140 n.19, 985; Kurtz & Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at
769-71; A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 15-16 (2d ed.
1989). Although the effectiveness of the remedies is usually only implicit in the.
discussions, its definitional significance is sometimes made quite explicit. See infra
notes 175-177 and accompanying text.
38
This possibility is taken up in Section IV.B, infra, but for now it is worth noting
that if one allows for a gap between remedies and behavior, one complicates the
drawing of efficiency implications from the type of rule employed.
39
See Coleman and Kraus, supra note 8, at 1340-47; see also Morris, supra note 15,
at 842-44, criticizing C&M's use of the "protection" terminology and concluding that:
rules-such as property, liability, and inalienability rules-that determine entitlement forms are best thought of as the rules constituting or defining the
structure of particular entitlements rather than as rules providing for the protection of pre-existing "general" entitlements. Calabresi and Melamed's three
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We can obtain some help here by looking more closely at the
passages that implicitly define the various rule types. Consider
in oarticular a more comolete version of the passage relating to
in~lienability rules:
~
~
An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is
not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The
state intervenes not only to determine who is initially entitled ... , but also to forbid its sale under some or all circumstances.40

The italicized words indicate a prescriptive focus. They certainly do not require that the prohibition be effective. If they
did, a prohibition of prostitution would involve an inalienability
rule only in those cases where the act of prostitution is deterred;
in cases where the prohibited sale takes place we would be
• a property ru1e 1s
• exempnnea.
••
41
]' T
wrced• to say t11at
"-~ otmng m
their article suggests that C&M would really want to say that a
rule forbidding prostitution is sometimes an inalienability rule
and sometimes a property rule, depending upon whether a sale
is in fact deterred. And if they would, what would they then say
about a situation in which the nrohibited sale occurs but the par•
ties are caught and prosecuted~? 42
The same point applies to ordinary items of personal property. C&M assert that "much of what is generally called private
property can be viewed as an entitlement which is protected by
~

r•

'

i

•

•

rules thus constitute three forms of entitlement, rather than one general kind of
entitlement protected in three different ways.
ld. at 844 (footnote omitted).
40 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1092-93 (emphasis added).
The significance of the
omitted material indicated by ellipses is taken up in Section II.B, infra.
•11 Because bans on prostitution prohibit only compensated exchanges of sex, they
generate only a partial inalienability rule, one that applies when the price between
willing buyer and willing seller is relatively explicit and non-zero. It is sometimes
useful, therefore, to distinguish between compensated and uncompensated transfers
and between the inalienability rules that may govern each. See Morris, supra note 15,
at 837-38. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. 1849 (1987).
42 A thoroughly descriptive approach would presumably speak in terms of statistical
regularities, and the fact that a given act is generally deterred might be enough to
speak of the existence of an effective rule. However, C&M's treatment does not
otherwise take such a disengaged anthropological stance, and there is no evidence
whatsoever of statistical generalization in their arguments.
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a property rule." 43 But is this true if we go with the descriptive
form of the definitions? Recall the word "must" in C&M's definition of property rules. 44 Clearly there are rules against theft,
and equally clearly most people honor such rules most of the
time. But is it true that they "must" honor those rules, in the
sense that they realistically have no option but to do so? In this
same passage, C&M go on to write, "No one can take the entitlement to private property from the holder unless the holder
sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjectively values
the property." 45 Yet, if we take the word "can" literally, rather
than as an inartful way of saying "is allowed to," the proposition
becomes rather ludicrous. 46 In fact, if we take the empirical
question seriously, it will be true in a considerable variety of
contexts that the individual who in most lawyers' and lay persons' ordinary reckoning "owns" an item of personalty does not
even have the protection of a liability rule, since another person
could take the thing, avoid detection, and not even have to pay
compensation. Presumably this is not what C&M meant to follow from their definitions. Certainly, it is not what they should
have meant to follow if, as the assertion quoted above confirms,
they wanted their definitions to resemble even loosely our more
ordinary conceptions.
These considerations suggest that property, liability, and inalienability rules should be considered prescriptions concerning
what people should do, not descriptions of what they can or
must do. Consider, however, what CRrM have to say about cases
like that of the recklessly driving Marshall:
The example of eminent domain is simply one of numerous instances in which society uses liability rules. Accidents is another. If we were to give victims a property entitlement not to
be accidentally injured we would have to require all who en-

C&M, supra note 4, at 1105.
Id. at 1092.
45
ld. at 1105 (emphasis added).
46
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 453, 458-64 & tbl.l (1997) (arguing that the threat of criminal punishment is a
weak deterrent in view of the small probability that perpetrators of even serious
crimes will be successfully prosecuted and presenting in particular data indicating a
one percent chance of such for larceny or motor vehicle theft).
43
44
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gage in activities that may injure individuals to negotiate with
them before an accident, and to buy the right to knock off an
arm or a leg. Such pre-accident negotiations would be extremely
expensive, often prohibitively so. To require them would thus
47
preclude many activities that might, in fact, be worth having.

In this curious passage C&M make an empirical claim, namely
that society in fact uses liability rules in regard to the allocation
of accident costs. 48 Now the general ru,le, in this society at least,
is that the accident costs of someone unintentionally injured by
the act of another are to be shifted to the other if, but only if,49
the other was negligent, a compensation premised on fault.
How does this relate to the scheme of definitions offered by
C&M? In particular, does it illustrate the employment of a liability rule as they claim?
H we assume that their rule types are attuned to the law's prescriptions, then for non-faulty accidents the actor has a property
right in the activity, whereas for faulty accidents the victim has a
property right against injury. 50 The law's prescription is that
Marshall should not act recklessly, at least not without his potential victim's consent, and if he does so then he should pay for
the consequences. The latter part of this rule is a rule of compensation, to be sure, but it is not a liability rule as defined. The
law does not say that it is good, or even acceptable, for Marshall
51
to drive recklessly provided he pays for the consequences.
On the other hand, if we assume that their rule types are descriptive, referring to what Marshall can do rather than what he
is supposed to do, then it might seem that Taney has only liabil"C&M, supra note 4, at 1108-09 (footnotes omitted).
" Of course, the fact that this claim is empirical does not necessarily mean that the
rule types at issue are descriptive in the sense we have been discussing. C&M could
be making an empirical claim about society's use of prescriptively understood rules.
49 See Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 29, at 162-64 (describing the unavoidable accident doctrine). For simplicity, this assumes away affirmative defenses as well as issues
of causal proximity. One subtle qualification is discussed infra at notes 221-223 and
accompanying text.
50 See supra note 22.
51 Once again, one might reply that to say that we will do nothing to stop reckless
driving other than require compensation, if that were the case, is to "accept" reckless
driving. But that is true only in the limited sense that we would accept the fact that
the iaw should do nothing more in terms of coercive responses to reckless driving.
See supra note 31; infra Section IV.B.
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ity rule protection of his house. And this would suggest, given
the empirical claim made by C&M, that they really had the descriptive notion of rules in mind. But what then shall we say, for
example, about a Marshall who is judgment proof? Since no
compensation can be collected from him, Taney does not have
even liability rule protection. Once again, surely C&M did not
mean, and should not have meant, for their definitions to depend upon such fortuities.
What then are we to make of the efficiency argument that underlies C&M's discussion of accident costs? If one takes the
prescriptive interpretation of the rule types, as the foregoing analysis suggests one should, then accident law is governed in the
general case by property rules. Are C&M correct that this would
be inefficient because the transaction costs of bargaining will
"preclude many activities that might, in fact, be worth having"? 52
To answer that question, one must be more precise than
C&M were about the identification of the activity that is supposed to be "worth having." For example, the driving of automobiles is certainly an activity worth having, but how would this
be precluded by a property rule that "protects" )'aney's entitlement to be free of injury caused by negligent driving? If C&M
were contemplating an activity, say driving simpliciter, that simply poses the risk that someone will drive negligently, then it
may well be important on efficiency grounds not to have a
property entitlement in Taney to be free of such an activity. In
fact, the Taneys of our society do not have such property entitlements. But they do have property entitlements against negligent driving, with no impairment of efficiency along the lines
adduced by C&M. 53
Thus, to the extent it is valid at all, C&M's efficiency argument works only against certain configurations of property entitlements, and it does not work against the particular property

See C&M, supra note 4, at 1109.
Of course, there may be other reasons that fault-based liability is inefficient, at
least in a particular context. For example, the administrative costs associated with
determining fault may be higher than those associated with some no-fault systems.
See generally Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis (1970) (undertaking a general critique of the fault system); Steven Shavell,
Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987) (same).
52

53
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rules that our society in fact recognl7:es with regard to accidents.
Liability rules, in the prescriptive sense, are certainly used in our
law, but they are not nearly so common as C&M seem to suggest.55 Only by conflating the lawyer's ordinary sense of liability
with C&M's technical sense of (prescriptive) liability rules does
one get the false impression that liability rules, in the latter
technical sense, are so widespread. 56
54 Indeed, there is a substantial literature illustrating the efficiency of a fault-based
system of accident compensation, as well as the limits thereof. See, e.g., John Prather
Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 323 (1973);
Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972); Steven
Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980).
55 There may be cases of excused speeding, for example in the case of an
ambulance, but in such cases it vmuld be odd to say that the driving was faulty at all.
Rarely applied e"amples of liability rules, on the prescriptive understanding, are the
rules prescribing compensation for damages occurring during privileged intentional
invasions of property interests and the rules requiring compensation for damages
accidentally caused by important but ultrahazardous activities. See Keeton et al.,
supra note 30, § 16, at 108-09, § 78, at 545-59.
50 Indeed, it would have been less confusing had C&M used a different terminology
for what they called liability rules. Cf. Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 443 (commenting that rules allowing forced sales are not ver; aptly called "liability rules").
More descriptive, though less convenient, would have been a term like "compensated
taking" rules. Cf. Morris, supra note 15, at 847, 876-80 (retaining the term "liability"
rule and contrasting it with an "uncompensated taking" rule); Rose, supra note 22, at
2178-79 (characterizing a liability rule as involving a "property right subject to an
option"). In earlier work, Calabresi had referred to both the nuisance and negligence
rules of liability as "liability rules" without characterizing the latter notion except by
tacit reference to the lawyer's conventiona] meaning of ]jability. See, e.g., Guido
Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment,
11 J. Law & Econ. 67 (1968). To be sure, part of the blame for this particular
confusion must be placed on Hohfeld, who used the notion of "liability" in the
similarly technical sense of being subject to a power. See supra note 1. There is,
however, no evidence that C&M relied on Hohfeld in formulating their conception of
liability rules. Moreover, Hohfeld's conception of a liability is quite different in other
respects. In particular, the requirement of payment is irrelevant to whether or not
something is a Hohfeldian liability, as illustrated by the donative creation and
uncompensated exercise of a power of appointment. Applying Hohfeld's framework
to the reckless driving case, if Marshall drives recklessly into Taney's house and is
required to pay for the resulting damage, Marshall's ability to impose this change
does not entail an Hohfeldian liability in Taney with respect to the house, since
Taney's legal rights in the house are not changed thereby. (The physical attributes
and the value of the house are changed, but these are distinct matters.) Rather, that
ability (arguably) entails a Hohfeldian power in Marshall to create a new claim-right
in Taney with respect to a different thing, Marshall's assets. This assumes that a
Hohfeldian power can be exercised by an act that oniy risks an unintended change in
legal relations. In this nonparadigmatic Hohfeldian sense, Taney's property in the
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Evidently C&M were confused on this point. Their various
arguments and characterizations lead in conflicting directions,
although the confusion generally goes completely unnoticed. 57
This may be attributable to a desire to illustrate liability rules as
more commonly employed than people were inclined to admit,
at least at the time their article was published. Thus, the idea
that a nuisance would be allowed to continue for the sake of
some overriding public good sounds like a form of eminent domain exercised by a private party, a practice fraught with difficulties.58 C&M were careful to point out such uses of what are
liability rules, even on the prescriptive understanding of their
rule typology. 59 Nonetheless, when one moves to the problem of
"accidents," such an understanding of their definitions entails

house is "protected" by a liability rule, and this is true even though the law neither
authorizes nor approves of Marshall's exposing Taney to the risk of recklessly inflicted damage without Taney's prior consent. See Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 52-53 (indicating that a holder of a legal power may be under a legal duty not to exercise that
power, but not indicating whether the exercise of a power in violation of such a duty
is necessarily a nullity).
57 For example, one commentator cites C&M in support of the proposition that "we
could conceptualize strict liability as an entitlement protected only by a liability rule
(damages) and negligence as an entitlement potentially protected by a property rule
(an injunction)." Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for RiskCreation: A Comment, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 113, 135 (1990). As I argue, this is certainly
the right way to categorize the negligence regime (aside from the apparent identification of property rules with injunctive relief), but it is decidedly not how C&M
categorized it. Undoubtedly, C&M's categorization reflects the fact that negligence can
almost never be so anticipated as to make injunctive relief practicable. But we have
seen that this fact is not determinative. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
58 See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1970) (Jasen, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that permitting a nuisance to continue upon payment of permanent damages amounts to illegitimate private exercise of eminent domain);
Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805, 816-17 (W.Va. 1969) (Caplan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that permitting innocent improver to take land of neighbor upon payment of
permanent damages amounts to same). The claim of a private taking in such cases is
less convincing when the putative taker makes the investment that is being protected
without knowledge that his actions violate the property rights of another. In such
cases, the moral power of the argument against compensated private takings suffers
from the weakness, or even absence, of perverse incentives. Nonetheless, such dissents express legitimate concern about even unintentional but negligent invasions of
property interests.
59
See C&M, supra note 4, at 1105-06.
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the conclusion, contrary to C&M, that liability rules are rather
unusual. 60

II. THE AMBIGUITY RESOLVED
A. Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules
A reader deeply imbued \vith the spirit of American Legal
Realism and the pragmatic instrumentalism that has been its
legacy will undoubtedly be impatient with this discussion. She
will argue as follows. What is the point of this quibble over
terminology, over "may" instead of "can"? What, after all, is
the difference between the following laws:
Law #1: Do not act negligently. H you do act negligently, you
must pay for consequent injuries.
Law #2: You are permitted to act negligently, provided you pay
for any consequent injuries.

Under each law, she win argue, one is required to pay if (and
6
only if) one negligently causes injury. ' Of course, if some other
legal consequence, besides compensating victims, is attached to
negligence in the context of Law #1 but not in the context of
Law #2, then there would be an obvious difference between the

60 One of the interesting puzzles in this regard concerns strict liability for defective
products. Assuming that defectiveness can be meaningfully distinguished from the
results of a negligence analysis, then such rules may indeed satisfy the prescriptive
definition of a liability rule. The familiar implication is that manufacturers are not
acting improperly by (non-negligently) producing defective products, since the rule is
simply one compelling that a contract of insurance be sold with the product in
question, with whatever market-induced deterrence of defects that results therefrom.
See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud.
645 (1985); Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Comments on Epstein, 14 J. Legal Stud. 671 (1985);
Michael J. Trebilcock, Comment on Epstein, 14 J. Legal Stud. 675 (1985); Ernest J.
Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 681 (1985).
However, the assumption that defectiveness is meaningfully distinguishable from
negligence is certainly subject to challenge, especially in the context of design defects.
See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Van d. L. Rev. 593 (1980). See also
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §§ 1, 2 (Proposed Final Draft 1997)
(effectively precluding non-fault-based liability for defects in design or failure to warn).
61 The "only if' necessity clause does not, of course, follow analytically from the statemeni of the rules, but from the unstated premise that no other rule requires payment
if one is non-negligent or if one's negligence does not proximately cause harm.
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way these rules operate. 62 Conversely, if social practice has
evolved so as to undermine the prohibition formally expressed
in a provision like Law #1, then the applicable real rule under
such a nominal law may well be equivalent to Law #2. But let us
put these possibilities aside and limit our attention to the quoted
laws. 63 Even as stated are they not, practically speaking, inevitably the same rule? If so, what is the point of categorizing
them differently?
To answer these questions, one must recognize a fact long
familiar to legal philosophers, going back at least to Aquinas,
and before him to Aristotle. Rules of law are aimed at two
theoretically distinguishable types of citizen, each of which can
and generally does exist in varying degrees in real people.
Sometimes a rule is directed at the citizen who is law-abiding,
who turns to the law for guidance as to his responsibilities and
who would not knowingly disobey the law. On the other hand,
sometimes a rule is directed at the disobedient citizen, the recalcitrant who looks to the law only in order to discern what material consequences will attend his breach of the law's requirements.64 As H.L.A. Hart reminded us a good ten years before
C&M published their article:

"For example, criminal punishment is often prescribed for reckless behavior in
some contexts, including automobile driving. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W.
Scott, Jr., Criminal Law§ 3.7 (2d ed. 1986).
63 One might also question whether Law #2 makes any sense on its face.
After all,
why would the state permit someone to act in a way that is negligent, which is to say
unreasonable? There are many possible answers to that question. For example, if
unreasonableness is determined by a community standard, then the Jaw might express
a decision to override that community standard, authorize the conduct, and insulate
the negligent actor from any more serious consequences, legal or otherwise, that
might result from a determination that the actor has violated that standard. This
determination could arise because lawmakers are convinced that the prevailing
community standard of care is too stringent. This may be bad policy, as reflected in
the fact that our Jaw of negligence looks more like Law #1 than Law #2, but Law #2 is
certainly not incoherent.
·
"For a quick summary with citations to both Aristotle and Aquinas, see John
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 28-29 (1980) (distinguishing between Jaw as
needed to solve "the co-ordination problems of communal life" and law as needed
"to force selfish people to act reasonably"). Kant emphasized that sometimes the
state must resolve good faith disagreements among Jaw-abiding individuals over
matters of principle. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals *312 (1797).
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At any given moment the life of any society which lives by
rules, legal or not, is likely to consist i11 a tension between. those
who, on the one hand, accept and voluntarily co-operate in
maintaining the rules, and so see their own and other persons'
behaviour in terms of the rules, and those who, on the other
hand, reject the rules and attend to them only from the external
point of view as a sign of possible punishment. One of the difficulties facing any legal-theory anxious to do justice to the
complexity of the facts is to remember the presence of both
these Roints of view and not to define one of them out of existence.b5

Nor is this just the armchair idealism of philosophers. Empirical
work supports the proposition that, in general, people obey the
law at least as much out of a sense of the legitimacy of legal
authority and the fairness of the laws that it generates as out of
a fear of punishment.""
Vi/ith this in mind, it is easy to answer the question posed by
our legal realist. The two laws quoted above are the same from
the perspective of the recalcitrant, since the information about
potential legal consequences is the same. 67 Yet they are profoundly different for the la\v-abiding citizen. True, such a citizen might still ask for further guidance on the question of what
constitutes "negligence" in driving, but given an answer to that
question, or even given an instruction simply to use the citizen's
' 5 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 88 (1961).
Lon Fuller illustrated the significance of this distinction most effectively in his famous allegory of King Rex, whose
subjects were steadfastly Joyal and willing to comply with the law but nonetheless
found it impossible to regulate their conduct according to the Jaw because of the
serious mistakes that Rex made in attempting to develop, express, and apply rules.
See Fuller, supra note 3, at 33-94. Fuller's arguments demonstrate the importance of
various considerations, such as the norm that rules should not be contradictory, see
id. at 65-70, that tend to be overlooked when one focuses only on Jaw as a means of
controlling society's miscreants.
"''See generally Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990) (presenting an
empirical study of people's attitudes toward compliance with the Jaw). For a quick
and more recent summary of the empirical literature see Robinson & Darley, supra
note 46, at 468-71.
' 7 Of course, the recalcitrant might view the two Jaws as carrying different consequences in terms of nonlegal reactions by other citizens to the recalcitrant's conduct.
Notice, however, that such a consideration by the recalcitrant presupposes that the
two laws carry different social messages for at least some other citizens--citizens who,
therefore, must not themselves be recalcitrant.
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own best judgment about the matter, this citizen stands in a very
different relationship to the first law than he does to the second. 68
Thus, one can distinguish between guidance rules, rules designed for law-abiding citizens, and enforcement rules, rules designed to deal with recalcitrants. 69 To avoid confusion, it should
be added that a given rule can be directed at both audiences and
so function as both a guidance rule and an enforcement rule.
For example, the first sentence in Law #1 is primarily a guidance
rule, while the second states only an enforcement rule. Law #2,
however, principally states a guidance rule, although an enforcement rule would probably be implied in the event that an
actor refused to compensate someone injured by his negligence.
In any event, the important point here is to recognize that Law
#2 is not simply a function-merged restatement of Law #1, because the guidance aspect of Law #2 is not the same as the guidance aspect of Law #1. 70
Legal realists have difficulty seeing this difference because
they tend to operate under the famous "bad man" postulate articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes a century ago:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at

it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good

68
See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights and Compensation, 14 Nofis 3 (1980) (distinguishing between cases in which A justifiably invades B's rights and cases in which A
impermissibly invades B's rights, in each case A owing B compensation for the invasion). Of course, negligence is a notoriously tricky concept. For recent work laying
out theories not based on efficiency, see Richard W. Wright, The Standards of Care
in Negligence Law, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (David G. Owen ed.,
1995) (articulating a Kantian-Aristotelian theory); Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 311 (1996) (articulating a social contractarian theory).
"I do not mean to suggest that enforcement rules have no effect of inducing a
greater degree of law-abiding behavior. In other words, enforcement at time h can
have the effect of increasing the percentage of the population for whom enforcement
is unnecessary at a later time h. I discuss aspects of this dynamic feature of the legal
system in Section V.B, infra.
70
This is not, of course, an unexplored phenomenon. For example, Hans Kelsen
has been criticized for his view that a law is nothing but a direction to officials to
apply a sanction under specified conditions, for such a conception ignores the role of
rules in speaking to the people whose conduct is ultimately of importance. See Hart,
supra note 65, at 35-41.
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one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law
or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience ....
. . . The prophecies of what the court will do in 71fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.

During this century, this point of view has exercised tremendous
72
influence over many legal scholars and practitioners.
It has
also been subjected to withering criticism in the general jurisprudential literature, most of which underscores the fact that
under a Holmesian conception of law it is impossible even to
make sense of the idea that someone might violate the law.
Holmes' theory strips the law of its normativity, without which
"duty" and "violation" become meaningless. All that 73remains is
"choice" and the non-normative factors that affect it. Indeed,
this provides a convincing explanation for why the Holmesian
view \Vas incorporated wholesale into the economic analysis of
law. It remains there today, largely untouched by critical com71 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459-461
(1897). There are, of course, many other interesting themes in Holmes's famous
article that are only tangentially relevant to the present discussion, such as the
rejection of formalism and antiquarianism in law and the importance of scientific
policy analysis. See id. at 464-78. For comments on these themes, see Symposium,
The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 989 (1997).
71 Its influence on the legal realists is obvious.
See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, The
Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 8-10, 12-15 (3d ed. 1960) (articulating and
maintaining essentially the same view while recognizing at least some of its limitations). But it has gone beyond this to become an integral part of the dominant
instrumentalism of American legal thought. See Robert Samuel Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory 36-37, 116-18 (1982) (differentiating legal
realism from the broader category of pragmatic instrumentalism, but maintaining that
Holmesian predictivism is typical of both); William H. Wilcox, Taking a Good Look
at the Bad Man's Point of View, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1058, 1058 (1981) (opining that
this viewpoint "has survived as the accepted legal theory within the American legal
profession for much of this century").
73 See generally Summers, supra note 72, at 101-35 (summarizing and expanding
upon the criticisms of "state power predictivism" as a theory of law). This effect was
fully intended by Holmes. To be sure, he did not deny normativity itself; he denied
only that law has this feature. Thus, for him decisionmaking could involve considerations of moral duty as well as prudence, but the law entered into the matter only
as affecting the latter by way of material costs and benefits. See Holmes, supra note
71, at 459-64 (arguing that such a framework is the consequence of the need to
distinguish between law and morality). Thus, Holmes' framework does not admit of
even the possibility that a directive by government, however legitimate, can impose a
moral obligation. He thus in1plicitly denies the basis of much governmental activity.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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mentary, either in the form of the discredited theory of what the
law "really" is or as an empirical proposition about how people
in fact relate to the law. In fact, the connection between these
two variants of the Holmesian viewpoint can be seen in C&M's
seminal discussion.
The bad man view, considered as an empirical proposition, is
quite evident in C&M's introduction to their rule typology. They
begin their paper with assertions like the following:
Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of
two or more people, or two or more groups of people, it must
decide which side to favor. Absent such a decision, access to
goods, services, and life itself will be decided on the basis of
"might makes right"- whoever is stronger or shrewder will
win. Hence the fundamental thing that law does is to decide
which of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail.74

This is a strikingly pessimistic view of human nature, more so
than even Hobbes would endorse. 75 It ignores the existence of
private institutions that serve to settle disputes as well as the
willingness of individuals or groups to find alternative methods
by which to reach fair resolutions that will allow them to continue to live together in society. 76
But more important for our purposes than the response of
citizens to a vacuum of state authority is the response of citizens
to the exercise of such authority. C&M continue:
Having made its initial choice, society must enforce that
choice. Simply setting the entitlement does not avoid the problem of "might makes right"; a minimum of state intervention is
C&M, supra note 4, at 1090 (footnote omitted).
Hobbes' arguments for a strong sovereign assume only that some people would
treat others in such short-sightedly instrumentalist ways. See Gregory S. Kavka,
Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory 96-102 (1986).
76
There have since been many developments in the understanding of social
ordering without the state, or in the minimally significant shadow of the state, or even
in competition with the state. Some are particularized studies of social practices.
See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes
(1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992). Others are
exercises in grand-scale social and historical theory. See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, Law
and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983); 1 F.A.
Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order (1973).
74

75
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always necessary. Our conventional notions make this easy to
comprehend with respect to private property. If Taney owns a
cabbage patch and Marshall, who is bigger, wants a cabbage, he
will get it unless the state intervenes.77

So the citizenry is assumed to be not only incapable of decent
social life in the absence of exercised state authority but also
nnnr1111ng
U
~YV..l.l.l.J..!

fA
LV

a"~o-nt
'-"'-'"-'}'L

"'U"h
.-.ntbr-.n"ty
o•von
\..o
QUL
.!V.! L
\...<
VJ._ nrhPn
VV.l.l\,...l.J.

0

~

PVPTI"'l~Pil
PYI"'Ppt
V.H.-.J.-..u.J_......,.,
,._....,,._._. .,.

to the extent it is backed by further state intervention, presumably involving the threatened or actual use of force.
With such views, false though they be/8 it is easy to see why
C&M slipped into a vocabulary that conflates the idea of rule
types based on prescriptions of what people are supposed to do
or refrain from doing and the idea of rule types based on descriptions of what people are in fact compelled to do or not do.
Their treatment of accident law is illustrative. Indeed, once one
assumes, or believes, that the law has no behavioral impact beyond the effect of the Raw's coercive force, the Holmesian view
becomes inevitable. Like Holmes, one then perceives no difference between meaningfullegal authority and the risks, positive
or negative, of exposure to the state's coercive power. The empirical version of the Holmesian attitude thus comes back to his
discredited jurisprudence. 79
C&M, supra note 4, at 1090-91 (footnote omitted).
'"For a powerful critique of the bad man idea as a behavioral assumption in law
and economics, see Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The
Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1309 (1986) (marshaling argument
and empirical evidence against any such assumption as universally applicable). Even
the occasional modern defense of Holmesian bad man theory accepts the importance
of relatively law-abiding citizens. See, e.g., Wilcox, supra note 72, at 1061 (arguing
that the "good man" and the "bad man" at least share an interest in predicting the
state's material interference with their activities). While it is true that the "good
man" has such an interest in predicting the state's use of coercive power, he will
generally have no trouble in this regard because he follows the law's guidance rules.
Problems arise only if the law is perverse, as when enforcement rules punish conduct
that is ostensibly permitted under the guidance rules. If the messages are thus seriously conflicting, fidelity to law is undermined. See Fuller, supra note 3, at 65-70
(discussing the problem of contradictory laws). Conversely, well-designed legal systems
will avoid such difficulties.
"interestingly, if the jurisprudential version of Holmes were valid, one could coherently deny the empirical version, for one could believe that the law really is just the
coercive force that the government exerts and yet also believe that some or a!! of the
people (always excepting oneself, of course) are simply unaware of that fact,
77
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Moreover, this explains the tendency in the literature to identify C&M's rule types with remedial devices that are effective.
If the remedy is less than perfectly effective because an award of
damages is not paid or an injunction is not obeyed, then the
remedy does not in fact by its terms give an accurate prediction
of the state's use of its coercive powers. A court order, after all,
is just words, which might well be a very unreliable indicator of
the state's actual employment of force. A complete Holmesian
bad man will not necessarily comply with a court order to pay
damages or to refrain from a particular act. From the Holmesian point of view, the nominal remedy cannot be determinative
of conduct unless it is effective. 80
Nonetheless, the counterfactual reductionism of Holmesian
jurisprudence is not the inevitable consequence of an economic
viewpoint. One can employ a theory of rational economic decisionmaking within the framework of constraints imposed by legal duty or moral duty or both. Optimization strategies need
not be "unconstrained," nor need they be constrained only by
physical forces or the pain or unhappiness that they cause. 81 Indeed, if one looks at paradigmatic examples of conventional
economic analysis, one does not find a general assumption of
recalcitrance. Rather, what one finds is an assumption of compliance with the prescriptions of law, with special analysis of
choosing out of their ignorance to obey the meaningless directives to which the real
laws-the predicted positive or negative exercises of state power-happen to be
attached. But at some point this must be self-defeating, taken as a theory of Jaw,
because the effect of compliance with those directives by a significant number of
people is to give life to those very directives, so that they cannot be considered
meaningless at all. Of course, if we take the Holmesian view not as a theory of law,
but as a recommendation to view the law in a certain way, it is not incoherent. It is at
least intelligible to advise someone to ignore features of the law that others rightly
take to be important. Such advice may well be unethical, but it is not self-contradictory. Cf. Holmes, supra note 71, at 459 (characterizing his bad man as one "who
cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and practised by his neighbors").
80
See, e.g., C&M supra note 4, at 1106-24 (implicitly assuming effectiveness of
sanctions in discussing relative merits of property, liability, and inalienability rules).
81
See, e.g., Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia 32-34 (1974) (discussing endstate maximizing political theories and the significance of side-constraints to the
articulation of rights); id. at 171 ("The central core of the notion of a property right in
X ... is the right to determine what shall be done with X; the right to choose which of
the constrained set of options concerning X shall be realized or attempted. The
constraints are set by other principles or laws operating in the society .... " (footnote
omitted)).
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situations in which one can specify an economicaHy significant
group of recalcitrants whose behavior will affect the allocation
of goods and services. 82 In other words, the standard economic
• •
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•
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•
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analysis concerns opt1m1zmg behavwr m chOices among 1aWu11
alternatives. Once again, this is "just" an assumption, one that
can be relaxed if and when conditions indicate illegal conduct is
taking place. But it is nonetheless significant that many, if not
most, economists outside the law and economics discipline do
not use the Holmesian behavioral assumption as a working
proposition. 83 The contrary working assumption of law-abiding
84
conduct is not arbitrary, for it is made with good reason.
"'A perusal of almost any standard text on microeconomics will illustrate the point.
See, e.g., Michael Parkin, Microeconomics 125-49 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing rent control, minimum wage laws, and sales taxes, and assuming for the most part that citizens
>viii comply with these laws, while nonetheless indicating that illegal "black markets"
sometimes arise). Another text illustrates the point nicely in the course of describing
the economist's sensitivity to unintended consequences:
Bob, 16 years old, currently works after school at a grocery store. He earns
$5.50 an hour. Suppose the state legislature passes a law specifying that the
minimum dollar wage a person can be paid to do a job is $6.00 an hour. The
legisl~tors say their intention in passing the law is to help people like Bob earn
more mcome.
Will the $6.00 an hour legislation have the intended effect? Perhaps not.
The manager of the grocery store may not find it worthwhile to continue
employing Bob at $6.00 an hour. ... If the law specifies that no one will earn
less than $6.00 an hour, and the manager of the grocery store decides to fire
Bob rather than pay this amount, Bob's losing his job is an unintended effect of
the $6.00 an hour legislation.
Roger A. Arnold, Microeconomics 15 (3d ed. 1996). Notice how the assumed choice
is paying the minimum wage or not employing Bob; employing Bob illegally is not
even addressed, nor is there any discussion of the severity of the sanction for
violation of the minimum wage rule. The general assumption, in other words, is that
the parties involved will choose from among alternatives permirted by the law. See
also id. at 89 (illustrating same assumption). Of course, the possibility of relaxing the
assumption in appropriate cases is also noted. See, e.g., id. at 86 ("Buyers and sellers
may regularly get around a price ceiling by making their exchanges 'under the
table."').
83 One area of inquiry that might seem to be exceptional is game theory.
Considered as part of economics or of political science there is no doubting the influence
game theory has had on work in law and economics. However, it is important to
recognize that the very goal of game theory has been to model behavior abstracted
from the constraints of an existing normative order, often in order to explain the
emergence of such orders. In other words, there is typically no normative structure,
let alone a legal structure, toward which one can meaningfully say that the actors
adopt the Holmesian bad man's view. See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution
of Cooperation (1984); Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (1977).
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Consequently, one must consider the implications of relaxing
C&M's excessively Holmesian assumptions. It thus becomes necessary to locate their rule typology within a background that
distinguishes between guidance and enforcement rules. In that
context, the prescriptive mode expressed by words like "may"
and "must" comes to the fore. This holds true for a wide range
of possible compositions of the population. For example, if
a. = the proportion of the population that is perfectly law-abiding,

f3 = the proportion of the population that is perfectly recalcitrant, i.e., those who are Holmesian bad men, and
y = the proportion of the population that is neither perfectly
law-abiding nor perfectly recalcitrant,
then the prescriptive interpretation is practically important so
long as (a.+ y) = (1 - p) is not trivially small. In any such case, it
makes a difference whether a law is expressed as Law #1 or as
Law #2. The difference matters even for those members of the
(a. + y) portion who have less than purely altruistic reasons to
comply with the law; they may act for any mixture of reasons, as
long as the presence of an authoritative legal directive counts at
all as a reason for compliance distinct from the direct material
costs of non-compliance that may be imposed by the state. 85 In

Whether or not the analysis of purely self-regarding behavior under special
conditions, such as the repeated play of a game, can succeed in reproducing the
salient features of a normative order, such analysis is quite different from that which
applies when one shifts to the context of behavior embedded in an extant normative
order, the kind of context germane to almost all modern legal issues. The usual
microeconomic analysis reflects this difference.
84
See generally Dale A. Nance, Civility and the Burden of Proof, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub.
Pol'y 647 (1994) (arguing that there is a duty, variously reflected in both civil and
criminal law, to assume a citizen's compliance with serious social norms until evidence clearly indicates otherwise, and grounding this duty in both descriptive and
normative considerations including the economics of decisionmaking).
85
Only the a portion of the population treats legal duty as lexically superior to their
self-interest, narrowly understood; the y portion treats legal obligation in some more
complex manner as competing with (and possibly commensurate with) such selfinterest. Cf. Harrison, supra note 78, at 1328-38 (discussing lexical priorities and
other preference structures that do not reduce to self-interest narrowly conceived).
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other words, the present argument does not depend on naive
or
86
even unduly optimistic assumptions about human behavior.
How then shall we reformulate C&M's rule typology under
the modest and certainly more realistic assumption that (a + y)
is not trivially small? The strange and counterintuitive implications of a descriptive interpretation of these rule types, canvassed in the previous Part, strongly suggest that they should be
understood as types of guidance rules rather than types of enforcement rules. Certainly guidance rules must be part of the
legal structuring of entitlements, or a lacuna will result: The law87
will fail to address important concerns of law-abiding citizens.
On the other hand, enforcement rules must also be part of the
picture if the law is to deal with recalcitrants. 88 So before we
" Once again, Hobbes is illustrative. He distinguished between the "just" and "unjust
man": The former "fulfils the law because it is law and not for fear of punishment or
for the sake of reputation." Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: Its
Basis and Its Genesis 23 (Phoenix Books 1963) (1936). More precisely, Hobbes distinguished between
the attitude of the unjust man who obeys the laws of the State for fear of
punishment, i.e. without inner conviction, and the attitude of the just man, who
for fear of death [likely to result from a state of anarchy], and therefore from
inner conviction, as it were once more accomplishing in himself the founding of
the State, obeys the laws of the State. Fear of death and fear of punishment
remain as different as far-sighted consistent fear, which determines life in its
depth and its entirety, is from short-sighted momentary fear which sees only
the next step.
ld. at 25-26.
"'Nor is it sufficient to say, in defense of ignoring the distinction between guidance
and enforcement rules, that one need only concern oneself with the marginal actors
who are perfectly recalcitrant. That is true, at least approximately, as to some decisions, such as the level of penalty to be attached to violations of guidance rules. But
it is decidedly not true about the choice, for example, between Law #1 and Law #2.
That choice will affect not only the marginal actor, but all non-recalcitrants as well,
for the latter will understand Law #2 as authorizing a pure, private cost-benefit
maximization concerning the question of the degree of care to be taken; the sideconstraint form of Law #1 partially precludes such an understanding. In other words,
replacing Law #1 with Law it2 entails shifting the citizen from constrained private
optimization to unconstrained private optimization.
""In principle, even enforcement rules are prescriptive in the sense we have been
discussing. As rules, rather than empirical generalizations, they refer to what officials
and citizens should do, not to what they will do. On the other hand, at some point
prescription must converge with description, at least at a statistical level, or the system
will be both morally defective and practically ineffective. See Fuller, supra note 3, at
81-91 (discussing the congruence between official behavior and announced rule as an
important feature of the internal morality of law); Hart, supra note 65, at 100
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conclude that C&M's rule types are categories of guidance rules,
we should review what they had to say on the question of enforcement.

B. Calabresi and Melamed on the Enforcement of
Transaction Rules
As one would expect, given their Holmesian premises, C&M
were not silent on the question of enforcement. As already
mentioned, they characterized property, liability, and inalienability rules as providing different forms of "protection" for
entitlements. Our analysis has indicated, however, the ambiguity that remains despite this characterization. So we must look
further to discern C&M's views on enforcement.
The most striking feature of C&M's article, given prevailing
views, is that they did not define their rule types with reference
to specific methods of enforcing these "protection" devices. With
one exception to be noted below, legal remedies-effective or
not-were not an explicit part of their definitional statements. 89
Indeed, at later points, they wrote in contrary terms when the
exposition required them to do so. Thus, they analyzed situations in which, they concluded, property rules are appropriate,
adding that such rules should be "supported by injunctions or

(arguing that if disregard of the primary rules of a legal system is sufficiently
widespread it becomes "pointless . .. to assess the rights and duties of particular
persons by reference to the primary rules").
" Long after C&M provide their presumably definitional statements, they do comment in ways that relate the rule types to remedies. For example, they indicate
injunctive relief has something to do with property entitlements, but the exact relationship is unclear:
Yet a nuisance with sufficient public utility to avoid injunction has, in effect,
the right to take property with compensation. In such a circumstance the
entitlement to property is protected only by what we call a liability rule: an
external, objective standard of value is used to facilitate the transfer of the
entitlement from the holder to the nuisance [maker].
C&M, supra note 4, at 1105-06. The ambiguity remains: There is no indication here
whether the shift from property to liability rule protection is analytically determined
by the "sufficient public utility" (indicating a prescriptive conception of the rule
types) or by the fact that it "avoid[s) injunction" (indicating a descriptive conception). However, to speak of "facilitating the transfer" certainly signifies social
approval of the nuisance-creating activity, suggesting the dominance of the prescriptive conception.
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criminal sanctions." 90 This locution presupposes that the specification of a property rule is logically distinct from the specification of the particular means of its enforcement, at least insofar
as the enforcement is to take the form of injunction or criminal
•
91
sanctiOn.
Moreover, this passage appears at the end of a section de--~+ ....... d +..-... ,......., ro nl, C"~co nf ror~T"rrl·,.....rol
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lL aS an application of the previously developed ideas to the topic of criminal law, C&M's argument proceeds by demonstrating the importance of using the criminal sanction to enforce property rules
against what I have called recalcitrants. Specifically, they argue
that the criminal sanction is employed to prevent recalcitrants
from effectively treating property rules as if they were mere liability rules. 93 But if protecting an entitlement with a property
rule entails effective enforcement of the limitation to consensual
transfers, then by definition recalcitrants could not take or damage the eniitlement without such consent, and further sanctions
would be unnecessary. In other words, C&M's argument here
presupposes the prescriptive understanding of their rule types.
They assume the entitlement has been defined for citizens for
V.!.!l.tti.!.tC!!
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oo Id. at 1127.
"One could instead try to read the indicated passage as an inartful way of spelling
out what is entailed by the attribution of a property rule. But this will not work, since
cases will arise in which neither injunctive relief nor criminal punishment is
appropriate, yet the entitlement must surely fall within the property rule category.
for example, intentional nuisances that are not conditionally privileged upon
payment of damages are governed by a property rule, as we have seen. Yet such
nuisances might cause injury even though in a particular case the activity has ceased
before legal action is taken. If there is no risk of continuing injury, an injunction will
generally be denied. See 1 Dan B. Dobbs, Dobbs Law of Remedies § 5.7(2), at 76364 (2d ed. 1993). At the same time, any criminal prohibition of public nuisances
might fail to apply because of the private nature of the conflict or because there is
insufficient evidence of intent to satisfy criminal law standards. In such a case, the
only remedy that is called for under conventional law is one of damages for injury
already suffered. See generally id. § 5.6(2), at 755-60 (discussing elements of damage
awards). Punitive damages might or might not be available, depending on proof of
malice or other requirements, see id. § 5.12(3), at 833-34, but either way the
transaction remains governed by a property rule.
n See C&M, supra note 4, at 1124-27.
"ld. at 1126. The significance of this argument is examined more fully in Section
V.B, infra.
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whom something other than the criminal sanction (or the possibility of injunctive relief) is relevant.
The most plausible candidate for this other something is the
authoritative guidance that the rule provides: Even the perfectly
law-abiding citizen may well want to know, for example, whether
or not a given entitlement is subject to compensated, involuntary
taking. Thus, both the language and the structure of C&M's argument suggest that, despite their explicit Holmesian assumptions about the citizenry, such a specification of rules for the
law-abiding citizen is meaningful and important.
But what about other corrective justice measures, such as requiring compensation for a victim? How do these fit into C&M's
scheme? Unless such measures are to be regarded as implemented by liability rules, this kind of enforcement seems to be
completely absent from their discussion. But not quite. Return
once again to the definition of a rule of inalienability:
An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is
not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The
state intervenes not only to determine who is initially entitled
and to determine the compensation that must be paid if the entitlement is taken or destroyed, but also to forbid its sale under
some or all circumstances. 94

The emphasized portion suffers from an ambiguity that follows
from the conflation of guidance rules and enforcement rules. It
could mean that part of the very definition of an inalienability
rule is an aspect of liability rule protection. Or it could mean
that, quite apart from the specification of an inalienability rule,
there must as a practical matter be enforcement by way of a rule
of compensation for involuntary takings. Which is the better
way to construe this passage?
Interestingly, C&M's definition of property rules does not include similar language about compensating the holder. 95 Since
entitlements defined by prescriptive property rules would also
require enforcement to deal with recalcitrants, the passage concerning inalienability rules would thus seem to be of a different
nature, suggesting that it indicates a joinder of a prescriptively
94
95

Id. at 1092-93 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1092.
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understood liability rule feature with the inalienability feature.
This is paradoxical because, however one interprets C&M's liability rules, such rules either condone or at least permit the
taking of the entitlement, provided compensation is paid. Yet
an inalienability rule would seem to work as a desirable entitlement form only if it prohibits involuntary transfers as well as
voluntary ones. Indeed, later in their discussion C&M make it
c~ear that an inalienability rule would be the rule of choice for
particularly important entitlements that we do not want people
to be without. 96 If this is so, then it is likely we would want to
prohibit involuntary transfers as well as voluntary ones. Can the
italicized language be understood as trying to accomplish this?
It can if we take this reference to compensation as implying a
sanction that is imposed for violating the inalienability rule. The
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is also true elsewhere, and as just indicated, property rules would
as a practical matter also need to be protected by compensatory
damages. 97 But that fact need not be definitional for either type
of rule. Indeed, it should not be definitional because in some
cases compensatory damages are inappropriate for the protection of an entitlement that is undeniably governed by a property
or inalienability rule. 98

'Jo See id. at 1100 (discussing "merit goods," such as minimum !eve!s of education,
clothing, and bodily integrity, that are considered essential); id. at 1111-15 (discussing
freedom from enslavement and other entitlements that society might want to prevent
the holder from selling).
"For example, when an ongoing activity is found to be a nuisance and the
"balancing of equities" does not render the nuisance specially privileged to continue
upon payment of compensation, an injunction is appropriate under conventional
doctrine. But such prospective relief by itself is inadequate when injury has already
been incurred, in which case an award of damages will often be appropriate. See Mel
Foster Co. Properties, Inc. v. American Oil Co., 427 N.W.2d 171, 175-76 (Iowa 1988)
(discussing the measure of damages when nuisance-causing activity has been abated);
Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 683 (N.C. 1953) (awarding both injunction
and damages); see generally Roger A. Cunningham, William B. Stoebuck & Dale A.
Whitman, The Law of Property§ 7.2, at 421 (2d ed. 1993).
" Professor Levmore rightly observes that compensatory damages are sometimes
but not always appropriately used to protect what is ordinarily considered property.
However, following the usual identification of C&M's rule types with remedies, he
infers that compensatory damages for past injury are implicit in C&M's definition of
property rules. This in turn requires Levmore to designate a new rule type for
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Consequently, the italicized portion of the passage quoted
above would not appear to refer to an implicit liability rule feature of inalienability rules so much as it refers to the practical
remedial consequences of an immunity from such involuntary
taking. Yet, notwithstanding C&M's discussion, there might
also be some contexts in which such an iffimunity would be undesirable.99 So the better interpretation is that the indicated passage refers: (a) primarily to an enforcement rule-not necessarily part of the conception of inalienability itself-that specifies a
right to compensation held by the person whose inalienable
right (or property right) has been taken contrary to the rule's
immunity; and (b) secondarily to a prescriptive liability feature
in those special contexts where inalienability does not involve
such an immunity. The former we may call a remedial compensation rule in order to distinguish it from liability rules and from
the liability to involuntary taking that may be a feature of some
inalienability rules. 100
This distinction, and C&M's failure to draw it clearly and consistently, explains their peculiar treatment of the law of compensation for accident costs. The greater part of that law involves
property-like interests not protected by a remedy of damages. See Levmore, supra
note 37, at 2153-61.
"Certainly it would not be logically incoherent to have a rule that prohibits voluntary transfers but permits involuntary, compensated transfers (takings). One can
imagine an entitlement that should not be marketable but which should be subject to
compensated takings, on the distributive ground that the surplus of cooperation in
the transfer should always go to the "purchaser," or on the paternalistic ground that
the holder would sell the entitlement at what the government considers too low a
price if given the chance. See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1349 n.20 and
accompanying text (noting the paternalistic possibility). There certainly are exceptional situations, not addressed by C&M, in which an ordinarily inalienable right may
be taken against the will of its holder with the full support of the law. For example,
the courts have bad no difficulty allowing involuntary servitude for the state, notwithstanding the explicit language of the Thiiteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Butler v.
Perry, 240 U.S. 328 (1916) (validating public conscription for road construction).
Thus, it would be better to have a notion of inalienability rules that leaves open the
question of the permissibility of compensated involuntary transfers. Professor Morris
refers to situations where neither voluntary nor involuntary transfers are allowed as
"full inalienability" rules. See Morris, supra note 15, at 881-83.
100
Again, even remedial compensation rules are, in the first instance, prescriptive in
the sense we have been discussing. They refer to what the obligor should pay, not to
what be will pay. See supra note 88. But they are nonetheless very different, even as
prescriptive rules, in their focus upon correcting a situation that should not have
occurred in the first place.
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both a substantive norm-a property rule, as we have seenand a remedial norm requiring payment of damages. That is, it
involves both guidance and enforcement rules. C&M's characterization of this arrangement as instantiating a liability rule
flows from their Holmesian premises, premises that obscure the
distinction between the contents of the substantive norm and
the costs imposed pursuant to the associated remedial norm.
Yet this distinction cannot be avoided if we are to render the
whole of their argument intelligible. 101
This analysis supports the inferences developed in previous
sections. Despite the confusion in their article, it is better to
understand C&M's rule types as categories of prescriptive judgments imposed by the law. Under this reconstruction of their
work, property, liability, and inalienability are categories of guidance rules-directives about what oeonle are suooosed to dorather than descriptions of what th~ la~ in fact f~~ces people to
do. Remedial responses to the non-compliant are quite distinct.
A similar thesis was presented in 1986 by Professors Coleman
and Kraus, who distinguished between rules specifying the normative content of entitlements-such as property, liability, and
inalienability rules-and enforcement rules prescribing remedies for the violation of the former. 102 Strikingly, theorists mak101

In an interesting passage, Carol Rose comments:
When some unidentified person accidentally smashes your car and pays you
damages in compensation, you do not think that this person has an "option"
while you have a PRSTO [a property right subject to an option]. You think
that you and she are caught in a muddle, where rights have suddenly and
accidentally gotten all confused. A liability rule is the best that you can do
after your car is wrecked. Your property in the car has turned into a PRSTO,
not because anybody thinks it is a good idea to define it that way, but because
nobody can do anything better for you now that it is ruined.
Rose, supra note 22, at 2181. Professor Rose's sense that this is not the kind of case
to characterize in terms of C&M's liability rules is correct. But she is confusing the
prescriptive sense of C&M's "liability rule"-which can be construed as entailing an
option, see supra note 56-with what I have called a remedial compensation rule.
Once one sees this, one need not accept the proposition that the property in the car
was "turned into a PRSTO" by the accident; the paradoxical element simply disappears.
102
They expressed the matter this way:
The point we are anxious to emphasize is that property, liability and inalienability rules are best thought of as constituting a subset of the set of norms
governing the transfer of lawful holdings. They are transaction-norms . ...
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ing use of C&M's framework have either ignored or misconstrued the point. In Part IV, I will substantiate this claim and
address the question of why Coleman and Kraus were less successful than they might have been in redirecting the discourse.
Meanwhile, it will be useful to examine one way in which the
confusion between guidance and enforcement is routinely manifested. This examination will illustrate that the issue of liability
for negligence is only one of many problems inherent in C&M's
theory.
III. SANCTIONS AND PRICES
A. The Distinction between a Sanction and a Price and the
Standard Holmesian Mistake

The distinction between guidance rules and enforcement rules
has many implications. One that is central to the theme of this
Article concerns the difference between a "sanction" and a
"price." According to a common and reasonable understanding
of the terms, a sanction is "a detriment imposed for doing what
is forbidden, such as failing to perform an obligation," 103 whereas
a price is the "payment of money which is required in order to
do what is permitted." 104 The upshot of our previous discussion
is that the tort law of negligence imposes sanctions rather than
prices on faulty conduct that causes harm, whereas the law of
... [l]t is unhelpful to think of them as tools or instruments for protecting
entitlements. Thus, we insist upon a distinction between the rules by which
claims are generated and the rules that create the institutions for enforcing
those claims: a distinction all too often blurred in previous work on the
property-liability rule distinction.
Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1344, 1346-47. Professor Morris makes the same
point tangentially in regard to her very valuable elaboration of the C&M typology,
but she does not draw the kind of implications addressed here. See Morris, supra
note 15, at 845 n.59.
103
Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1524 (1984).
104
Id. at 1525. For a sophisticated and historically informed analysis of this distinction, see Finnis, supra note 64, at 325-37. While Cooter's definition of a price is
relatively narrow in restricting the concept to situations in which the required payment is to be made in "money," as opposed to other things of value, his definition is
broad in embracing both action that is permitted without the other's consent, as
under liability rules, and action that is permitted only with such consent, as under
property rules. By the same token, his definition of sanction is relatively broad in
that it does not presuppose a punitive purpose in imposing the sanction.
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eminent domain imposes prices rather than sanctions on legitimate governmental takings, and the law of nuisance sometimes
imposes sanctions and sometimes imposes prices depending on
the social value of the nuisance-creating activity.
To reinforce this conclusion and amplify its significance, let us
change the context. Consider now the difference between the
following two environmental laws:
Law #3: Discharge of chemical XYZ into the air, water, or
ground is hereby prohibited. If you make such a discharge, you
shall be liable to the State Environmental Agency for $5,000
per ounce of XYZ discharged.
Law #4: You may discharge chemical XYZ into the air, water,
or ground provided you pay to the State Environmental
Agency $5,000 per ounce of XYZ discharged.
unce again, the law-abiding citizen receives a very different
message from these two laws. She will see the first law as directing her not to pollute in the specified manner and creating a
sanction for violation of that directive; she will see the second as
creating a pricing system for such pollution, so that it is appropriate-as far as the law is concerned-for her to pollute to the
105
extent that payment is compatible with her other goals.
Not surprisingly, followers of the Holmesian approach are inclined to say that there is no real difference between these two
105 See Thon1as C. Schelling, Prices as Regulatory Instruments, in Incentives for
Environmental Protection 1, 6-7 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1983) (elaborating on the
distinction between a "fee" or "charge," on the one hand, and a "fine" or "penalty,"
on the other). A price charged by the government can also be called a tax, especially
when the obligor does not receive a quid pro quo distinct from the benefits enjoyed
by citizens generally. Thus:
The distinction [between a fine and a tax J is that if engaging in a course of
conduct will result in a fine, then the conduct violates the law; but if a tax is
levied the conduct does not violate the law (though, as we shall see, we might
have to say that where a tax is levied the conduct usually does not violate the
law). Fines are connected with legal wrongdoing; taxes are (usually) not.
Hence, fines are sanctions whereas taxes are not, even though the point of a tax
may be to discourage conduct (such as smoking cigarettes).
Theodore M. Benditt, Law as Rule and Principle: Problems of Legal Philosophy
148-49 (1978). Benditt's parenthetical qualifications concerning a tax arise from the
fact that taxes can be imposed on acts that are otherwise illegal. See id. at 149. Even
in such cases. the imposition of the tax is not the feature that makes the conduct
·
illegal.
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Iaws. 106 This in tum can lead to the conclusion that a citizen
should view Law #3 as equivalent to Law #4. As expressed by
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel:
[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws just because the laws exist. They must determine
the importance of these laws. The penalties Congress names
for disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms .to
sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal sanctions is based on the supposition that managers not only mar
but also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so. 10

Of course, this view is incoherent when applied to Law #4; discharging chemical XYZ does not violate the rule or incur a
sanction. There simply is no "disobedience," as long as the
price is paid. 108 So ifthe authors' assertion makes any sense with
regard to the decision whether to discharge chemical XYZ, it
106 See Holmes, supra note 71, at 461 ("[F]rom [the bad man's] point of view, what is
the difference between being fined and being taxed a certain sum for doing a certain
thing? ... If it matters at all, still speaking from the bad man's point of view, it must
be because in one case and not in the other some further disadvantages, or at least
some further consequences, are attached to the act by the law."). Thus, even the
Holmesian bad man might see a difference if it is probable that Law #3, but not Law
#4, will be construed as a criminal prohibition and thereby subject to special procedural restrictions on enforcement not applicable to Law #4. Ironically, the bad man
might then see Law #3 as imposing less of a constraint upon discharge, since the
probability of its enforcement would be reduced by the additional procedural protections enjoyed by a criminal defendant. In any event, for our purposes we may assume
away this difference by stipulating that both laws are noncriminal provisions.
Alternatively, the legal realist might argue that any difference between the two
laws arises from the fact that a judge would enjoin XYZ pollution under Law #3 but
not under Law #4. But that depends upon the judge's receiving different messages
from the two laws; we cannot explain the judge's willingness to grant an injunction by
the fact that she is willing to do so. Moreover, injunctive relief is not always practically feasible even when it would be theoretically appropriate, as when the polluting
discharge cannot be anticipated by others. Yet the law-abiding will want guidance
even in such instances.
107
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender
Offers, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982). The authors cite C&M in the course
of their argument. See id. at 1156 n.5.
108
If one takes the Holmesian approach to its logical conclusion, the managers
should not pay the price prescribed in Law #4 unless they believe that the costs of
paying such a price are less than the costs of not doing so, which will depend on
things like the probability of detection of the discharge. For one can make the same
argument about those rules, distinct from Law #4, that specify the remedial consequences if someone fails to pay as provided in the given price regime.

878

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 83:837

must be in the context of a rule like Law #3. 109 Given such a law,
discharge of the chemical would be "disobedience," would "violate the rules," and would incur a sanction, at least if detected.
Clearly, it is in the context of laws like Law #3 that Easterbrook
and Fischel are making their assertion, which treats Law #3 as
though it were Law #4.
·
Observe catefully the implications of their claim. They assert
that managers have no ethical duty not to discharge the chemical. This claim goes beyond the mere assumption of pervasive
recalcitrance. The Holmesian bad man is actually praised as
performing his ethical obligation by engaging in his narrowly
self-interested calculations, not only in the context of Law #4
where cost-benefit trade-offs are contemplated if not encouraged, but also in the context of Law #3, where the law ostensibly
denies the citizen such trade-offs. Something is seriously amiss.
The nature of the problem can be discerned from a careful
reading of one of the articles upon which Easterbrook and Fischel
rely. In 1979 David Engel argued that, even assuming legislative
legitimacy, management has no moral obligation to obey civil or
even criminal prohibitions if it is profitable to disobey them,
given the p:robability of detection and prosecution and the economic detriments potentially imposed by society.no Professor
Engel's arguments reveal a view of management as incapable of
109
One might quibble over whether environmental protection laws are within the
category of "economic regulatory laws" described by Easterbrook and Fischel. However, elsewhere these authors express the matter in a more general way:
Managers have no general obligation to avoid violating regulatory laws, when
violations are profitable to the firm, because the sanctions set by the legislature
and courts are a measure of how much firms should spend to achieve compliance.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168 n.36. Even if one were to limit
attention to prohibitions designed solely to improve economic efficiency, it would not
follow that a business undermines efficiency by obeying the prohibition when it is
more profitable to disobey it. An effective prohibition can have long-run or indirect
economic benefits that are not reflected in the particular business' revenues.
110 David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 Stan. L. Rev.
1, 37-58 (1979) (cited with approval in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168
n.36). To be sure, Engel acknowledged that a stronger case could be made for a corporate duty to disclose harmful corporate activities, beyond that level of disclosure
which would be profit-maximizing. See id. at 70-85. And he noted that such voluntary disclosure would likely lead to "substantive" corporate voluntarism: "Altruistic abstention from prohibited substantive conduct is likely to be cheaper than, for
example, committing a crime and then disclosing it." !d. at 43.
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understanding a law's content or purpose apart from the material detriments that it imposes. Implicitly, he posits a radical
separation of the manager's social epistemology from that of the
political community, so that management views government not
as a part of the same social system but rather as a set of morally
inscrutable exogenous forces, like hurricanes or droughts, that
impinge on the business. 111 These forces lack normative significance in themselves, so their significance is measurable only by
reference to material consequences such as costs. 112
This suggests an explanation for Easterbrook and Fischel's
unelaborated qualification, "We put to one side laws concerning
violence or other acts thought to be malum in se." 113 The obvious purpose of this qualification is to avoid a reductio ad absurdum from the application of their reasoning to decisions about
whether to engage in violence, fraud, or other such acts as means
to the end of profit maximization. One might try to argue that
acts malum in se will be understood by managers as acts that
ought not to be done, whether profitable or not. But even if we
can give a noncircular meaning to the notion of malum in se, the
reductio cannot be avoided. For the clarity and predictability of
prohibitions are not uniformly greater for prohibitions of acts

As Robert Gordon has recently observed:
Probably the most common reading of [The Path of the Law] is that it sets
forth a purely positivist theory of law-a deflated, de-moralized, "disenchanted" view (to use Max Weber's term) of the legal system. To those who like
this view, the "bad man" is just the rational man-Homo law-and-economicus-who treats all legal rules as prices on conduct. To less approving eyes,
Holmes recommends that the lawyer regard the legal system in a wholly
alienated and instrumental fashion-not as a set of norms established for common membership in a political community, nor an attempt to realize (however
imperfectly) ideals of justice or social integration, but simply as random and
arbitrary outputs of state force, which are opportunities for or obstacles to
realizing his client's self-interested projects.
Robert W. Gordon, The Path of the Lawyer, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1014 (1997).
112 A similar argument might be offered to explain the identification of property,
liability, and inalienability rules with specific remedies. The remedies might be
understood as the only available measure of the importance of the entitlements they
protect, which implies an agnosticism about the meaning of the substantive prescriptions, even in light of the purposes they serve. As discussed in the following text,
such an attitude is unjustifiable in most cases.
113 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 107, at 1168 n.36.
m
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malum in se. Indeed, often the opposite is true. 114 Even if it
were true that prohibitions of acts malum in se are generally
more understandable and predictable than other prohibitions,
managers' moral obligations as to any particular law cannot be
determined by such a statistical fact. In any event, as a general
matter neither the rationale nor the reach of prohibitory laws,
even those not addressing acts nwlwn in se, are so incomprehensible as to drive managers and their lawyers to such agnosticism,
self-serving protestations notwithstanding. 115 Many such laws
116
may be ill-advised, but that is another matter entirely.
Of course, a clear understanding of the difference between a
sanction and a price does not obviate policymakers' difficulty in
choosing which to employ in response to a particular problem.
H may be highly controversial whether a particular activity should
be sanctioned in some way, priced in some way, or handled in
yet some other fashion. Considerations of justice or efficiency
may indicate that pricing is appropriate in contexts that might
naiVely be thought to call for sanctions. 117 And if considerations

11
" Some may believe, for example, that negligent driving is malum in se while
polluting with a particular chemical thnl poses dubious, long-term risks is malum
prohibitum. Yet the laws governing the former may be much more vague and less
predictable than laws governing the latter. Compare, for example, Law #1 with Law #3.
115
Although skeptical complaints about our ability to discern the law from nominally authoritative sources have generally come from the critical legal theorists of the
political left, the replies to their arguments apply as well to the extreme skepticism
evidenced in Professor Engei's arguments and reiterated by Easterbrook and FischeL
See generally Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1989) (arguing
that the frequency of cases in which a determinate answer is not readily available is
not large enough to undermine the claim of adjudicative legitimacy); Lawrence B.
Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev.
462 (1987) (arguing that the moderate indeterminacy in judicial decisionmalcing does
not delegitimize the liberal state). My argument leaves open the possibility that
particular subclasses of regulatory Jaws are so vague and of such dubious purpose as
to warrant the agnostic response. But there is nothing to indicate that Professors
Engel, Easterbrook, and Fischel had any such modest claim in mind.
116
One reason such laws might be considered ill-advised is that they do not facilitate
the maximization of wealth, a substantive consideration related to the economic
question of whether particular entitlements are more efficient if constructed as property rules or as liability rules. See supra notes 25-26.
117
For example, to the extent that liability for the crimes of a corporation's agents is
vicarious and therefore strict, an argument can be made that pricing is the better way
to govern corporate efforts to monitor and control the agents' conduct unless management is complicit in the criminal conduct. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful"
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of justice are unhelpful or inconclusive in resolving a particular
question, one may well turn to considerations of efficiency as
the primary determinants. 118 But any such analysis must still
recognize the difference between a sanction and a price if it is to
gauge accurately the effects of the choice upon the behavior of a
population that does not consist entirely of Holmesian bad men.
If one wants to encourage nonconsensual takings in a particular
context, then one will do so less effectively with a sanction than
with a price, ceteris paribus. Conversely, if one wants to discourage nonconsensual takings, then one will do so less effectively with a price than with a sanction, again ceteris paribus. 119
B. Rediscovering the Distinction: Cooter}s Theory of
Sanctions and Prices

These points are strengthened and refined by an examination
of one of the most explicit and systematic treatments of the
subject of prices and sanctions in the law and economics literature, an article published by Robert Cooter in 1984. 120 Using the
definitions of sanction and price quoted above, 121 Cooter argues
persuasively that even the narrowly self-interested citizen will
experience a difference between the two. 122 The difference
arises from the fact that the paradigmatic sanction will involve a
substantial discontinuity in the private cost function of the affected citizen, whereas the paradigmatic price will involve a conMean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in
American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193,228-30 (1991).
118 This is one way to understand the enormous literature on nuisance law spawned
by Ronald Coase's seminal article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1
(1960).
119 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 Duke L.J. 1, 29-36 (arguing, inter alia, that by
adopting a stance of moral neutrality, pricing may undercut informal moral norms
against polluting). For a recent study emphasizing the important role of a sense of
moral duty in white collar crime, see Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction
Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate
Crime, 30 L. & Soc'y Rev. 549 (1996).
12
°Cooter, supra note 103.
121
See supra text accompanying notes 103-104.
122
Actually, the way he describes this point of view is as "rationally self-interested."
Cooter, supra note 103, at 1527. I would not so readily concede the term "rational"
to the Holmesian legal realists. It is clear, however, that Professor Cooter means to
refer to someone who acts to minimize private costs in a narrow economic sense.
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tinuous tradeoff between the payment of the price and the cost
123
of conduct necessary to avoid payment.
For example, a rule prescribing liability for negligently inflicted injuries will create a discontinuity at the point where the
level of precaution drops below the legal standard; at lower levels, a substantial liability will be added to the costs of precaution, whereas at higher levels of precaution, the private cost will
be only the significantly lower cost of precaution. In contrast, a
rule that simply prescribes that one should pay for the costs of
accidents that one causes, or some subset of such accidents not
defined with reference to a standard of conduct, produces a
relatively continuous private cost curve that is the sum of the
124
costs of precaution and the costs of the damages done.
Cooter's point is that the first kind of rule will produce a different set of incentives for conduct than the second. Under the
first kind of rule, the self-interested actor will be driven to comply just barely with the standard of care necessary to avoid the
extra costs associated with liability, however those costs are related to the costs that the actor imposes on others. On the other
hand, under the second kind of rule, the actor will engage in a
tradeoff at the margin in order to choose a level of precaution
125
that minimizes the sum of precaution costs and external costs.
Professor Cooter goes on to argue that there are reasons to
believe that, in a context like automobile accidents, a sanction
rule based on collliuunity standards of due care will operate
more efficiently than a pricing rule, 126 whereas in a context like
pollution control a pridng system will operate more efficiently

See id. at 1525-31.
'" Id. at 1526-27.
' 25 I d. at 1529-30.
Cooter's argument depends on the existence of a continuous
behavioral variable that is within the control of the actor, the chosen quantity of
which both affects the likelihood of the occurrence of an externality and determines
the imposition of any applicable legal sanction. These conditions may be met in some
contexts, such as the choice of a level of precaution in driving an automobile, but
they may not model well the actor's choices in other contexts, especially dichotomous
choices about whether or not to act. Late in his article, Cooter does try to adjust his
model to account for dichotomous choice. See id. at 1548-50 (discussing criminal law).
"'See id. at 1533-34 (arguing that auto accidents will generate an efficient com123

munity standard of care because of the symmetry of risks inflicted and endured by

drivers).
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than sai:J.ctions. 127 More generally, Cooter prescribes when to select a sanction rule and when to select a price rule based on contextual features such as the ability of private and public actors to
discern the relevant cost conditions. He summarizes his conclusions this way:
If obtaining accurate information about external costs is cheaper
for officials than obtaining accurate information about socially
optimal behavior, then [lawmakers] should control the activity
by pricing it; if the converse is true, then they should control
128
the activity by sanctioning it.

Cooter's argument is certainly insightful. On the empirical
side, he confirms our rejection of C&M's claim by observing
that negligence law in fact operates as sanctions and not as
prices. 129 In other words, negligence law exemplifies property
and compensation rules rather than liability rules. 130

127 See id. at 1150-51 (arguing that pollution may require pricing because officials
lack the information about external private costs necessary to impose a publicly
determined and sanction-backed standard of care). Cooter does not address the possibility that the community standard that emerges from accidents, for example, might
reflect some notion of reciprocity that diverges from that required for efficiency. His
basic point would remain intact, however, provided that the increased costs of public
determination of the efficient standard of precaution are greater than the costs
resulting from a divergence of the community standard from the efficient level of
precaution.
,,. Id. at 1533 (emphasis omitted).
129 See id. at 1538-40 (contrasting negligence as sanction with strict liability as price).
130
Professor Coffee errs, therefore, in the first half of his assertion: "Characteristically, tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits." Coffee, supra note 117, at 194.
Only if one takes strict, no-fault liability as the "characteristic" form of tort liability
may one reach such a conclusion. Contrary to Coffee's claims, see id. at 197, 226-28,
Cooter's argument does not provide support for such a theory of the distinction
between tort and crime. To be sure, Coffee is much less explicit than Cooter about
what is meant by "pricing." At certain points, for example, Coffee seems to equate
pricing with the effort "to force the defendant to internalize the costs [he] imposes on
others." ld. at 228; see also id. at 238 n.157. This conception may more readily allow
one to subsume negligence Jaw under pricing rules, but it is not the more ordinary
notion of price that I, together with Cooter, have followed. Under this more ordinary
notion, while pricing tends to internalize the costs of action under both property and
liability rules, the converse is not true; not all means of internalizing costs are prices.
I should note, however, that the deficiencies in Coffee's theory of the tort/crime
distinction that are thus revealed do not seriously undermine his central practical
conclusions about the overextension of the criminal law. This is because the primary
target of his argument is vicarious criminal liability, which is typically strict, no-fault
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On the other hand, Cooter's argument does not completely
respond to the problem articulated here. Returning to the negligence issue, the first rule described by Cooter closely matches
the negligence standard of liability prescribed by our
Law #1: Do not act negligently. If you do drive negligently, you
must pay for consequent injuries. 131
But the second rule Cooter discusses is a rule of compensation
that does not depend for its incidence upon the presence of
negligence, quite unlike our
Law #2: You are permitted to act negligently, provided you pay
for any consequent injuries. 132
Indeed, the economic cost conditions, whatever they are for a
given context, will generate precisely the same incentives under
Law #1 as under Law #2. Cooter's argument, therefore, does
not allow us to distinguish between these two laws. Under his
discontinuity theory, both Law #1 and Law #2 are sanctions,
since they equally involve a "jump" in the costs imposed on the
actor as her precaution level drops below the standard for negli133
gence. Yet, under Cooter's definitions of sanction and price,
Law #2 is not a sanction, at least not if one takes at all seriously
134
the language in which the law is expressed.
Conversely, neither Law #3 nor Law #4 is a sanction under
the discontinuity theory, since they both entail a private cost
curve that is essentially continuous. 135 Nonetheless, Law #3
136
clearly qualifies as a sanction under Cooter's definition. Again,
liability, in the context of which pncmg under liability rules will sometimes be
appropriate. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
131 See supra Section II.A.
m See supra Section II.A.
m See supra text accompanying notes 103-104.
1" Of course, one might argue that, language notwithstanding, Law #2 was "intended"
to create a detriment for doing what is forbidden, but for our purposes we can assume
that the legislative history is quite explicit in expressing legislative approval of
conduct that by community standards is negligent. See supra note 63.
m See supra Section IIJ.A. These laws are discontinuous only to the extent that the
money paid for discharge cannot be prorated for partial ounces of discharge.
136 Again, one might argue based on legislative or enforcement history that Law #3
is a de facto pricing scheme, its language notwithstanding. But we may assume for
purposes of discussion that the legislative intent, if meaningfully expressed at all

1997]

Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules

885

Cooter provides no explanation for this result, except to acknowledge that the discontinuity feature is characteristic, not definitional, of sanctions, commenting in a footnote that, "Someone
who acts from duty and obeys the law out of respect will also
satisfy the legal standard, but not in order to minimize private
costs. "137
To be sure, Cooter's results indicate important considerations
that affect the choice of a sanction system or a price system from
the point of view of inducing appropriate conduct by the
Holmesian bad man. From that point of view, Law #2 is defective as an attempt to price behavior, and Law #3 is defective as
an attempt to sanction it. These facts may help to explain why
rules like Law #2 and Law #3 are not frequently encountered.
Of course, Law #2 is not encountered for the even more obvious
reason that it would be very unusual, though not inconceivable,
for the law to condone action by citizens that is unreasonably
dangerous when measured by community standards. 138 In contrast, Law #3 does not suffer from such internal moral tension,
and its defectiveness qua sanction can be cured by aggravating the
penalty according to willfulness or recurrence of the discharge. 139
Consider, however, how Professor Cooter characterizes his
contribution:
Scholars of jurisprudence traditionally view law as a set of obligations backed by sanctions, or commands backed by threats.
In contrast, economists tend to view law as a set of official
prices. Associated with each of these viewpoints is a characteristic blindness. The jurisprudential perspective blinds lawyers to the fact that officials cannot regulate the economy efficiently by giving orders. Instead, they must rely upon legal
instruments similar to prices. Conversely, the economic perspective is blind to the distinctively normative aspect of law,
viewing a sanction for doing what is forbidden merely as the
price of doing what is permitted. In brief, the economic analysis of law lacks a clear account of sanctions, and the jurisprudential tradition lacks a good account of prices. This Article atbeyond the language of the law, was clearly expressed to the opposite effect and has
not been undermined by subsequent events.
137
Cooter, supra note 103, at 1527 n.9.
138
See supra note 63.
139
See Cooter, supra note 103, at 1551.
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tempts to bridge the two traditions by developing a theory
about the difference between the effect of prices and sanctions
. 140
upon beh avwr.

Cooter is about half right: The standard economic analysis has
lacked an adequate account of sanctions, and Cooter has contributed to that account from within the tradition of economic
analysis. On the other hand, his account does not fully bridge
the gap because it leaves unexplained the differences between
Law #1 and Law #2 and between Law #3 and Law #4. That is, in
his account-notwithstanding the qualification mentioned earlier141-the citizen is still assumed to view all of these laws as
only imposing costs on behavior, instead of providing authoritative directives for the guidance of conduct. Cooter's identification of sanctions as typically involving discontinuities in private
cost functions does not change that. Indeed, in the end he does
not provide the "distinctively normative aspect" that he prom143
ises.142 A significant part of the economist's blindness endures.
The other prong of Cooter's criticism is less accurate. He is
certainly right that a tendency to consider laws only in terms of
flat prohibitions of conduct might blind one to the need to price
certain conduct instead of sanctioning it. However, this blindness does not arise from anything in the "jurisprudential perspective." If what is prohibited is not the performance of an act
that needs to be priced but the refusal to pay a price that has
been or should be established for an act, then even an impoverished jurisprudence of pure criminal law can allow for pricing

I d. at 1523 (footnotes omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 137.
1" See supra text accompanying note 140.
1" This is further illustrated by Cooter's interesting clarification:
This Article distinguishes two kinds of rules and identifies one of them with
prices and the other with sanctions. Of course, it is possible to expand the
definition of a price to cover sanctions by defining a sanction as a discontinuous
price, or to expand the definition of a sanction to cover prices by defining a
price as a continuous sanction. However, the important point is not to argue
about names but to understand the differences in the behavior caused by (the
first kind of rule] and (the second kind of rule].
Cooter, supra note 103, at 1527 n.10. Cooter does not explore how to reconcile such
definitional restructuring with his o'vvn earlier articulated distinction between sanction
and price. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
1'10

1' 1
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structures, both those consensually determined prices associated
with property rules and those imposed prices associated with liability rules. In any event, jurisprudence has long been more
sophisticated than such a view allows, as Professor Cooter is certainly aware. 144 The culprit here, responsible for using draconian
prohibitions of actions that should be priced, is not simplistic jurisprudence. It is simplistic politics and a lack of the imagination needed to set up markets where they have not previously
existed. 145
C. Reclaiming the Distinction: Brennan and Buchanan on
Rules of the Game
Much of the preceding discussion is critical of the methodology of law and economics practitioners. To conclude this Part, I
offer a brief illustration of the fact that economists who study
law, especially those who were not trained as lawyers, sometimes do get it right. The illustration comes from the work of
two leading proponents of the economic analysis of political behavior, the "public choice" school of thought. 146
In 1985, Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan published a
work addressing, among other things, the methodological and
jurisprudential foundations of their theories of political economy.147 They defended the use of Homo economicus to model
the behavior of political actors, arguing that parsimony and
symmetry require the same assumptions about political actors
that apply to non-political ones:

144
See, e.g., id. at 1524 n.4 (noting distinction between commands backed by threats
and the more general idea of norms backed by sanctions).
145
For discussions of market-oriented solutions to environmental problems arising
from the absence of the property rights necessary to give rise to markets, see
Symposium, Free Market Environmentalism: The Role of the Market in Environmental Protection, 15 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 297 (1992). For discussions of the use
of prescriptively understood liability rules in environmental law, compare Schelling,
supra note 105 (emphasizing the advantages of pricing structures), with Rose, supra
note 119 (articulating, and pe:J:'haps overstating, the offsetting disadvantages of pricing
structures).
146
For a quick overview of this relatively new field of study, see Edward L. Rubin,
Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. Legal Educ. 490 (1996).
147
Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules: Constitutional
Political Economy (1985).
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If an individual in a market setting is to be presumed to exercise any power he possesses (wit.b,in the limits of market rules)
so as to maximize his net wealth, then an individual in a corresponding political setting must also be presumed to exercise
any power he possesses (within the limits of political rules) in
precisely the same way. If political agents do not exercise discretionary power in a manner analogous to market agents, then
this result must follow because the rules of the political game
constrain the exercise of power in ways the rules of the market
148
do not ....

Now, whether or not one agrees with this particular argument, or any of the other arguments they offer for modeling political actors as profit maximizers, these economists clearly recognize the idea of constrained optimization and the fact that
"rules" form a crucial part of the constraints.
Of course one might reply that these economists use the idea
of "rules" metaphorically, as a simplified and approximate substitute for the Holmesian specification of costs and benefits of
predictable exercises of public power. But elsewhere they address this point quite clearly, rejecting the Holmesian refinement: -Following-Hobbes they propose, also controversially,
that "just conduct" is nothing more nor less than conduct "that
9
does not violate rules to which one has given prior consent."].l
They then explain more precisely what it means not to violate
such rules:
[A ]!though the rules will typically include instructions as to
how violations are to be handled and what punishments are to
attach to such violations, and although these instructions are
therefore contained within the inclusive agreement, it seems
wrongheaded to say that agreement implies only a willingness
to accept the defined punishment for violations. Consent is to
the rules, and the moral force of promise keeping is such that
one is obligated to other players to play by those rules. To
violate the rules may sometimes be personally profitable, but it
will not be "just," and it will not become "just" simply by virtue
of one's acceptance of punishment. "Just conduct" will consist
in keeping one's promises to other players, that is, in abiding by
,., Id. at 48-49.
"' Id. at 97.
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agreed-on rules. A player, for example, who punches another
with his fist in American football concedes a fifteen-yard penalty. But he also endures the moral opprobrium of having
committed an "unjust" act, and it is expected that this purely
moral dimension-the player's sense of justice-will carry
weight in moderating his behavior.
It is important to make this point because, in some economists' discussions of the law, one obtains the impression that
choosing whether to abide by the rules is like selecting a drink
at a soft-drink machine; that is, one either abides by the rules
and pays no penalty or fails to abide by the rules and simply
pays the price of so doing, as reflected in the rules. But the
legislated punishment is not to be construed simply as the
"price" of an alternative course of action; it also symbolizes the
fact that a "wrong" has been committed. 150
One need not endorse a purely contractarian theory of justice,
or the indicated moral significance of promises, in order to appreciate the force of these points. In a society where respect for
law
not totally absent, sanctions are not simply prices. Put
another way, guidance rules are distinguishable from enforcement rules; both have behavioral significance as well as theoretical importance. 151

is

15
" Id. at 101.
m Other economics-oriented theorists are moving in a similar direction. See, e.g.,
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L.J. 1 (arguing that the Jaw can discourage
criminal behavior not only by raising its cost but also by instilling aversion to the
criminalized behavior). In this, they recapture at least part of the insights of an older,
less economics-oriented generation of scholars. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, The
Limits of the Criminal Sanction 64-65 (1968) (arguing for an expansion from the
Benthamite conception of deterrence as "the propensity of punishment to scare
people," adopted to address the "rational hedonist who will do anything that
promises to enhance his well-being if he thinks he can get away with it," to a broader
conception as a "complex psychological phenomenon meant primarily to create and
reinforce the conscious morality and the unconscious habitual controls of the Jawabiding"). Professor Dau-Schmidt has also extended this analysis to certain elements
of civil law, but curiously seems to stop short of calling ordinary fault-based civil
damages "preference shaping." See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as
More than Prices: The Economic Analysis of Preference Shaping Policies in the Law,
in Law and Economics: New and Critical Perspectives 153 (Robin Paul Malloy &
Christopher K. Braun eds., 1995).

890

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 83:837

IV.

CONCEPTUAL PRAGMATISM:
AN ALTERl'..JATIVE RESOLUTION?

Perhaps, however, one ought not draw so sharp a contrast between guidance and enforcement rules. To be sure, the two
kinds of rules-or two functions of a given rule-are distin-.
guishable, but they are also related, both as a matter of historical development and as a matter of normative theory. In this
Part, I explore certain consequences of this relationship. As a
way of introducing the matter, and in order to answer a residual
question from Part H, I start with a brief treatment of the impact
of the work of philosophers Jules Coleman and Jody Kraus.

A. Recent Work on Transaction Structures
As already noted, Coleman and Kraus have argued that property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules should be construed as rules of a different type than enforcement rules: The
former are various ways of specifying the content of entitlements, in particular the "transaction structures" applicable to
such entitlements. 152 The question of structuring entitlements,
they a:tguea~ ts~~quite distinct frow the question of how to enforce the structure that is chosen. The distinction they drew is
essentially the same as the one I have drawn here. Yet most
scholarship concerning entitlement transaction structures continues to ignore their argument. 153
A good example is an article recently published by Louis
Kaplow and Ste,;en Shaven. 154 Purporting t~ follow C&M, they
define a property rule as involving "absolute protection" of an
otherwise specified entitlement, such that a potential actor
"would not dare to cause [the harm protected against]." 155 It is
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
An exception is Akhil Reed A mar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles,
84 Geo. L.J. 641,674-77 (1996) (citing Coleman and Kraus in support of an argument
that monetary remedies for Fourth Amendment violations do not necessarily condone
police misconduct by simply adding a "cost of doing business").
15
·' Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27.
155
ld. at 723; see also id. at 723 n.27 ("The characterization of a property rule as a
choice of who should enjoy an entitlement, coupled with its absolute protection, is
emphasized in Calabresi and Melamed .... ") (failing lo identify exactly where C&M
"emphasized" such absoluteness). Elsewhere, Kaplow and Shavell define property
15
'

153
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hard to imagine a clearer endorsement of the descriptive conception of a property rule: It refers not to what citizens are told they
should do, but to what the citizens are in fact coerced into doing.
The Coleman and Kraus article is not discussed or even cited.
In another recent article, Ian Ayres and Eric Talley explicitly
distinguish between the "ownership structure" of entitlements
and their "degree of protection," refer to C&M's typology as
addressing the latter issue, and identify liability rules with
"remedies at law" and property rules with "equitable relief." 156
Misleadingly, they cite Coleman and Kraus for the proposition
that the type of protection determines the content of an entitlement.157 Essentially the same remedy-based definitions are employed, with no attention paid to the Coleman and Kraus thesis,
in a still more recent essay by James Krier and Stewart Schwab. 158
A more perplexing example is provided by a philosopher.
Jeremy Waldron at least responds at some length to the Coleman and Kraus thesis. 159 But even after an obviously careful
reading of their article, Waldron professes not to understand
why it is important to determine whether a particular rule is part
of the contents of a transaction rule or part of the means of its
enforcement. 160 So it is not surprising that Professor Waldron's
restatement of C&M's scheme reflects no cognizance of the ambiguities analyzed in the foregoing pages:

rules more ambiguously as ones in which the state "guarantees property right
assignments against infringement through the threatened use of its police powers," id.
at 715, without indicating whether the threat is invariably successful as deterrence or
whether the state's "guarantee" is anything more than the threat itself.
156 Ayres & Talley, supra note 26, at 1031. Elsewhere, they expand their conception
of a property rule to include "specific performance ... and certain types of punitive
sanctions," id. at 1037, or indeed any sanction "severe enough to deter all nonconsensual takings." Id. at 1036. This makes their conception essentially equivalent to
that of Professors Kaplow and Shave!!.
157
See id. at 1041 n.50. While Coleman and Kraus did argue that what C&M called
the type of protection partly determines the entitlement's content-because it is actually part of that content-this connection dissolves once one identifies the type of
protection with particular remedial devices.
158
Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 442-43.
159
Jeremy Waldron, Criticizing the Economic Analysis of Law, 99 Yale L.J. 1441
(1990) (reviewing Jules L. Coleman, Markets, Morals, and the Law (1988), which
reprints the article by Coleman and Kraus).
160
See id. at 1448-49.
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A right is protected by a property rule if the right-holder may,
with the support of society, enjoin any infringement that takes
place without his consent; a right is protected by an inalienability rule if it is legally impossible for even an apparently wining
right-holder to sell or give away his entitlement; and a right is
protected with a liability rule if a person other than the rightholder may invade or reduce the value of an entitlement pro161
vided he compensates the right-hoider afterwards.

Notice that, as in the pieces written by Ayres and Talley and
Krier and Schwab, property rules are here defined in terms of
one of the many possible coercive remedies (the injunction) that
the right-holder can obtain from the state. Again, this was not
the way C&M originally defined such rules. 162 Nor does Professor Waldron's reformulation make any more sense of the matter
than C&M did. For example, it implies that a prescription requiring consensual transfer- supported by a criminal prohibition
of an unconsented taking would not create a property rule if
injunctive relief were unavailable. 163
Vv'aldron also seems to define inalienability rules in terms of
one particular kind of sanction, the sanction of nullity in the
1
r.tnte's~
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entitlement.
But C&M wrote no such thing; they specified
only that "[ a]n entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its
transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing
l_ \.,...j_
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Id. at 1444 n.3 (citing C&M).
'"See supra Part I and Section I LB.
163 See supra note 91 (discussing the unavailability of injunctive relief when a nuisance has been discontinued); cf. Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1366-67 (rejecting the idea that property rules should be defined in terms of the availability of
injunctive relief). Of course, Waldron might reply that I take him too technically,
that he means "enjoin" in a non-technical sense closer to "prohibit." If he means it in
this way, and if the "support of society" to which he refers means simply the moral
support provided by social authority, then he would be using a notion of property
rules that is very close, if not identical, to the prescriptive interpretation of C&M for
which 1 have argued here. If, however, the social support is a matter of coercive
sanctions, then his notion of property is somewhat different, a notion that l consider
infra in Section IV.B.
1M Another possible interpretation of Waldron's "legal impossibility" is that the law
makes it factually impossible to make the transfer in question. At best, this reading
would make Waldron's notion equivalent to the descriptive form of the rule types
shown wanting in Parts 1 and II supra.
161
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seller." 165 More importantly, a nullity approach leads to the odd
conclusion that an explicit prohibition of alienation would not
create an inalienability rule if a de facto transfer would be legally accepted after the fact, even if criminal punishment were
imposed for the transfer. 166
To be sure, Waldron defines liability rules with somewhat
greater precision than did C&M: He specifies that the actor
must compensate in order to remain within the bounds of social
approval, whereas C&M confusingly specified that the actor
must be "willing" to compensate. 167 But this improvement only
reinforces the prescriptive theory advanced here and the corresponding distinction between the content of a prescription and
the issue of its enforcement. 168 Waldron's definition of liability
rules, though coherent in itself, thus stands in sharp, perhaps
unintended, contrast to his remedy-based definitions of property
and inalienability rules. In other words, the confusion persists.
What accounts for these intransigent responses to the Coleman and Kraus thesis? I suggest several contributing factors.
First, mistakes in exposition may have led readers to dismiss the
arguments of Coleman and Kraus as providing merely an alternative account of transaction rules, an account others are entirely free to disregard in preference for C&M's original, presumably coherent account. As one illustration, Coleman and
Kraus characterized liability rules as rules legitimating a transfer
of the entitlement in question if and only if ex post compensation is paid therefor. 169 It is clear that under their conception of
165
C&M, supra note 4, at 1092. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text; supra
notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
166
In the context of prostitution laws, for example, one can imagine concluding that
the restitution of money paid for illegal sex should not be required because of the
inability to undo the sexual experience, and yet at the same time deciding to punish
one or both parties for violating the rule against selling sex. Cf. Cougler v. Fackler,
510 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1974) {holding that the civil remedy of restitution is inappropriate
where part of consideration for payment is an illicit sexual relationship).
167
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
168
Unfortunately, Waldron adds a temporal dimension to the definition by requiring that the compensation be paid "afterwards." Waldron, supra note 159, at 1444
n.3. This is another mistake, one that Waldron apparently picked up from Coleman
and Kraus. See infra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
169
See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1345; see also id. at 1345 n.15 (asserting
without documentation, that this view "follows closely [the] standard meaning since
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a liability rule, the holder of the entitlement has no power to
make a voluntary sale to the other party. 170 This must have come
as quite a surprise to anyone working with C&M's scheme, since
their first and paradigmatic example of liability rules was the
power of eminent domain. 171 In the context of such governmental acquisition, the parties are free to negotiate a voluntary sale
if they wish, so that legitimate transfer does not proceed only
nonconsensually. Moreover, in the event of a forced sale, the
compensation is typically paid in the same way, temporally
speaking, as for voluntary sales, even though it is sometimes
permissible that it be paid ex post. 172 Similar points apply to
C&M's other principal example of liability rules: nuisances conditionally privileged by their accompanying social benefits. 173 It
Calabresi-Melamed," with the obvious qualification that in their view "transaction
rules specify the content of particular rights").
170
See id. at 1347-49 (noting that liability rules could be defined so as to allow for
the possibility of voluntary sale, expressed as an "alternative" to their view of the
concept of a liability rule, but not attributing this alternative view to C&M).
171
See C&M, supra note 4, at 1093, 1106-07. But see Kaplow & Shavell, supra note
27, at 758 n.143 ("Eminent domain is usually viewed independently, rather than as
part of-the-subject-of property versus~ liability rules .... Nonetheless, some authors
have cited this example in the present context [of liability rules]." (citation omitted)).
And what is the example Kaplow and Shavell give for the "unusual" use of eminent
domain as an example of liability rules? Answer: C&M!
172
See Sackman & Van Brunt, supra note 29, §§ 8.10-.14 (describing limited and
conditional judicial acceptance of ex post compensation and a variety of state laws
requiring prepayment). While landowners occasionally are successful in claiming
that past government action has "taken" the owner's property without just compensation, a so-caiied "inverse condemnation" action, the presumptive remedy for
such a claim is the reversal of the government action (unless the government chooses
to exercise eminent domain). See, e.g., first English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (recognizing landowner's right to
compensation only for losses incurred pending reversal of the governmental action,
at least when such reversal is practically possible).
173
See C&M, supra note 4, at 1105. Certainly nuisance easements can be purchased
before the fact. While I am not aware of modern American cases in which such an
easement has been taken without consent but for ex ante compensation, such takings
are not inconceivable. Indeed, a historical example exists in the allowance of private
eminent domain by milling companies flooding private lands in order to provide
services considered important to the public. See, e.g., John F. Hart, The Maryland
Mill Act, 1669-1766: Economic Policy and the Confiscatory Redistribution of Private
Property, 39 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 3-5 (1995) (discussing such a statutory rule widely
used for a century in colonial Maryland and contrasting it with the colonial law of
Virginia, which also provided for compensation to be paid ex ante). Virginia still
retains statutory provisions for such private takings, although they are phrased in
terms of a taking in fee rather than by easement, lease, or other lesser interest. See
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does not seem, therefore, that Coleman and Kraus were reworking C&M's scheme so much as providing an entirely new
scheme that they believed would be a more useful way to think
about transaction rules. Their readers may simply disagree about
its superior usefulness. 174
Relatedly, Coleman and Kraus did not stress as much as I
have here the strange consequences, indeed the virtual incoherence, of a scheme that identifies property, liability, and inalienability rules with categories of effective enforcement. To rehearse the point in the context of a recent article, consider the
implications of Kaplow and Shavell's characterization of a
property rule:
We will suppose that a property rule involves two elements:
the grant of an entitlement to either the victim or the injurer
and absolute protection of that entitlement. Specifically, if the
victim has the entitlement to be free from harm, the injurer is
precluded from causing harm. We might imagine, for instance,
that an injurer would suffer such a stringent sanction if he
Va. Code Ann. §§ 62.1-116 to 62.1-127 (Michie 1992). There are numerous other
occasions on which private companies have been, and still are, permitted to take
easements or fee interests for a judicially determined amount of compensation.
Historically and economically most important is the example of takings of rights of
way by canal and railroad companies. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law,
Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 17891910, 33 J. Econ. Hist. 232, 237 (1973). It would be very odd not to consider such
practices as involving liability rules under C&M's rule typology just because the
compensation is paid ex ante.
174 In retrospect, Coleman and Kraus were attempting to accomplish part of what
Madeline Morris more effectively achieved several years later. See Morris, supra note
15 (expanding and recategorizing C&M's typology). For example, one confusing
aspect of the article by Coleman and Kraus is the use of the term "combination" to
refer to the creation of new rule structures out of property, liability, and inalienability
rules. See Coleman and Kraus, supra note 8, at 1345-52. If I am correct in my analysis of these rule types, they cannot be "combined" in the sense of creating a rule that
is "both a property and a liability rule," id. at 1348 (their rule (3)), because each rule
type is logically incompatible with each other; combination thus produces a rule that
cannot apply to anything. The same mutual exclusivity applies even more clearly to
the definitions of these rule types as provided by Coleman and Kraus. See id. (their
rules (1) and (2)). Presumably, therefore, they were addressing the creation of hybrids
rather than combinations, which is facilitated by identifying the components that
make up property, liability, and inalienability rules. See Morris, supra note 15 at 83138 (analyzing these and other mutually exclusive rule types in terms of their
"initiation choice," "veto power," "monetary compensation," and "in-kind enjoyment" components).
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caused harm that he would not dare to cause it, or that the state
would directly prevent the injurer from acting to cause harm
(for example, by closing down a plant that did not stop polluting). Similarly, if the injurer possesses the entitlement to cause
. . cannot stop hi m f rom d omg
. so. 175
__ arm, t h e VlCtlill
h

As already mentioned, all ambiguity about the prescriptive or
descriptive character of C&M's rule types has been resolved
here in favor of the descriptive version. Thus, A's entitlement
relative to B is governed by a property rule if and only if B is in
fact so scared by the threat of sanction that he "would not dare"
to take the thing without A's consent. If C is not so scared by
that threat, for reasons entirely personal to C or otherwise unrelated to the normative features of the entitlement, A's rela176
tionship to Cis governed by, at most, a liability rule.
The resulting conceptual scheme does not even cowe close to
the notions of property actually in use in law and in everyday
discourse. In particular, it means that A's right to, say, his automobile is governed by a property rule as to many private citizens, but not as to many others who have no different moral or
legal claim to be privileged in their acquisition of it. If Coleman
m Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27, at 723.
Notice that they do not assume,
separate from the specification of property rules, that persons will be too scared to
violate such rules; rather, they posit that an entitlement is governed by a property
rule only as to those persons who are too scared to violate it.
"'Once again, C might not even be subject to a liability rule, under Kaplow and
Shavell's formulation, if she can somehow avoid the state's demand to pay
compensation. However, their characterization of liability rules is Jess clear in terms
of the issues discussed here. At one point, for example, they write, "We will presume
that under a liability rule, the injurer is permitted to cause harm but must compensate
the victim for the harm, or the court's best estimate of it." Id. (footnotes omitted).
Notice their use of the word "permitted" instead of the word "able," thus suggesting
a guidance rule, but also their use of the ambiguous word "must," which, given their
conception of property rules, probably denotes that the taker cannot avoid paying
the compensation. Elsewhere, they write, "[T]he state may employ liability rules,
under which it merely discourages violations by requiring transgressors to pay victims
for harms suffered." Id. at 715. Once again, the word "requiring" is ambiguous, and
the phrase "discourages violations" stands in sharp contrast with the language of
permission used in the former characterization. The former is clearly closer to that of
C&M, since it covers eminent domain; under the latter characterization, while it is
probably true that the requirement of compensation discourages the use of that
power, such use cannot be said to "violate" the landowner's legal rights. The latter

characterization matches more closely \Vhat 1 have called a remedial compensation

rule, such as that governing tort liability for negligence.
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and Kraus had emphasized such bizarre implications of the descriptive interpretation of C&M's typology perhaps they would
have had greater impact, even among the economists. 177
Finally, Coleman and Kraus did not explain at any length exactly why it is that one needs to provide "content" to entitlements.178 For consequentialists in general, and law and economics practitioners in particular, consequences are everything, or
nearly so. By the same token, conceptual pragmatists will question whether there is any meaning in a rule'aside from its associated consequences. Why, they might ask, does one need more
than the existence of a general sense of entitlement coupled
with the specific enforcement mechanisms that support or deter
its transfer? Doesn't this provide all we need to know in order
to understand transaction structures?
I have suggested the importance of "content" rules by referring to them as "guidance" rules and distinguishing between the
law-abiding citizen and the recalcitrant. Guidance rules are important for law-abiding citizens; for the most part, enforcement
rules are not. 179 Thus, one view of the cathedral is obtained by
m To be sure, Kaplow and Shavell did seem to be aware of a problem. Acknowledging this lack of correspondence with ordinary conceptions, they were forced to
qualify their notion of a property rule by commenting in a footnote, "Of course,
possessory rights are in fact often insecure; theft of one sort or another is frequently a
serious problem. The social intent, however, is ordinarily for possessory rights to be
inviolate, and for ease of exposition, this Article will usually analyze them as such."
Id. at 716 nJ (emphasis added). But what does this mean? The authors' characterization of property rules as providing "absolute protection"-adopted, we are told,
"for ease of exposition"-is fundamentally incompatible with their retreat to the
prescriptive concept of social intent as the key to the property concept. If Kaplow
and Shavell are really operating within the framework of social intent, relevant if not
determinative in a world of Jaw-abiding citizens, their language of fear and physical
restraint is inappropriate as a component of the rule typology; but if they are really
addressing protection against Holmesian bad men, as that language implies, then
social intent is of no behavioral significance. As we shall see, it is possible to combine
the idea of social intent with the interest in controlling recalcitrants, see infra Section
IV.B, but that requires two distinct components of the rule typology rather than a
single but equivocal component.
178
They did give brief attention to the matter in a footnote. See Coleman & Kraus,
supra note 8, at 1347 n.17.
179
There are secondary or derivative ways in which enforcement rules become
relevant to fully law-abiding citizens, as when such citizens must interact with recalcitrants, or otherwise consider their behavior. Even for interactions among lawabiding citizens, enforcement rules will matter for some purposes on some occasions.
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supposing a society populated entirely by such citizens. Even in
such a society, there would be a need for authoritative answers
to questions about the structure of entitlements. Well-behaved
citizens are not necessarily omniscient, nor do they always agree.
So problems of coordination and conflict resolution would still
arise, as would good faith differences of opinion on matters of
principle. 180 As long as there are controversial questions on such
matters that need to be settled for all or most citizens, there will
be a need for guidance rules. 181 Of course, as one moves away
from the admittedly unrealistic assumption of no recalcitrance,
the importance of enforcement rules increases and the importance of guidance rules decreases. But guidance rules remain
behaviorally significant short of the also unrealistic assumption
of perfect recalcitrance. 182 Greater emphasis on these points
would help to convince even the most ardent consequentialist of
the importance of taking seriously the distinction between guidance rules and enforcement rules.
It would also help to overcome the analytical difficulty encountered by Professor Waldron. His inability to see why it
matters whether a given norm is part of the content of a rule or
For example, despite the implicit assumption made throughout the text, it is possible
for a guidance rule and an enforcement rule to conflict so that the enforcement rule
imposes a sanction on an act that the guidance rule permits or even requires a person
to perform. This represents extraordinarily bad law, possibly so bad as not to be law
at all, despite any positivist claims of pedigree. Cf. Fuller, supra note 3, at 65-70
(discussing the related problem of contradiction in the guidance rules themselves).
But ho\vever vve characterize the situation, the !a\v-abiding citizen wiH then have to

attend both to his privileges and duties under the guidance rule and to the potential
consequences of his being sanctioned under the enforcement rule.
wo For interesting work on the problems of coordination and the relevance of norms
thereto, see, e.g., David K. Lewis, Convention: A Philosophical Study (1969);
Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 83. On the public resolution of good faith disagreements on matters of principle, see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, supra note 35, at 164-224
(discussing a theory of legislative integrity and how it affects the resolution of such
disagreements).
" 1 To avoid misinterpretation, I should add that the notion of "guidance" involved
here does not presuppose that the state acts in a paternalistic way, though of course
that is possible. A good faith difference of opinion among citizens as to the appropriate rule to govern a particular context may require resolution without necessarily
implying that the state's lawmakers know better than the citizens what the right result
is, let alone that the rules adopted will neglect the importance of individual autonomy.
1" See Laycock, supra note 6, at 8-9 (noting the importance of non-remedial
substantive law to the law-abiding citizen and accordingly criticizing the tendency to
collapse the distinction between such law and the law of remedies).
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part of its enforcement structure can perhaps be attributed to
the uninformative nature of the term "content" employed by
Coleman and Kraus. Whereas ''enforcement" speaks clearly to
the purpose of dealing with recalcitrants, "content" is opaque in
terms of purpose. To put the matter differently, guidance rules
have content, but so do enforcement rules, and the importance
of content is determined by the purpose to be served. Once one
sees this, it is clear why one needs to know whether a given provision is part of the (content of the) guidance rule or part of the
(content of its) enforcement provisions.
For example, we have seen that a monetary exaction that is
part of a guidance rule operates as a price, as in Law #2 and
Law #4, whereas one that is part of an enforcement rule operates as a sanction, as in Law #1 and Law #3. 183 And that difference, once again, matters to the law-abiding citizen. Thus, when
a law is ambiguous, some interpretive effort is required to decide which canonical form is involved. Consider:
Law #5: Any person who discharges chemical XYZ into the air,
water, or ground in excess of the amounts specified in the foregoing provisions must pay to the State Environmental Agency
$5,000 per ounce of excess XYZ discharged.

A law expressed in this manner must be construed by the lawabiding citizen to determine whether the discharge of chemical
XYZ is prohibited, as in Law #3, or conditionally permissible, as
in Law #4. Only by making that judgment can such a citizen understand the law and conform her conduct to its requirements. 184
With the benefit of these clarifications, the significance of the
Coleman and Kraus thesis should be more widely appreciated.
In Part V, I take some preliminary steps toward incorporating
into a general analytic theory of law the insight that C&M pro-

See supra Section III.A.
For example, if the "foregoing provisions" prohibit the discharge of XYZ beyond
stated amounts, then Law #5 would be interpreted as a sanction, especially (but not
only) if the $5,000 figure is disproportionate to the costs imposed by the discharge.
If, on the other hand, the discharge of XYZ is not expressly prohibited and if discharges within the stated limits are probably of de minimis impact, and the $5,000
figure approximates the environmental harm of larger discharges, then Law #5 would
be more sensibly interpreted as a price. Other assumptions can make interpretation
more difficult.
'
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vided a typology of guidance rules. Before doing so, however, I
address more fully the jurisprudential significance of enforcement
rules in relation to the reconstructed typology of guidance rules.

B. The Pragmatic Significance of Enforcement
The persistent attention to consequences nevertheless raises
the possibility of a third conception of what C&M's transaction
rules are about. To see how, one must recognize the interdependence of guidance and enforcement issues. For any normative legal theory-including, in particular, any form of liberalism-in which the question of the moral validity of a rule is, at
least in part, a function of the means of its enforcement, to address the content of a legal rule is unavoidably to address the
question of enforcement. VVhen we ask whether to make a law
against particular conduct, ordinarily \Ve are not simply asking
whether that conduct is desirable and whether a rule should exist to discourage it, but rather whether it is so undesirable, or so
undesirable in particular ways, as to warrant a prohibition backed
by coercive sanctions. 185 Distinguishing between guidance rules
and enforcement rules carries the potential to be understood, or
rather misunderstood, as necessarily separating the process of
generating guidance rules from the process of generating the associated enforcement rules.
I have argued elsewhere that any radical separation of this
186
sort is a misleading way of thinking about legal issues.
The
ability to distinguish analytically the problem of formtilating
guidance rules from the problem of formulating enforcement
rules should not lead to the conclusion that the former task can
be undertaken without regard to the latter. This is true not only
185 To be sure, the state can and sometimes does act in ways that are not coercive, at
least not in the physical sense, and one should avoid the conceptual mistake of
thinking that a particular norm is "law" only to the extent that it is backed by such
coercive sanctions. See generally Hart, supra note 65, at 26-48 (developing objections to the simple model of law as coercive orders). Thus, it would be a mistake to
say that Law #1 and Law #2 are identical qua law even though they are admittedly
different qua guidance rules.
'"Dale A. Nance, Legal Theory and the Pivotal Role of the Concept of Coercion,
57 U. Colo. L Rev. 1 (1985) (arguing that the paradigmatic conception of law is the
governance of human conduct by coercively enforced rules and criticizing tendencies
in modern jurisprudence to downplay the significance of coercion).
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for practical reasons, such as the need to shape guidance rules in
ways conducive to enforcement, but also for the important theoretical reason that the "moral jurisdiction" of an institution to
promulgate guidance rules is affected by the nature of the enforcement rules that will be brought to bear.' 87 It may be morally legitimate to condemn the white supremacist's advocacy, yet
morally illegitimate to incarcerate him for that advocacy.
Moreover, persons recalcitrant in a particular context are not
necessarily selfishly free riding on a system of social cooperation. They might be civil disobedients acting entirely in good
faith, or they might be morally in the right, or they might be
both. 188 Inevitably, the use of coercive sanctions to deal with recalcitrants affects the nature of the guidance rules that an institution may properly promulgate, at least in a liberal order. 189
The desire to structure our concepts so as to retain at least the
possibility of such liberal discourse may help to explain the persistence of attempts to connect the different rule types with particular coercive remedies or sanctions. As indicated above, these
attempts have so far been imprecise and largely unsuccessful,
but that does not mean that they necessarily must be so. The
idea would be to interpret the various rule types as being stated

187 To amplify this point, two potential errors can creep into the process of
lawmaking when the formulation of guidance rules is separated from the process of
generating enforcement rules. First, the issue of enforcement may come to be seen as
of quite secondary importance, so that any good guidance rule is automatically seen
as worthy of enforcement-the problem of the overenforcement of morality. Second,
one may fail to recognize that the content of the guidance rule may be rightly
affected by the means of enforcement that is chosen. In other words, one cannot
assume that the set of properly enforceable guidance rules is simply a subset of the
set of guidance rules that would be proper if enforcement were unnecessary. As the
history of the common law amply demonstrates, the evolution of enforced guidance
rules is affected by the interaction of guidance rules with the particular means of
enforcement employed. Or, to put the matter differently, rights have evolved in the
context of remedies.
188
A classic statement of the liberal ethos is Justice Brennan's majority opinion in
the Texas flag burning case. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional a statute criminalizing the offensive burning of the national flag).
189
Although the examples in the text are drawn from the context of governmental
restrictions on speech, similar concerns undoubtedly affect seemingly more mundane
topics like property rights. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale
L.J. 733, 771 (1964) (emphasizing the importance of private property in protecting a
sphere of privacy and autonomy within which the state may not reach).
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with implicit reference to the use of the full panoply of coercive
remedies.
Thus, when C&M wrote that under a liability rule a person
"may destroy" the entitlement conditioned on payment of compensation/90 perhaps they were trying to capture the idea that
no coercive state action may be employed as a consequence of
the taking or damaging except to assure a public determination
of appropriate compensation and, if necessary, to induce its
payment. If that is all that the permissive locution means, then
it is silent on the question of governmental approval or disapproval of the action, for the permission is directed at officials.
So construed, the definition offered by C&M would embrace
both situations in which the activity is condoned, such as eminent domain, and those in which the activity is proscribed, such
as negligent driving. On the other hand, it would not cover the
application of criminal sanctions or punitive damage awards to
reckless driving.
A more complicated adjustment would be necessary to make
coherent the definition of property rules. One would need to
indicate that property rules involve the use of coercive remedies
e\!eri When- appi'ophate c-ompensation is paid, if consent to the
transfer is not obtained. But which coercive remedies? Once
again, the availability of injunctive relief is an inadequate criterion, since one can imagine protecting property guidance rules
with only criminal sanctions. Conversely, a definition solely in
terms of criminal sanctions will not do, since one can easily
imagine protecting property guidance rules with only civil
remedies. So we are driven to something like the foUowing: A
property rule is in place whenever some coercive state action
(other than those permitted under liability rules) may be employed against a person who takes or damages an entitlement if
and only if the taking or damaging is without the consent of the
holder of the entitlement. 191 Inalienability rules would in turn be
characterized as operating whenever some coercive state action
(other than those permitted under liability rules) may be em°C&M, supra note 4, at 1092.

19

The parenthetical qualification is necessary to preserve the mutual exclusivity of
the rule types, as C&M clearly intended; the "only if" restriction is necessary to
prevent the definition from embracing what we will want to call inalienability rules_
191
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ployed in the event of a putative transfer, taking, or damaging of
an entitlement with the consent of the holder of the entitlement.
Scholars working in this tradition may have been groping toward a set of definitions like these, definitions that place the coercive remedies in a predominant position in the very conception
of transaction rules. 192 As an interpretation of C&M's original
work, this description has the virtue already described of subsuming two very different kinds of "liability" rules under the
same category, seemingly in accord with C&M's applications.
But what has really been gained by this reformulation? On
closer inspection, very little.
In the first place, this pragmatic approach does not speak in
terms of what citizens are in fact forced to do, but rather in
terms of what the law is prepared to try to force them to do. The
latter is morally relevant, but it is of very little help to those interested in efficiency comparisons, since it is impossible to say
anything meaningful in a world of non-negligible recalcitrance
about the relative efficiency of the various rule types unless one
adds empirical information, or at least empirical assumptions,
about the nature, extent of use, and effectiveness of the coercive
measures that are in fact available in each context. For example, it would be impossible to conclude that a liability rule is
more efficient than a property rule-even if there are high
transfer transaction costs and low damages assessment costsuntil one knows much more about the coercive remedies that
would be applied to enforce them. In particular, enforcement of
the liability rule might be so weak that it does not deter recalcitrants from taking without paying the required compensation, in
which case a property rule could be more efficient than a liability rule whether or not the property rule deters takings. So the
pragmatic consequentialist approach, or at least this particular
one, leaves too much unspecified for the economist's purposes. 193

'"See supra notes 5, 37, 154, 156, 158, 161 and accompanying text.
193
The same point remains true even if the definitions are changed by specifying not
when coercive sanctions may be employed but when they will be employed. This
compromise descriptive approach eliminates, definitionally speaking, uncertainty
about sanction employment in trying to discern the effects of a rule, but the seriousness of the sanctions remain too indefinite to allow accurate conclusions about
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In the second place, such remedy-based grouping of guidance
rules loses important information about the subject norms. In
particular, since both Law #1 and Law #2 fall within this pragmatic categorization of "liability" rules, neither the citizen nor
the analyst can discern, just from knowing that it is governed by
a "liability" rule, whether the conduct is socially approved or
socially condemi1ed. 194 The grouping does not respond, therefore, to the needs of the law-abiding citizenry or to the concerns
of the analyst who would take such citizens into account. Of
course, the actual rules that fall into this grouping may provide
the needed information. But as long as there are significant
numbers of law-abiding citizens in the society, empirical generalizations about their behavior will be in part a function of the
content of those rules in a way that is not captured by the fact
that they both fall within the category of "liability" rules. And
that further complicates the task of making any useful generalizations about the relative efficiency of those rules.
This second category of problems can be handled by fusing
guidance rules with coercive sanctions. More precisely, one
could cl~fine eac}l rule type by reference to both (1) its content
as a pure guidance rule, and (2) conditions on the use of coercive sanctions. Such hybrid rule types would preserve the focus
on guidance for the law-abiding and, at the same time, serve to
highlight the moral issues raised by the use of state coercion to
deal with recalcitrants. For example, one could interpret C&M's
property rule category as follows:
Pragmatic Conception of Property Rules in Law: A's entitlement relative to B is governed by a property rule if and only if
(1) B is permitted to take or damage the entitlement only with
A's consent, and (2) some state-authorized coercive sanction
may be employed against B on account of B's taking or damaging the entitlement in violation of (1).

Thinking in terms of such Janus-faced structures may well be
the most philosophically illuminating way to understand many

efficiency in the face of recalcitrance. A formal demonstration of this point is
presented in the Appendix.
PM In other words, some instances of conventional property, those protected only by
a monetary damage remedy, would fall within the liability rule category.
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legal rules. 195 Certainly, this conception of property rules is far
closer to conventional use of the idea of property, _that of lay
persons as well as lawyers, than the remedy-focused conceptions
articulated above. 196 But once again, without empirical information or assumptions about the effectiveness of the coercive sanctions as well as the extent of recalcitrance among the population-information that is no part of this conception of property
rules-one is unable to make any significant generalizations
about the efficiency of such rules as compared to similarly defined liability or inalienability rules. 197

"'Compare this Pragmatic Conception with the following now classic definition of
property:
[T]hat is property to which the following label can be attached:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or
withhold.
Signed:
Private citizen
Endorsed: The state
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 374 (1954). Of
course, neither the Pragmatic Conception in the text nor Professor Cohen's more
picturesque formulation captures the liberal concept of full ownership of a thing,
though for different reasons. For example, to obtain the notion of A's ownership of
Blackacre, one must specify not only that A may keep B off Blackacre, but also that
A may herself use Blackacre without B's consent. The Pragmatic Conception, like all
versions of C&M's typology, leaves open the nature of the entitlement at issue; it can
refer to A's Hohfeldian liberty vis-a-vis B to use a thing or to A's Hohfeldian claimright that B not use the thing. Nevertheless, ownership entails more than just a particular form of transaction rule. See generally A.M. Honore, Ownership, in Oxford
Essays in Jurisprudence (A. G. Guest ed., 1961).
19
' Notice that conventional property rights, even those protected only by damages
remedies, are back in the property rule category where they belong.
197
To complete the story, such definitions are included here:
Pragmatic Conception of Liability Rules in Law: A's entitlement relative to B is
governed by a liability rule if and only if (1) B is permitted to take or damage
the entitlement with or without A's consent, provided that if done without A's
consent then B must compensate A for the value of the loss in an amount and
under terms publicly determined, and (2) some state-authorized coercive sanction
may be employed against B on account of B's taking or damaging the entitlement in violation of (1).
Pragmatic Conception of Inalienability Rules in Law: A's entitlement relative to
B is governed by an inalienability rule if and only if (1) B is not permitted to
take or damage the entitlement with A's consent, and (2) some state-authorized
coercive sanction may be employed against B on account of B's taking or
damaging the entitlement in violation of (1).
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The present argument certainly does not rule out on conceptual grounds a comparative efficiency analysis, even one that
proceeds by making simplifying assumptions. It insists only that
concepts be employed in a coherent and sensible fashion. Up
until now, the most common simplification facilitating efficiency
comparisons has been to assume, either implicitly or explicitly,
the operation of perfectly effective sanctions, whether as part of
the meaning of transaction rules or as a separate social parameter. As in C&M's arguments, damages are assumed to be paid,
injunctions are assumed to be obeyed, and criminal prohibitions
are assumed to be effective, at least until the question of "optimal enforcement" is addressed specifically, usually in the con198
text of criminal sanctions.
The principal difficulty with this approach is that the assumption about remedial effectiveness, however quickly it is abandoned, is in tension with the Holmesian assumption about the
citizenry, the assumption that makes it superficially plausible to
ignore the distinction between guidance and enforcement. Does
it make sense after all to assume that all citizens will ignore any
legal rule to the extent it is not backed by a coercive sanction
and~-at the sametime, 10 assume that they will obey the rule to
the extent it is backed by such a sanction? Such a world is peculiar indeed. The examples that come to mind are the legal
Notice that under these Pragmatic Conceptions not all structures involving remedies
limited to compensation are liability rules, but only those that, like conventional
options, B is permitted to exercise. On the other hand, the traditional option does
llOI involve a liability rule, because the option exercise price, as distinct from the
price of the option itself, is privately determined. Such options simply constitute a
form of property rule. Thus, all liability rules involve a kind of option, but not all
options involve liability rules. Cf. Rose, supra note 22, at 2178-79 (characterizing a
liability rule as a property right subject to an option). Notice also that the Pragmatic
Conception of inalienability includes, but is not limited to, structures under which the
entitlement may be taken without A's consent for a publicly determined price. As
noted earlier, it might be better to separate such rules from rules that provide for full
inalienability, that is, from entitlements that may not be taken with or withoul A's
consent. See supra note 99. This has the virtue of isolating two logically independent
binary variables, A's power to transfer voluntarily to B, or its absence, and A's liability
to involuntary transfer to B, or its absence.
198 Compare C&M, supra note 4, at 1106-24 (apparently assuming effectiveness of
sanctions in discussing relative merits of property, liability, and inalienability rules)
with id. al 1093 (noting that economic considerations include questions of administrative costs of enforcement) and id. al 1124-27 (acknowledging that enforcement of
criminal sanctions is less than perfect).
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system of an unjust and illegitimate state populated by moral yet
cowardly citizens, or alternatively that of an omnipotent state,
however just, populated by narrowly self-interested citizens.
Evidently, the latter is the image that hovers in the back of more
than one scholar's mind. 199 Still, why either such system should
be used as a model from which to learn about our own is in considerable need of explanation.
Economic analysis can proceed, however, without the Holmesian baggage. One need not assume ubiquitous recalcitrance.
Starting with our Pragmatic Conceptions, which avoid the confusions that attend building effectiveness into the rule types
themselves, one can separately assume that the sanctions brought
to bear are in fact sufficiently powerful to persuade all recalcitrants, or at least those of interest, not to violate the rules' prescriptions. Since the law-abiding need no compulsion, this would
produce a situation of uniformly law-conforming behavior that
can be analyzed in terms of transaction costs, compensation assessment costs, and so forth. 200 Some, but by no means all, of the
conclusions that law and economics writers have advanced can be
restated in such terms. 201 A major difference identified in the
course of the present analysis is that sanctions will not be
treated as prices by the law-abiding, a fact that will be of practical significance as the assumption about the strength of the sanctions is relaxed. Failure to recognize this fact, and a resulting
underestimation of the behavioral impact of guidance rules
backed by relatively weak sanctions, have been recurring features of extant law and economics literature.

199
Recall C&M's assumptions about the behavior of people in the absence of state
authority. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
200
In particular, this is the best way to reconstruct the confused yet laudably explicit
conceptual scheme employed by Professors Kaplow and Shavell. See supra notes
175-177 and accompanying text. For example, A's entitlement to her automobile can
be felicitously described as governed by a property rule by noting that the prescriptive norm is that others are not allowed to take her car without her permission.
It is also true, as a contingent and assumed fact, that recalcitrants who would not
honor this prescription are prevented from taking the car without her permission by
the presence of sanctions. This way, when the assumption of perfect effectiveness of
sanctions is relaxed, it is still correct to say that A's entitlement is governed by a
property rule even as to a person who is willing to take A's car without her consent.
201
This point will be illustrated further in Part V, infra.
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Rather than continue this line of analysis, I want to suggest a
different, and I think more useful, way to approach the design of
transaction structures. Instead of assuming initially a nonubiquitous recalcitrance that is entirely offset by powerful threats of
coercive sanctions, it is in many ways more illuminating to assume initially no recalcitrance at all. Although in theory one
should generate the same results from either direction, this assumption requires one to focus more explicit attention on law's
relevance to the neglected "silent majority" of citizens. who are
generally law-abiding.
V. THE DESIGN OF GUIDANCE AND ENFORCEMEI'IT RULES

Consider the simplifying assumption that all persons, or at
least those persons of interest in the particular analysis, are
completely law-abiding. This eliminates the need to assume the
uniform effectiveness of coercive remedies and allows a direct
comparison of the efficiency of property, liability, and inalienability rules on terms not terribly dissimilar to that of C&M
(provided one filiers out the language of recalcitrance). Indeed,
this is the best way to reconstruct C&M's argument. 202 As we
have seen, one then works with the prescriptive concepts of such
rule types, as reflected in the first component of our Pragmatic
Conceptions. There is no conceptual tension of the sort encountered in the more usual analysis, built on the Holmesian perspective. Of course, one need not limit the arguments to efficiency considerations; the assumption of no recalcitrance facilitates, but does not require, a focus on efficiency. In any case,
the model of society from which this analysis works is considerably less cynical, and in most contexts substantially closer to
203
reality, than those associated with the Holmesian perspective.

201 Recall that C&M proceed by first addressing the allocation of entitlements,
based on considerations of economic efficiency, distributional preferences, and other
concerns, see C&M supra note 4, at 1093-1105, and then addressing the protection of
those entitlements by property rules, liability rules, or inalienability rules, see id. at
1105-15. The analysis in the text parallels this approach but does not duplicate it.
203 1t is interesting to contrast this model with those that economists consider
optimistic. Professor Polinsky, in an oft-cited early article elaborating and qualifying
the C&M framework, started with a set of unusually explicit assumptions that he
called "the best of all possible worlds," one of "cooperative behavior, costless
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In the following Sections, I illustrate the value of approaching
the analysis of entitlements in this way. ·After developing several thoughts about how the law would be articulated in the context of no recalcitrance, the assumption is relaxed to allow for
some, but never complete, recalcitrance. Only a cursory analysis is attempted here, as this subject amounts to the reconstruction of law in a liberal state.
A. Guidance Rules in a World of No Recalcitrance

Guidance will be of value even to the most scrupulously lawabiding citizens. Our assumption does not require that citizens
have shared values, other than r_ecognition of the importance of
the rule of law, nor does it require that citizens have perfect, or
even imperfect but shared, information about the world. 204 Assuming a world of persons of varying interests, values, and information, in some contexts people will need to know whether a
certain entitlement is alienable. If so, they may consider options
for alienation. If it is not, they will not attempt to alienate. In
some contexts people will need to know whether a certain entitlement can be adversely affected, destroyed, or taken, without
the consent of its holder, provided compensation is paid. If not,
they will not take. If so, they will choose, on whatever grounds
of utility or fairness that matter to them, whether or not to take
the entitlement. But if they do take, they will voluntarily pay
the necessary compensation. Some form of adjudication may be
necessary in order to determine an "objective" value of the entitlement, but declaratory relief will suffice; enforcement of the
debt so generated will not be necessary. In this manner, C&M's

redistribution, and perfect information." A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L.
Rev. 1075, 1080 (1980). Moreover, it is clear from his discussion that "cooperative
behavior" does not mean law-abiding behavior, but rather the absence of often selfdefeating and efficiency-defeating strategic hold-out behavior. See id. at 1078.
Polinsky was, of course, precluded from considering law-abiding behavior as part of
the "best of all possible worlds" because he followed the usual identification of rule
types with remedy types, in the context of which recalcitrance is implicitly assumed.
See id. at 1076 (identifying property rules with injunctive relief and liability rules with
damages).
204
See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
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property rules, liability rules, and inalienability rules should be
seen as among the various ways that social life can be structured.
Problems such as the overuse of resources held in common,
transaction costs, holdouts, and free riders-the principal issues
underlying C&M's analysis-would exist as well in the hypothesized world. Consequently, in considering how particular classes
of entitlements should be structured, the various considerations
of static efficiency, dynamic efficiency, and distributional
pref205
Pererences that C&M describe would still come into play.
sonally, I find C&M's framework rather impoverished in its failure to take seriously justice-based arguments that do not depend
ultimately on the idea of preferences. But that is another story. I
do not pretend to offer here a comprehensive normative theory
of transaction structures. 206 Certainly, it is difficult to envision a
system that emphasizes property rules and inalienability rules
without presupposing some form of liberal legal order, wherever
situated on the political spectrum. And that has important implications. The most obvious is that liability rules should be disfavored, involving as they do a clear incursion on the autonomy
of the entitlement holder. Of course, as communitarians would
be quick to observe, property rules involve an incursion on the
autonomy of the non-holder in that they eliminate the freedom
to take without the holder's consent. But economists will surely
recognize that the two incursions are not symmetric: The holder
may invest time and energy in the res governed by the rule and
thus stands to lose under a liability rule in a way207that is not applicable to the non-holder under a property rule. Thus, iiabi1' 05 In many cases, work by scholars in the Jaw and economics tradition can be
"translated" into versions relevant to such an assumed world. See Stephen Marks,
Utility and Community: Musings on the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 215,
225-26 (1996) (indicating that C&M's article, as well as more recent work by Ayres
and Talley and by Kaplow and Shavell, may be understood as relevant to a world in
which full compliance is assumed).
'Db This would, of course, be a Herculean undertaking. As Professor Marks notes in
connection with his assumed world of full compliance, we can imagine working out
the details of "property Jaw, contract Jaw, corporation Jaw, the Jaw of estates and
trusts, tax Jaw, commercial law, and securities law," among others. See id. at 226.
207 And this is true even if the investment of time and energy by the holder is not
reflected in the economic value of the res. Professors Coleman and Kraus distinguish
the classical liberal conception of property rights, motivated by a concern to protect
autonomy, from the economistic conception of property rights premised on pro-
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ity rules should be limited to situations in which there is a demonstrable and convincing need to override the holder's choice
to refuse alienation. Further, as between property and inalienability rules, property rules should be the default preference,
in this context out of respect for the autonomy of the willing
holder and the willing transferee. The precise conditions under
which a convincing need arises to override these default preferences are of course controversial, but a mere gain in economic
efficiency may not be enough. 208 Moreover, the reality of the
claimed needs, even on narrow economic grounds, is often subject to challenge. 209
The main point for present purposes, however, is that the entire thrust of the questions to be addressed changes dramatically
as one shifts focus, however incrementally, to consider the recalcitrant citizen. In particular, it should now be clear that in
discussing the various guidance rule types, one can raise the
question of what form of enforcement is best as to each. Thus it
is perfectly coherent, if not always desirable, to speak of property rules that are enforced only by compensatory damage
awards, or only by punitive damage awards, or by both; of liability rules that are enforced only by injunctions, or only by
criminal sanctions, or by both; and of inalienability rules that
are enforced by any of these, singly or in combination. The
combinations are obviously many. Indeed, if there are, say, six
primary remedial options (e.g., criminal sanction, civil compensation, restitution, civil punitive awards, injunctive relief, and
recovery of litigation expenses) that can each be used or not
used to protect a given entitlement, then sixty-four basic remetecting only the (economic) value of the entitlement. See Coleman & Kraus, supra
note 8, at 1356-65.
208 Professor Dworkin has argued, for example, that even if certain rights, like
property rights, are causally attributable to the economic advantages to society
derived therefrom, those rights generate claims that need not be defeasible in the
interest of policies such as achieving economic efficiency. See Ronald Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously 90-100 {1978).
209 For example, a recent article demonstrates that the need to allow buyers to take
intellectual property without enduring high transaction costs, a problem that has led
to proposals for compulsory licensing schemes, can be and is being handled under
property rules by parties' contracting into schemes that allow subsequent compensated takings. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293 (1996).
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dial combinations are possible. 210 For each guidance rule category, one can therefore consider which combination of remedies
is appropriate. 211
A recent article by Stephen Marks illustrates several of these
points nicely. 212 Professor Marks employs a set of simplifying assumptions in order to investigate the relationship of the C&M
sche11Ie to tort and crilTLinallavv. He assumes "shared valt1es" in
the sense of views about what constitutes a good society,
"shared knowledge" about the facts of the world, and voluntary
213
"full compliance" with the authoritatively announced rules. After analyzing how entitlements might be structured in this assumed world, he relaxes first the assumption of full-compliance
and then the assumption of shared knowledge. In particular,
Marks recognizes the crucial if obvious point that the question
of coercive remedies only enters the picture when the former assumption is relaxed. This analysis is offered for the ultimate
purpose of illustrating how utilitarian theorists can explain the
now prominent idea of excluding from the social utility to be
maximized the utility resulting for criminals from their criminal
acts. 214 Marks' solution is that we collectively choose rules so as
to maximize social utility in the full compliance world, but we
strip criminally derived utility from the social welfare function
210 A remedial dimensionality of m = 6, meaning six binary variables that can be
combined in any way, yields (2)' = 64 possible remedial combinations, not all of
which would necessarily be meaningful or practical. In Section IV.B, infra, I iry to
outline some practical considerations identifying the most important combinations.
For a good discussion of some remedial subtleties inspired by the C&M framework,
see Levmore, supra note 37.
211 According to Professor Morris' elaboration of the C&M scheme, the three (or
four, if one distinguishes between partial and full inalienability, see supra note 99)
C&M rule types are just some of the 14 meaningful entitlement forms (out of a
possible (2)' = 64 forms) that can be generated by different combinations of three
binary variables with respect to transfer applicable to either party: "initiation choice,"
"veto power," and "monetary compensation." See Morris, supra note 15, at 838-49.
Thus, C&M's scheme of transfer rules is based on a guidance rule dimensionality of
n = 6, meaning six independent binary variables, even though not all combinations
are meaningful.
21 ' See Marks, supra note 205.
213 ld. at 223-24. This is the only such use of the full-compliance assumption that I
have encountered in the work of theorists making explicit use of the C&lvl rule
typology.
214 See id. C\t 221-23.
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once the full-compliance assumption is relaxed and the issue is
simply one of optimal enforcement levels. 215
Despite the insightful use of a full-compliance model, Marks'
argument suffers from confusing features and incomplete arguments. Foremost is the question of why, in a world with all
these assumptions, one would need rules at all. With shared
knowledge, shared social values, and well-behaved citizens, why
would people not simply know and do what is best without the
aid of rules? Perhaps there is an answer to this question, but
Marks does not provide it. 216 My suggestion that the need for
authoritative rules arises from problems of coordination in a
world of imperfect information and from good faith disagreements on matters of moral principle provides the basis for the
promulgation of rules, compliance with which Marks initially assumes. Thus, in constructing models for an analysis of law, however ideal, one must not lose sight of the problems that make
law an important, if not necessary, social institution. 217
Notwithstanding the assumption of no recalcitrance, whatever
scheme of property, liability, and inalienability rules is chosen
for the law-abiding citizenry will include a class of remedial
rules concerning transfers that can be subsumed only with some

See id. at 228-29.
See id. at 224 (asserting, without explanation, that inhabitants of such a world
would promulgate rules). Because of the assumptions of shared knowledge and
shared social values, the answer cannot lie in the claim that individuals will have
differing opinions about how social utility should be maximized. Perhaps the answer
lies in the proposition that the full-compliance assumption, which pertains only to
rules, presupposes that authoritative rules are adopted, so that without such rules
there will be no assurance that people will choose to maximize social utility in their
actions even though they all know what actions would lead to such a result and all
value such a result. It is not clear how this can be fleshed out.
211
One cannot tell exactly what Professor Marks intends by his assumption of
shared values, because he does not go through the exercise of relaxing that assumption. See id. at 217 n.7. Such an exercise would give needed contextual definition to
the original assumption as well as to its relationship to the assumption of shared information. Similarly, his main argument for the possible usefulness of liability rulesrules conditioning the permissibility of some acts upon the payment of compensation-in a world of full compliance depends upon the public's being unable to
observe directly the actor's personal utility, so that compensation is used to test the
value of the act to the actor. See id. at 225. But Marks does not explain how this
problem even arises in a world of completely shared information, which he also
assumes at this point in his argument. See id. at 224.
215
216
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work under the prescriptive version of the C&M typology or a
suitable elaboration thereof. These are rules that deal with the
innocent mistakes that even law-abiding citizens will occasionally make. For example, suppose Taney sends money to MarshaH by mistake; the money was meant to go to Chase in discharge of a debt. Assuming that the social judgment is that
I\tiarshall must return the money, l\1arshall has a duty that is a
not so obvious feature of Taney's property right in the money.
Not only must Marshall refrain from intentionally or negligently
taking or destroying Taney's money, the more obvious kind of
duty, but he must also return such money when mistakenly
given to him without any fault on his part. 218
Similarly, suppose Taney destroys the object of Marshall's
property right under the reasonable but mistaken belief that the
res was within Taney's property rights or that their relationship
with regard to the res was governed by a liability rule. 219 Assuming that the social judgment is that the burden of such mishaps should fall on the destroyer, Taney may be required to
compensate Marshall for the loss. 220
To be sure, one might conclude from the preceding that the
law of negligence, in its remedial dimensions, would have no
role at all in a world of law-abiding citizens; negligence is faulty
conduct, and such conduct would not occur in the hypothesized
world. Individuals' property interests in not being harmed negligently would be respected, so the law of negligence would consist simply of a prohibition or set of prohibitions against unreasonably risky acts. The problem of innocent mistakes, however,
forces us to qualify this conclusion to a small but perceptible ex-

m See Dobbs, supra note 91, § 4.1(1), at 553. By the same token, an innocent finder
must return the thing found to its previous holder. See Ray Andrews Brown, The
Law of Personal Property§ 3.1, at 24 (Walter B. Raushenush ed., 3d ed. 1975).
' 1' As these possibilities i!!ustrate, there can be uncertainty among a wholly Jawabiding citizenry even after guidance rules are promulgated on a given subject.
Devices such as declaratory relief are of value in such cases. See Hart, supra note 65,
at 89-96 (discussing uncertainty as one of the central problems that developed legal
institutions attempt to solve, and distinguishing this issue from the problem of developing efficient sanctions to enforce obligations).
220 See Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 17, at 110 (noting that reasonable mistake is
rarely an effective defense to a claim for damages resulting from otherwise intentional torts).
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tent. Negligence liability under current law is often said to be,
in theory and perhaps in practice, a matter of objective fault,
with conduct measured by what is reasonable for the hypothetical person of ordinary prudence, not what would or did seem
reasonable to the actual actor. 221 Consequently, such liability
may be imposed upon someone who has acted in utmost good
faith. Of course, the presence of good faith does not mean that
the actor is without fault, even in a subjective sense, because a
mistake that led to those good faith beliefs might itself have
been one that ought not to have been made. But in the case of
actions of children or the insane, for example, fault-based liability under negligence law might well entail no plausible claim
that the actual actor should have acted otherwise. 222 Thus, to the
limited extent that subjective fault is not mirrored by objective
fault, the compensatory demands of conventional negligence liability might be necessary even in the hypothetical society of
completely law-abiding citizens. 223
See id. § 32, at 173-75.
See id. at 176-82. Use of an objective standard might be a consequence of underlying principles of moral responsibility, as distinct from moral fault, or it might simply
be a consequence of concerns about the difficulties of proving subjective fault, with
objective fault being used as a proxy. See id. § 4, at 21-23. To the extent that this use
of an objective standard is the result of proof difficulties, it would be largely unnecessary in a world of law-abiding citizens, who would not make perjurious denials about
material facts.
223 It is instructive to contrast this point with what Professor Marks has to say about
compensation rules when he relaxes the full-compliance assumption. Marks draws
the following conclusion about the respective roles of strict and fault-based tort
liability: "Tort law has a dual nature, encompassing both prohibited and conditionally
permissible acts. However, this duality does not correspond to the divide between
strict liability and negligence." Marks, supra note 205, at 233. The first of these
conclusions is entirely consistent with the arguments of the present Article. The
second is consistent with the present arguments only to the extent that negligence
liability covers conditionally permissible acts as described in the text or to the extent
that strict liability is a misnomer. See supra note 60. These are not, however, the
considerations that led Marks to his conclusion, for he concedes that compensation
based on negligence is a form of fault-based liability that is introduced as a possible
legal response only with the relaxation of the full-compliance assumption. See id. at
228 n.39 and accompanying text. Rather, he reaches this conclusion by hypothesizing
a world without full compliance in which the following transaction structure is put in
place:
211

212
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These various obligations of restitution and compensation for
mistakes might be construed as prescriptive liability rules, since
they do not involve the social judgment that the action giving
rise to the obligation was improper. On the other hand, this is
not to say that the law condones those actions. In the context of
negligent or intentional (but good faith) harms, it is surely true
that, could those harms or mistakes be publicly anticipated, the
social judgment would be that the act should not be performed;
indeed, if such anticipation were communicated to the actor before the action is taken, it would change the conditions that render the act not improper. Even in the context of a mistaken delivery of an item to another, communication of the anticipated
burdening of the innocent recipient might well deprive the actor
of the benefit of the rule requiring restitution. Such features are
not part of the paradigms of liability rule invoked by C&M, such
as eminent domain, and there is no reason to think C&M intended their conception to extend to the restitutionary obligations outlined here.
act prohibited act conditionally permissible act permissible
lowest level
I
I
highest ievei
of care
A
B
of care
harms
harms
harms
not compensated
compensated
compensated
Id. at 231 exhibit 3G. Under this structure, actions with the lowest levels of precaution (less than A) are prohibited and violations of the prohibition are subject to a
requirement of compensation; actions with the highest levels of precaution (greater
than B) are unconditionally permitted; and actions with intermediate levels of
precaution are permitted subject to a duty to compensate. This and similar structures, Marks concludes, "resemble activities subject to negligence," id. at 231, yet it
entails conditionally permissible action (between A and B). Given his earlier
concession that negligence entails fault, it is not clear why Marks concludes that the
structure as a whole "resembles" negligence, except that it is true that the requirement of compensation is discontinuous as a function of precaution, with the discontinuity occurring at point B. He does not explain why it would not be more accurate
to say that the structure is a mixed system of negligence and strict liability, with
negligence liability below level A and strict liability at levels between A and B. For
there are two discontinuities in the structure, one that determines fault (at point A)
and one that determines the duty to compensate (at point B). Similar problems
affect Marks' conclusion that strict liability does not "exclusively" price behavior.
See id. That conclusion appears to entail the implicit assumption that what defines
strict liability is the negation of the discontinuity in compensation as a function of
precaution, whereas it would be more accurate to say that strict liability is defined by
a duty to compensate without the violation of a fault-based prohibition.
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This suggests a more general point. I have deliberately referred to an assumption of "law-abiding" conduct rather than
one of "moral" conduct. Yet many non-legal social norms would
provide all the guidance that is needed for law-abiding citizens
who are also reasonably moral persons. Moral norms prohibit
murder, for example, and most people do not need to be guided
on that subject by legal rules. Consequently, legal guidance
rules concerning murder are, for the most part, unnecessary until one takes account of those who are significantly recalcitrant.
But this is true only because guidance rules exist in a different
form. Moreover, to reiterate a point made earlier, there can be
legitimate differences of opinion about the morality of killing in
special circumstances, such as euthanasia and abortion. Such
problems often call for legal guidance because of the authority
that derives from deliberative resolution and the need for a
clear, or at 1east um"form, answer. 224

224 Omitted from the text is a consideration of breach of contract and the difficult
issue of whether damages for breach are a price-the "efficient breach" theory, see
Holmes, supra note 71, at 462 ("The duty to keep a contract at common Jaw means a
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else.")-or
a sanction. This can be rephrased as asking whether the breach of a contractual
promise is socially approved when the breaching party is prepared to compensate the
other party for the Joss. Compare Cooter, supra note 103, at 1544-47 (contending
that, because expectation damages vary with the extent of the harm, and not with the
state of mind of the breaching party, damages for breach of contract are a price), with
Finnis, supra note 64, at 320-25 (criticizing the Holmesian version of contractual
obligation and asserting that the common good requires performance of contracts).
Daniel Friedmann makes a powerful case against the efficient breach theory, emphasizing the presumptive authority of the contracting parties to choose whether to
permit efficient breach and the Jack of convincing evidence or argument showing that
permitting compensated breaches is more efficient than not permitting them. See
Friedmann, supra note 31. He does not, however, specifically address the issue of a
default rule, a rule determining the permissibility of compensated breach in the absence
of evidence of the parties' intentions on the question. Perhaps he assumes that the
parties' hypothetical intentions would be to prohibit even efficient breach, given the
moral force of promise-keeping and the need to plan one's activities. The popularity
of the efficient breach theory attests to the proposition that Friedmann's case for the
inefficiency of permitting compensated breach is not entirely irresistible. In any
event, the issue of a default rule warrants a clear and authoritative resolution upon
which contracting parties can rely. Friedmann's description of the current state of the
law suggests a default rule against intentional compensated breach. See id. at 18-23.
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B. Enforcement Rules in a World of Imperfect Recalcitrance
Obviously, innocent mistakes are not the only problems a society encounters in the real world. Consideration of recalcitrants
leads to a number of predictably necessary enforcement measures.
In light of the importance attributed to such remedial structures
in the post-C&M literature, I develop in this Section a somewhat more explicit account of the content of enforcement measures than I did of the guidance rules they are there to support.
C&M's treatment emphasized criminal sanctions as the means
225
of supporting the property rule/liability rule framework.
As
we have seen, their analysis of damages, injunctions, and other
civil remedies is torn between the problem of defining entitlements and the problem of enforcing them. Confusion continues
226
to flow from the former emphasis and the latter tension. So it
is important to reemphasize that any particular form of enforcement-whether it be a criminal sanction, a civil punitive sanction, a civil compensatory sanction, or only social stigmatization-might in principle be brought to bear to protect any one
of the three rule types that C&M explicitly discuss, as well as
other types they did not address.
Before turning to the draconian level of criminal sanctions, it
is both just and prudent to consider what can be accomplished
by the use of civil remedies. Justice requires this because a society committed to individual freedom, however that idea is expressed, must have a powerful justification for the imposition of
such burdens on individual interests as those that result from

"'See C&M, supra note 4, at 1124-27.
226 Note, for example, the implicit identification of property rules with the criminal
sanction and liability rules with compensatory sanctions in the use by Professors
Murphy and Coleman of the C&M framework:
The criminal law [in contrast to "other branches of the law"] functions to
prohibit and thus to go beyond requirements of mere negotiation and liability.
(If you willfully injure me, you may have to pay me compensation, but you are
also very likely to suffer criminal punishment for what you have done to me.)
Murphy & Coleman, supra note 27, at 112. In other words, we are told that civil law
rules do not "prohibit" violations of property or inalienability rules; they provide only
for compensation under liability rules. For these authors' further views on civil versus
criminal awards, see id. at 143-61.
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the application of the criminal sanction. 227 Prudence requires it
as well, in view of the enormous public costs associated with the
prosecution of crime and the execution of criminal sentences. 228
Moderate recalcitrance might be controlled by less serious sanctions than those corporal punishments, including incarceration,
associated with the criminal law. Several categories of issues
readily come to mind.
First, a recalcitrant might not respect property rules. To be
effective such rules require some sort of enforcement, perhaps
by a rule requiring compensation for violating the property entitlement. Second, recalcitrants might not accept inalienability
rules, so there will be a similar need to provide for compensation to someone whose inalienable entitlement has been violated, as C&M explicitly recognized. 229 Third, a recalcitrant
might refuse to honor a duty to compensate under a liability
rule that he has invoked by an unconsented taking. In each such
case, further efforts to enforce the payment of compensation
might take a non-punitive form such as empowering a court or
other agency to seize assets of the recalcitrant in order to pay off
the debt. 230
m See id. at 109 (arguing that measures Jess intrusive than criminal punishment
should be considered in the interest of protecting individual liberty and avoiding the
harshness of criminal sanctions).
228
The direct financial costs of incarceration and the judicial costs that result from
understandable efforts to resist incarceration are obviously enormous. For a recent
contribution addressing some of the Jess obvious negative implications of incarceration, see Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in
the Age of Prisons, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 497 (1994).
229
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
230
Obviously, such power is a significant part of our legal system. For an overview,
see David G. Epstein, Bankruptcy and Other Debtor-Creditor Laws in a Nutshell
(5th ed. 1995). In the case of liability rules, there are often special mechanisms for
securing payment of the price for exercise of the taker's option. See, e.g., Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970) (enjoining polluting activity
until payment of permanent damages). If title or possession has passed before default
in payments, the most likely result is the court-ordered return of title or possession if
such restitution is possible. See, e.g., Sackman & Van Brunt, supra note 29, § 8.10[1]
(summarizing cases holding that land taken by eminent domain must be returned if
the awarded compensation is not paid).
Professors Coleman and Kraus seem to believe that such problems present an
unavoidable need for recourse to the criminal law "or some institutional arrangement
very much like it." Coleman & Kraus, supra note 8, at 1366. They reason that criminal or quasi-criminal sanctions would be necessary to enforce judgments that pre-
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Of course, there will be cases in which the harm done to individuals by the failure of the recalcitrant to pay in accordance
with such obligations is too small to justify the expenditure of
the victims' resources in litigation, and this is true even if litigation expenses are potentially recoverable by the successful litigant. If corrective justice is to be achieved, such problems will
need to be solved by resorting to some sort of public enforcement or a class action device, whether privately or publicly initiated. In the latter case, for particularly diffuse and widespread
harm, the state might act as proxy in the collection of compensatory damages. Some civil fines imposed under current law
231
might be explained and justified in this manner. 'Nhether such
public enforcement is necessary depends upon the litigative
economies of scale available to the state and whether such
economies can be achieved in the private sphere. It might be, of
course, that private institutions will emerge to fill the void if the
state does not act. But do we have confidence in that possibility? If we do not, is our lack of confidence warranted? For example, before its large-scale use, would we have had confidence
in the emergence of the contingent fee as a means of financing
232
lawsuits by relatively poor plaintiffs suffering significant harm?
scribe the payment of debts or damages. See id. (Although presented as a hypothetical interpretation of an argument that the criminal law backs transaction
structures, the authors clarify in a footnote that they endorse that form of the
argument. See id. at 1367 n.35.) But as indicated in the text, in many cases it may not
be necessary or even desirable to invoke the criminal sanction in such contexts.
Property can be seized and sold without doing so, and in fact this is the usual practice.
(Physical resistance by the debtor, a rare phenomenon, might invoke the criminal
law, but because of the resistance to lawful authority rather than the failure to pay
the debt itself.) Only if there is available property from which to satisfy the judgment
but which is not readily accessible without the debtor's cooperation does debt
enforcement against the recalcitrant potentially drive one to something "very much
like" the criminal Jaw, namely "civil contempt" incarceration. See, e.g., Hicks ex rei.
Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (addressing the use of incarceration for contempt of court in ignoring court orders to pay available money in discharge of child
support duty). Nonetheless, this qualification only strengthens the ultimate point
Coleman and Kraus were making, that the criminal law's relation to transaction structures is more indirect than some law and economics practitioners have assumed.
m But see Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later, 76
B.U. L. Rev. 1, 7-10 (1996) (lamenting the tendency of public enforcement to expand
from civil fines that might be explainable in this fashion to criminal fines and
imprisonment).
232 On contingent fees, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 21.9, at
567-74 (4th ed. 1992).
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Such a civil compensatory enforcement scheme, even if augmented by publicly initiated enforcement when needed, will
likely be insufficient in two important ways. 233 First, as C&M argued, a stronger response is necessary in order to prevent recalcitrants from converting property rules and inalienability rules
into de facto liability rules, that is, rules that function like liability rules except that the involuntary taking is not socially condoned.234 These further measures will be necessary to offset the
uncertainty of enforcement of the compensatory remedies, 235 to
avoid undermining incentives for investment under property entitlements,236 and to reassert the wrongfulness of the recalcitrant's cost-benefit analysis itself. 237

233 A third inadequacy that may be noted is that on rare occasions both the harm
and the perpetrator can be predicted with reasonable certainty, in which case preventive relief is feasible and desirable, in the form of an injunction backed by the
potential of coercive measures, or even preventive detention. See generally Stephen
J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 113
(1996).
234 See C&M, supra note 4, at 1124-27 (noting also that the circumvention of
established property rules will hamper the effectiveness of the market in achieving
static Pareto efficiency); see also Murphy & Coleman, supra note 27, at 114-16
(describing the public interest in suppressing conduct that undermines the prescriptive rule structure, a kind of revolutionary activity). The prevention of injuries
that are not plausibly compensable, such as loss of life or limb, is often suggested as a
reason to impose a regime of deterrence. See id. at 112-13 (developing a similar suggestion by the philosopher Robert Nozick). But as the problem of automobile accidents illustrates, this reasoning by itself does not explain our existing institutions,
which frequently and rightly provide only compensatory remedies for such injuries.
m See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968) (applying economic analysis to suggest an "optimal level" of
enforcement); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between
the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 Am. Econ. Rev. 880 (1979) (same). One
must, of course, adjust for the Holmesian assumptions that appear in such articles.
236
See David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary
Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1990)
(arguing that extraordinary remedies such as punitive damages are needed to prevent
opportunistic takings that capture the potential gains from trade and thereby discourage investment by the initial entitlement holders). This otherwise illuminating
article is a good example of the continuing legacy of conceptual confusion about rule
typology. The problem mentioned in the text, that resort only to compensatory protection of property rules can undermine incentives, is described by these authors as a
problem that "liability rules may be strategically abused." I d. at 13. But what they
should have referred to is the strategic abuse of property rules enforced only by
compensatory remedies. This can be seen most easily by noting that, if entitlements
are correctly allocated as between property and liability rules, then it is difficult to
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Second, there is the distinct problem of recalcitrants who238 try
to convert inalienability rules into de facto property rules. If
the directly affected persons actually agree to the sale of a
nominally inalienable entitlement there may be particularly difficult problems associated with detection, since mutual consent
makes the existence of a complaining party unlikely. Thus,
publicly initiated punishment may be necessary for "victimless"
crimes, crimes for which a victim, if there is one, is unlikely to
complain by way of a civil suit because she is a willing party to
the transfer, or for illegal alienations in which the numerous victims are each too minimally affected to warrant expenditures
necessary for litigation.239 Such publicly initiated punishment is,
40
in general, criminal punishmene
make sense of the idea of a liability rule being "abused" by the taker's paying only
compensation: That is exactly what the law contemplates, for whatever good reasons
that may be. Abuse of liability rules must be attributed not so much to strategic
opportunism by takers, but rather to the law's error in allocating the entitlement to a
liability rule structure rather than a property rule structure. Of course, Haddock et
al. were precluded from articulating the matter in the way suggested here because,
like most people working in law and economics, they were unable to distinguish a
property rule that is enforced by a compensatory remedy from a liability rule however enforced.
237 See generally Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean
Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 111 (1988). Although deterrence and retribution
are often viewed as incompatible ideas, the one forward-looking and the other
backward-looking, Hampton rightly emphasizes their compatibility. See id. at 138,
143; see also B. Sharon Byrd, Kant's Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in Its Threat,
Retribution in Its Execution, 8 Law & Phil. 151 (1989) (arguing that the usual
emphasis on retribution in Kant's theory of punishment neglects the deterrent
element of the threat of punishment also evident in Kant's theory).
DB See Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in Criminal Justice:
Nomos XXVII 289,302-03 (1. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985).
m Indeed, the Jaw would also have to decide which party to a consensual transaction is the "victim." The law could achieve some deterrence by picking one or the
other party to the transaction, the identity of whom might or might not be known in
advance of the transaction, and endowing that person with civil remedies. But in
many cases the profit to be derived from the suit would not be worth the consequential losses to the "victim" in foregone future transactions.
'""To be sure, under existing law there are proceedings that are publicly initiated
and entail the imposition of punitive sanctions but that are not considered criminal,
perhaps because only monetary sanctions are available. These aberrations, created
in part to avoid constitutional restrictions on criminal prosecution, are criminal proceedings by any reasonable conception, and should be examined in that light. See,
e.g., Carole B. Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A Critical Assessment of the Insider
Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 Duke L.J. 960 (arguing that the nature and
severity of sanctions under the Act render it quasi-criminal).
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The same is not necessarily true of the first class of cases, unconsented takings, since there will generally be an aggrieved
party who would be willing to take legal action. In other words,
itis important to assess to what extent arguments presented for
sanctions that are more severe than compensation lead to the
need for punishment simpliciter and to what extent they support
specifically criminal punishment, meaning public prosecution. 241
One can put the question this way: Given the institutions of punitive and restitutionary civil awards, why have criminal punishment at all, other than to suppress consensual transfers of
nominally inalienable rights? As presently constituted the critical characteristic of criminal punishment, aside· from the fact
that prosecution is done by the state at public expense, is that
certain kinds of penalties, mainly incarceration or death, are
available only in such a context. Given this feature, there are
several things to say about the necessity of criminal punishment.
Civil remedies, at least as presently configured, give a cause of
action only to a plaintiff who has been injured, whereas one
might well want to be able to punish some outrageous actions
that only expose people to unacceptable risks of injury. This is a
problem for the civil law, though it may not be insuperable.
That is, the civil law could be configured to allow punitive damages without proof of actual injury. 242 Although it would require
greater institutional changes, tort law could also be restructured
to allow compensatory damages for risk exposure, whether or
not predicated on injury to all compensated persons. 243
241
C&M barely mention the subject of punitive civil awards. See C&M, supra note
4, at 1126 n.71.
242
There has long been controversy in the courts over whether a punitive award
must bear some relationship, some proportionality, to the injury suffered. See
Keeton et al., supra note 30, § 2, at 14-15. In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has
endorsed the idea that potential as well as actual damages may constitutionally be
considered in determining appr.opriate punitive awards. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598-1602 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources
Corp., 509 U.S. 443,460 (1993).
243
Interestingly, Professor (now Judge) Calabresi was one of the first to explore
such possibilities. See Calabresi, supra note 53, at 306. For a recent exchange on the
subject, see Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 439 (1990); Simons, supra note 57 (commenting on
Schroeder); Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and
Tort Law, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 143 (1990).
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Then, too, there will be some plaintiffs who, although seriously harmed, do not pursue a civil remedy, such as persons who
are killed or incapacitated by a recalcitrant or children (or other
family members) who suffer from abuse but are unabie or unwilling to sue or for whom the recovery of money would be of
little practical significance. These problems may be solvable:
Estates may sue by way of a guardian ad litem, which could be
the state itself as a last resort; children can also be so represented. But the more important relief in the family context
would be prospective, that is injunctive, and then the problem of
the ignored injunction must be anticipated. And if the injured
persons are unwilling to take action, it might be necessary for
the public to do so. Once again, criminal penalties will be necessary at some point.244
However, the problem that many tend to identify most readily
(if my students are at all indicative) is that monetary awards, no
matter hmllf high, -vviH not adequately deter certain conduct.
This is true in some situations, but one must sort it out carefully.
First, one must segregate examples where even the harshest
criminal punishment would not deter, such as where the actor
does not even take into account the punitive consequences of
her action. Such cases may still call for punishment on retributivist grounds, but it is unclear whether that necessarily means
criminal punishment. Perhaps in some cases retribution requires
something like "an eye for an eye," so that only the impairments
245
of life and liberty possible under criminal law will suffice.
One can also point to the very rich person, for whom paying
punitive damages might seem to be just a "cost of doing evil
business" even if she does attend to the consequences of her
getting caught. This example also seems misdirected, but for a
244 Exactly at what point criminal law has a valuable role here is controversial, and
alternative remedies-such as terminating the parental rights of an abusing parentmight be superior in many cases. See Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic
Relations in the United States§ 9.4, at 358-60 (2d ed. 1988).
245 This is closely related to the idea that punishment involves an "expressive
dimension" that cannot be duplicated by monetary penalties. Even here, however, it
is not clear that incarceration is the only way to achieve such public expression of
condemnation. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996) (arguing that shaming punishments can express society's disapproval of crimes).
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different reason: It underestimates the extent to which rich people value their wealth. 246 To say that rich people will not be deterred by punitive damages-in some way that criminal punishment would deter them-is really to say that our judges and
juries will fail to set the punitive award high enough. Why
should we assume this to be true? Maybe there are some acts
that would be appropriately deterred by the threat of incarceration but would not be so deterred by the threat of taking all or
nearly all of a rich person's present (or future) wealth, but it
seems unlikely. 247 A potentially more serious problem, one that
could necessitate criminal sanctions operating on the person of
the wrongdoer, is that a monetary sanction will be ineffective to
the extent that the wrongdoer can immunize her wealth and income against prevailing methods of debt collection. 248
For the time being, however, the more serious version of this
argument concerns those at the other extreme of our society:
Monetary penalties will not deter someone who has no wealth
to lose, especially if he suspects that he will never have much
wealth or that his wealth, either transient or illegally obtained,
will never be seized. This is a serious problem with civil punitive
damages and suggests that one of the most important reasons
for the institution of criminal law is to control willful wrongdoing by the poor. 249 Of course, there may also be offenses that are
246
Indeed, punitive civil remedies may well be essential for disciplining economically
powerful entities that are largely immune from significant criminal punishment. See
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1440-45 (1993).
147 Cf. Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 409 (1980) (arguing that, in the context of white-collar crime, large
fines provide deterrence as effective as that provided by imprisonment). At one
point, however, Posner concedes without explanation that "some ... crimes, such as
murder, are so serious that even the affluent cannot PCIY adequate fines." ld. at 417.
248
Under the current regime, some scholars believe that this is a seriuus and
increasing problem as to unsecured judgment debts such as those that result from tort
recoveries. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale LJ. 1 (1996).
24
' See Epstein, supra note 231, at 15 {"Although a person might have 'plenty of
nothing,' he always fears losing at least two assets: his liberty and his life. Take these
away and deterrence against aggression can proceed apace even if compensation is
utterly unavailable to the injured party."); Galanter & Luban, supra note 246, at 1426
("Increasing reliance on civil punishment therefore fosters a two-tier system with
organizations, the affluent, and those with modest but stable economic positions
controlled by civil remedies, while the economically marginal are controlled by the
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so heinous that, even if committed by a rich person, warrant
punishment more severe than monetary penalties, regardless of
deterrence. Moreover, if we use the criminal sanction against
the poor recalcitrant, some will believe that it must be extended
to the rich out of a notion of equal treatment, even if it is not
needed for adequate deterrence or the exaction of appropriate
retribution. 250
Despite these various arguments for the use of punitive sanctions of some sort and of civil or criminal punishment in particular contexts, a scheme of compensatory civil enforcement
should be optimal for an enormous number of situations. In
particular, our working theoretical contrast between the lawabiding citizen and the recalcitrant will not accurately describe
the majority of real persons. The ordinary person will be largely
law-abiding, subject to temptations to disobey the law's direc~
tives when strong personal interests are at stake. Even after a
knowing or negligent violation of some prescriptive entitlement,
the ordinary citizen may be brought back to the fold at the re-

criminal process."); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law,
85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193, 1204-05 (1985) ("[T]he criminal law is designed primarily for
the nonaffluent; the affluent are kept in line, for the most part, by tort law."). Of
course, the problem of the judgment-proof perpetrator explains the recourse to nonmonetary punishments; it does not explain why the action to impose those punishments should be prosecuted by the state. To the extent that the practice is justifiable,
it must be because of the government's economies of scale in the detection and
prosecution of serious wrongdoing and the inability or unwillingness of victims to
finance prosecutions that do not hold out any prospect of monetary return out of
which to pay even their litigation expenses.
250 These last two arguments, especially the equal treatment argument, seem rather
weak, but a full consideration of the issue would unduly extend this Article. For
some helpful thoughts on the equal treatment issue, see Posner, supra note 247, at
414-15. Professors Robinson and Darley have recently argued that the moral force of
the criminal law depends upon the public perception that the severity of criminal
punishments is in accordance with the community's perceptions of just desert. See
Robinson & Darley, supra note 46 at 477-88. From this one might construct an
argument that criminal punishment of rich malefactors is necessary to preserve public
confidence, perhaps because civil punishment is not as visible to the public as
criminal punishment or because the public does not appreciate the deterrent force of
punitive civil awards. Compare id. at 480 (arguing that the law "cannot have moral
credibility outside of a system with a clear criminal-civil distinction"), with id. at 491
(noting that "non-incarcerative [crimina!] sentences frequently can be used to inflict
the punishment deserved, even for many non-minor offenses").
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medial stage of a dispute. 251 And in situations where the legal
standard that separates prohibited from permissible conduct is
unavoidably vague, as in the case of negligence law, concern for
the difficulties in accurately knowing and applying the standard
to particular acts argues in favor of the modesty of compensatory responses. 252 Thus, it is plausible to believe that civil enforcement, indeed purely compensatory remedies, will be enough in a
great many situations.
Obviously, these are only the barest bones of a theory of enforcement rules. Much of the preceding simply reworks ideas
developed by others without any systematic attention to the
guidance/enforcement dichotomy. Yet even at this level, several
things should be clear. The present analysis benefits from a richer
set of assumptions about citizen response to authoritative norms
than one generally encounters in the literature spawned by
C&M's article. This helps to explain features of our existing law,
such as the often perplexing mixture of civil and criminal sanction schemes.253 And it provides a useful framework from which

251 This claim is at least not inconsistent with the moderate deterrent effects that tort
Jaw seems to provide. See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort
Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 377 (1994) (reviewing evidence and suggesting that tort Jaw has a moderate deterrent effect).
252 Cf. Marks, supra note 205, at 239 (suggesting the reduction of errors by limiting
penalties "to continuous (categorical) prohibitions or to the extreme range of discontinuous prohibitions").
253 It also helps open these schemes to criticism.
For example, it is one thing to
establish in what respect punishment, or criminal punishment in particular, is a
necessary adjunct of compensatory schemes. It is another to craft the institutional
relationship between the two or more systems in a coherent way. For example, one
should question the rationalizations of the multiple punishment that results from the
simultaneous availability of civil and criminal forms of punishment. See, e.g., Tuttle
v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1358-60 (Me. 1985) (articulating various rationales for
the use of punitive damage awards even in cases where a criminal punishment can be
imposed for the same act). The only sound basis for such multiple punishment is that
the criminal court was unable to impose a harsher penalty than the one it did, where
that inability is not attributable to the authoritative policy of proper lawmaking or
law-applying authorities. (Such an inability might be reflected in the criminal court's
imposing the maximum penalty under a statute that did not contemplate the kind of
offense, or the kind ofoffender, involved in the particular case.) Cf. Galanter & Luban,
supra note 246, at 1443 (commenting on the low level of criminal fines imposed on
corporate offenders without addressing whether this is a function of unintended
imperfections in the system or of explicit moral judgments by the judges and juries in
such cases).
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to consider the claim, made by others, that the criminal sanction
is overused, at least in its current form. 254
Most importantly, however, the present analysis gives greater
definition to the distinguishable problems of formulating guidance rules on the one hand, and formulating enforcement rules
on the other. This analytical precision allows one to focus on the
possibility that the former problems-detefTI1ining the appropriate guidance rules-pose important issues of distributive and
commutative justice, while the latter-formulating enforcement
rules-arise entirely in the domain of corrective justice.255 In particular, the problems of specifying the existence and content of liability rules, as technically defined here, fall in the former category; the problems of choosing between compensation and other
remedies fall in the latter. Conventional economic analysis of law
has great difficulty even contemplating this difference.
This in turn helps to explain another feature of the relationship between substantive and remedial law that is obscured
when the two are collapsed. Entitlements tend to be structured
as rules, what I have called guidance rules, much more so than
the remedies that are used to protect them. That is, substantive
legal norms tend to be wore rule-like and prospective in operation, providing more information to the potential nonofficial actors, whereas remedial norms tend to be more retrospective in
operation, allowing the judge to tailor a response after the fact
256
to suit the situation, pursuant to looser standards of application.
2" See generally Charles F. Abel & Frank H. Marsh, Punishment and Restitution: A
Restitutionary Approach to Crime and the Criminal (1984) (arguing that a restitutionary model of criminal law would better serve the combined goals of deterrence,
retribution, and rehabilitation); Randy E. Barnett, The Justice of Restitution, 25 Am.
J. Juris. 117 (1980) (arguing that a rights-based theory of justice is incompatible with
retribution- and deterrence-based theories of punishment); Herbert L. Packer, Two
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 66-68 (1964) (arguing that a
solution to the rising costs of providing due process is narrowing the scope of actions
subject to criminal sanction). See also Lois G. Forer, A Rage to Punish: The Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Sentencing (1994) (arguing that imprisonment
should be the least favored response to crime); Robert Sommer, The End of Imprisonment (1976) (advocating the end of long-term imprisonment).
255 The notion of "commutative justice" is intended to capture elements of justice in
interactions between people that are not appropriately called "corrective" but also
do not involve any "distributive" dimension. See Finnis, supra note 64, at 177-84.
256 See Emily Sherwin, Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies, 106 Yale L.J.
2083, 2084-89 (1997).
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Of course, from the perspective I have articulated, it is entirely
understandable that things would be structured this way. The
key role of guiding nonofficial conduct is supposed to be provided by what I have called guidance rules. If the substantive
and remedial norms are reasonably well constructed, only recalcitrants will look to the remedy in deciding how to act, and the
law might not want to provide very precise information to assist
them in this regard. Because of risk aversion, the very uncertainty of the remedy that will be applied will often serve to discourage a cost-benefit calculation about whether to violate
someone's entitlement. In an extreme case, the government
might be satisfied with people's knowing virtually nothing about
remedial law, although this is not without its difficulties.257
This does not mean that efficiency concerns have no place at
the enforcement level. Certainly the creation of incentives for
efficient or inefficient behavior is one factor to be considered in
choosing among remedial options, if only as a tie-breaker between options that are equally just. There is also the inevitable
question of how much direct and indirect cost is worth incurring
in our efforts to enforce guidance rules. But this obviously is
not only a question of efficiency, because economic cost is
weighed against more intangible social goals reflected in the
guidance rules, goals that can be reduced to monetary terms or
even to collective preference satisfaction terms only in a tautological but obfuscating decision-theoretic sense. At the same
time, considerations of distributive justice are pushed into the
background, applying only to such decisions as whether to adopt
a particular scheme of privately financed civil enforcement or to
adopt a publicly financed scheme of criminal enforcement. Indeed, the principal relevance of both efficiency and distributive
justice is that the scheme of enforcement rules is designed in
part to protect the collection of efficiency goals and judgments
of distributive justice that have been adopted by the polity in its
guidance rules. 258
257
See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984) (suggesting that such "selective transmission" might prevent some crimes).
258
This does not mean that enforcement practices are justified entirely by the need
to effectuate the particular judgments and choices about efficiency and distribution
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CONCLUSION

As a set of guidance rules, we might call C&M's scheme an n
dimensional view of the cathedral.259 Additional dimensions can
be constructed by taking account of the extent of recalcitrance
among the parties to the entitlement structure. An assumption
of significant recalcitrance gives rise to the need for remedial
rules that are unnecessary in the n-space of a law-abiding citizenry. These rules can be articulated as adding a set of m variables, corresponding to the number of possible remedies that
can be employed, either singly or in combination. This n+m dimensionality gives us not only a different picture but a richer
picture than the one C&M provided. We can, if we wish, make
the Holrnesian assumption about the citizenry, thus projecting
onto an m-space in which only the coercive remedies matter.
For limited purposes this may be useful, provided it is done in a
consistent manner. But generally more valuable is the projection onto n-space made possible by assuming a law-abiding citizenry. By comparing these two views, we obtain valuable information about the important roles of guidance and enforcement rules in the real world.
But C&M's pervasive assumption of a "flat" Holmesian world
blinds them to the difference between guidance and enforcement. Although their analysis is more coherent when understood as a rudimentary framework of guidance rules, it is nonetheless motivated in the language of enforcement rules and a
concern for recalcitrance that is assumed to be ubiquitous. The
resulting ambivalence is associated with several related mistakes.
First, there is a tendency to exaggerate the significance of both
efficiency and distributional goals in what should be seen as the
that are made; in part they protect the very authority and capacity to make such
institutional judgments and choices. This is one reason that an act of a kind that
threatens the system of public judgments and choices cannot always be defended on
the ground that, on the particular facts, the act happens to facilitate the effectuation
of such judgments and choices. Compare James W. Nickel, Justice in Compensation,
18 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 379 (1976) (arguing that corrective action such as a compensation award is just only to the extent that it protects a just distribution), with Peter
Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77
Iowa L. Rev. 515 (1992) (arguing that corrective justice can be validated without
reference to distributive justice).
15 ' With regard to the numerical value of n, see supra note 211.
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context of corrective justice, a tendency that reflects the broader,
justice-agnostic components of the pragmatic instrumentalism
favored by many law and economics adherents. This tendency
leads in turn to exaggerated empirical claims about the prevalence of rules allowing the violation of otherwise valid entitlements for the sake of efficiency or other consequentialist social
goals. Closely related is a tendency to exaggerate the importance
of the criminal sanction and other supracompensatory remedies
in enforcing what are dimly understood as guidance rules.
These tendencies, which some law and economics practitioners
have struggled to correct, can be largely attributed to the
Holmesian view. That view allows one to conflate monetary
sanctions, especially compensatory civil remedies, with "prices,"
thus obscuring the system's capacity to control violations of en-·
titlements by the use of such lesser legal sanctions directed toward relatively law-abiding citizens. 260
More generally, to adopt the Holmesian view of the citizenry
undermines the factual foundation of all theories. of justice in
law that depend on notions of individual autonomy and responsibility and even those that depend only on the notion of respect
for the individual. After all, how can one maintain any such
theory when the subjects are assumed to be Holmesian bad
men? Such a vision of law in society undermines the legitimacy
of the law by assuming away the citizens' general duty of obedience and their recognition thereoC 6 ' Indeed, to view the nonof-

260
To be sure, for C&M this may have been an unintended consequence of an argument that otherwise served an important function at the time:
It is not widely realized that Guido Calabresi's pathbreaking paper with A.
Douglas Melamed on the distinction between property rights and liability rules
was written in reaction to [Gary) Becker's article [on the economics of crime).
The article had seemed to imply that if the probability of apprehension and
conviction for theft was one, the optimal fine for theft would be simply the
value of the good taken. But then people would be indifferent between stealing and buying the things they want. The point of property rights, as Calabresi
and Melamed explained, is to compel voluntary transacting where transaction
costs are low.
Richard A. Posner, Gary Becker's Contributions to Law and Economics, 22 J. Legal
Stud. 211, 211-12 (1993) (footnote omitted) (referring to Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968)).
261
See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 166 (2d
ed. 1995) (arguing that systemic legitimacy "requires that the people generally recog-
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ficial citizenry consistently in the legal realist way is conducive
to a condescension, latent in ideas of "social engineering," that
sees citizens only as pawns to be manipulated in the service of
some good defined by a distinct officialdom, with the able assistance of its lawyers and academic advisors. If this is not the picture of society and public policymaking that one endorses, then
one should use the Calabresi and lV1elamed framework only after significant adjustment.
To paraphrase a famous judicial opinion, "Five generations of
bad man theorists are enough." 262 Put simply, the time has come
to relegate the ubiquitous recalcitrance assumption to those
specific contexts in which it has demonstrated plausibility and
usefulness. 263 As a general framework for the analysis of ordinary legal entitlements, not only is it unrealistic but it is highly
counterproductive. Hs rejection allows us to articulate a more
sophisticated, more realistic, and, yes, more honorable analysis
of legal entitlements.

nize an obligation to abide by the law, because it is the law"); Dworkin, supra note
35, at 190-92 ("A state may have good grounds in some special circumstances for
coercing those who have no duty to obey. But no general policy of upholding the law
with steel could be justified if the law were not, in general, a source of genuine
obligations.").
'"'See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
263 To be sure, such contexts are not necessarily limited to the problems of dealing
with hardened criminals. Analysis based on a Holmesian assumption might be necessary, for example, in a context where lawyers in a position to make crucial decisions
have been trained to think like the bad man. See, e.g., Lynn !VI. LoPucki, Legal
Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1498,
1545-49 (1996) (recommending bad man strategic analysis in contexts like bankruptcy
law).

1997]

Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules

933

APPENDIX

The purpose of this Appendix is to indicate the additional complexity of efficiency comparisons of property and liability rules when
these rule types are understood in the purely prescriptive manner.
suggested in Part II of the body of this Article or even in the pragmatic ways suggested in Section IV.B. It considers only the situation
in which transfer transaction costs attending a consensual trade (TC)
are high enough to preclude any possible consensual trade, and the
loss assessment costs attending a public determination under a liability
rule (AC) are low enough that they would not offset any social gain
that would result from a transfer of the entitlement. In such situations, the standard modern result in law and economics is that liability
rules are more efficient than property rules. 264 This result is shown to
entail further assumptions that are necessarily distinct from the definitions of property and liability rules. In what follows, the entitlement E is· assumed to reside initially in person A. Proposition 1 considers cases in which the value of the entitlement E to A-V(A)-is
more than the value of that entitlement if it were instead granted to
B-V(B). Proposition 2 addresses cases manifesting the opposite relationship, V(A) < V(B). Proposition 3 generalizes to cover both possibilities. The concept of efficiency employed can be either wealth
maximization or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency relative to subjective utilities; the choice does not affect the results given. 265 For simplicity, in
264 See Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 453-57 (criticizing the common assumption
that loss assessment costs are negligible and asserting that they are commonly as high
as transaction costs). Actually, one might restate the standard result in terms of the
relative size of TC and AC; that is, one could assert that liability rules are more
efficient whenever TC > AC, even though TC is not so high as to preclude consensual
transfer. Cf. id. at 464 (arguing that property rules should be used whenever TC <A C).
However, even C&M apparently rejected this, at least as a general conclusion,
because they believed that allowing the market to effectuate transfers where possible
would avoid errors in the estimation of the value of the entitlement to its initial
holder. See C&M, supra note 4, at 1124-27. Of course, in recent years other strands
of economic analysis have emerged claiming wider usefulness of liability rules or,
conversely, wider usefulness of property rules. See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note
26, at 1036-72 (asserting that certain liability rules and other forms of divided ownership can lead to more efficient bargaining even when transaction costs are low);
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 27, at 765-68 (asserting that property rules are superior
for "possessory" entitlements even if transaction costs are high). These subtleties,
which are affected by the conceptual confusions discussed in the text of this Article,
can be ignored for purposes of this Appendix.
265
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the concept employed by C&M in their analysis:
Economic efficiency asks that we choose the set of entitlements which would
lead to that allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense
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all cases sanctions are assumed to be costlessly enforced. Even more
complicated results would obtain if enforcement costs were introduced.

Proposition 1: V(A) > V(B). That is, A is the more efficient user of
E. Property rules can be more efficient than liability rules even in
contexts of high consensual transaction costs and low loss assessment
costs.
Assumptions: A is assigned the initial possessory use of entitlement E. V(A) is 200; V(B) is 100. TC is 150; AC is 0. B is
perfectly recalcitrant, a Holmesian bad man, capable of taking
E without costs other than those specified herein. Whether A
is perfectly recalcitrant, perfectly law-abiding, or anywhere in
between does not affect the result. H is, however, assumed
that A has no desire to suffer a loss on a transaction. Sanctions are enforced with certainty (or, alternatively, the figures
stated for sanctions can be taken to be discounted for the
probability that B will be detected and the sanction will be
i_mposed).
Rule L: A and B may transfer by agreement. B is permitted to
take without A's consent, in which case B should compensate
A for his loss. If B takes but does not compensate A, the
(only) sanction is that B will be fined 50 (payable either to A
or the state ). 266
Result: If Rule L is in place, B will take and not pay
compensation (a net gain of 100- 50= 50). Taking
with voluntary payment of compensation would net a
loss, since 100 - 200 = -100; purchasing E will net no
more than 100- 350 = -250, unless A does not demand
full compensation or severely underestimates the dis267
counted value of her future income stream.

that a further change would not so improve the condition of those who gained
by it that they could compensate those who lost from it and still be better off
than before.
C&M, supra note 4, at 1093-94. See Morris, supra note 15, at 848 n.62 (explaining
C&M's mistake in calling this "Pareto optimality").
"'Thus, Lis a liability rule by either prescriptive or pragmatic conceptions.
201
A would obviously benefit from being able to bribe B into not taking, but there
is no assumption warranting a belief that such a bribe would be successful; B might
simply take the bribe as well as the entitlement. Moreover, the ability to enter such
an agreement, assuming it vvere effectively enforceable, \Vou!d depend upon transaction costs; if TC for such an agreement were as high as for the sale of E itself, then
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Rule P: A and B may transfer by agreement. B is not permitted to take E without A's consent. If B takes E without A's
consent, B will be fined 150 (payable either to A or the
268
state).
Result: If Rule P is in place, B will neither purchase E (again, at a probable loss of at least 250) nor
take E without A's consent (with a net loss, since
269
100- 150 = -50).
Conclusion: Rule Pis efficient; Rule Lis not.
Corollary 1.1: If V(A) > V(B), then the claim that liability rules are
more efficient if transfer transaction costs are high and loss assessment costs are low holds for a perfectly recalcitrant B only if (1) the
disutility of the sanction imposed for violation of the duty to compensate under a liability rule is greater than the subjective valuation that
B would place upon E if B had the use of E; and (2) the subjective
valuation that B would place upon E if B had the use of E is greater
than the disutility of the sanction imposed for violation of the duty
(not to take) under the property rule.
Corollary 1.2: If one generalizes to consider a B who is not perfectly
recalcitrant, the necessary conditions indicated in Corollary 1.1 may
fail even though the monetary value of the sanction for violating the
liability rule is greater than the value of E in B's hands and the latter
is greater than the monetary value of the sanction for violating the
property rule. This is because the disutility associated with the violation of legal rules must then include not only the monetary value of
the sanction, but also some additional factor representing B's regret
in violating a legal rule as such. In such a case, condition (2) might fail.
Proposition 2: Suppose now that V(A) < V(B), that is, B is the more
efficient user of E. A property rule can be more efficient than a liability rule even though transaction costs are high enough to preclude
consensual trade, and even though assessment costs are not so high as

under the assumed TC = 150, there would be no net surplus of cooperation to be
divided.
268
Thus, Pis a property rule by either prescriptive or pragmatic conceptions.
269
Two points: (1) This result does not obtain if B is perfectly law-abiding. P and L
are equally efficient in that case. (As argued in the text, this is one way, perhaps the
best way, to construe the standard result that emerges from the law and economics
literature.) (2) Whether the result would be stable over time depends on the legal
relations between the parties after the taking, which are unspecified here.
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to offset the potential gains from a compensated taking under the liability rule.
Assumptions: A is assigned initial use of E. V(A) is 100; V(B)
is 200. TC is 150; AC is 50. B is perfectly recalcitrant. A's attitude toward the law's prescriptions is irrelevant, but he will
not willingly suffer a loss. Sanctions are enforced with certainty (or, alternatively, the figures stated for sanctions represent probabilistic discounting).
Rule L: A and B may transfer by agreement. B is permitted to
take without A's consent, in which case B should compensate
A for his loss. If B does not compensate A, the (only) sanction is that B will be fined 200 (payable either to A or the
state). 270
Result: If Rule L is in place, B will take and pay compensation (a net private gain of 200- 100 = 100, and a
net social gain of 100- 50= 50). Taking without voluntary payment of compensation would not be profitable, since 200 - 200 = 0; purchasing E would net a loss,
since 200- 250 =-50, unless A does not demand full
compensation or severely underestimates the discounted value of A's future income stream.
Rule P: A and B may transfer by agreement. B is not permitted to take E without A's consent. If B takes E without A's
consent, B will be fined 130 (payable either to A or the
state)
271
regardless of whether B compensates A after the fact.
Result: If Rule P is in place, B will not purchase E
(again, at a probable loss of at least 50). But B will
take E without A's consent, with a net gain of
200 - 130 = 70.

Conclusion: Rule P is more efficient than Rule L; the net 272
social gain under Pis 70, while the net social gain under Lis 50.
Corollary 2.1: If V(A) < V(B), then the claim that liability rules are
more efficient if transfer transaction costs are high and loss assess-

21 n

Again, Lis a liability rule by either prescriptive or pragmatic conceptions.

m Again, P is a property rule by either prescriptive or pragmatic conceptions.
271 Once again, the result does not obtain if B is assumed perfectly law-abiding. In
that case, only L would yield a transfer to the more efficient user, in accordance with
the standard claim in law and economics.

1997]

Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules

937

ment costs are low holds for a perfectly recalcitrant B only ifV(B) is
less than the disutility of the sanction imposed for violation of the
duty (not to take) under the property rule. Otherwise, under the
property rule, B would simply take E without A's consent, thereby effectuating the efficiency gain without incurring either TC or AC.

Corollary 2.2: If one generalizes to consider a B who is not perfectly
recalcitrant, the necessary condition indicated in Corollary 2.1 may be
satisfied even though the value of E in B's hands is greater than the
(probabilistically discounted) monetary value of the sanction for violating the property rule. This is because the disutility associated with
the violation of property rule must then include not only the monetary value of the sanction, but also some additional factor representing B's regret in violating a legal rule as such. In such a case, condition (2) might be satisfied.
Proposition 3: Unless the lawmaker can know which of V(A) and
V(B) is larger, it is necessary to take both potential conditions into
account. In such a situation of ignorance, there are numerous complexities. One can at least say, however, that a liability rule might be
more efficient than a property rule if (a) the liability rule is no less efficient when V(A) > V(B), and (b) the same liability rule is more efficient when V(A) < V(B). In order to satisfy both these conditions, it
must be true that:
(1) B's disutility associated with violating either the liability
rule or the property rule, including but not limited to the
probabilistically discounted material sanctions imposed, exceeds V(B), and
(2) When V(A) > V(B), then V(B) - V(A) > AC, i.e., there is
a net social gain from a compensated nonconsensual taking,
which, by hypothesis, will be greater than the net gain from a
consensual transfer because TC > AC. 273

273

Two points: (i) The reason for the qualified term "might" is that dynamic considerations, such as encouraging parties to find ways to reduce consensual transfer
transactions costs, might make property rules more efficient even if the indicated
conditions are met. See Krier & Schwab, supra note 26, at 462-64. (ii) The reason
Proposition 2 is stated in terms of sufficiency conditions (a) and (b) is that it is possible that the liability rule could be more efficient in contexts with V(A) < V(B) yet
less efficient in contexts with V(A) > V(B) and the gains from the former context
might exceed the losses from the latter (or vice versa).

